Relationships among various ontologies and accounts of modality by Christie, Andrew D
•I
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG VARIOUS ONTOLOGIES
AND ACCOUNTS OF MODALITY
by
ANDREW D. CHRISTIE. JR.
B.A. Princeton University
(1974)
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
April 1983
(§) Andrew D. Christie. Jr. 1983
The author hereby grants to M.l.T. peraission to reproduce and
to diatribute copies of this thesis docuaent in whole or in part.
Signature of the Author .
Department o£ Linguistics
and Philosophy
ADrtl 27. 1983
Cert1£ied by ) Ja.ea Hig91nbothaa
Thesis Supervisor
,Accepted by
George 80010.
Chair.an, Depart.ental Co•• lttee on
Graduate Students
MASSACHUSEns INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
AUG 1 1983
I,1BRARteS
Hum.
-1-
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG VARIOUS ONTOLOGIES
AND ACCOUNTS OF MODALITY
by
ANDREW 0" CHRIS'rIE, JR.
Submitted to the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
on April 27, 1983 in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Ph11~sophy
ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores connections between ontology
(in particular. the issues of whether two or more physical
obJects can occupy a spatial volume at a time and of identity
through time) and modality (in particular, whether the ordinary
modal sentences of English are appropriately formalized using
unary operators" CJ and 0" which permit quantification into
their scopes). Puzzles such as that of a statue and a piece of
bronze which occupy the ssme spatia-temporal receptacle
illustrate the linkage between ontologies and accounts of modal
properties. Resolutions to the puzzle must address central
issues concerning both ontology and modality. To clari£y the
resolutions_ I make a threefold classification of ontologies in
chapter one: monistic, mereological and pluralistic. Each
possibility and its modal consequences are examined in
subsequent chapters.
Chapter two discusses the monistic possibility, namely,
that no more than one obJect can occupy 8 spatial volume at a
time. I follow Chisholm in arguing that this position can only
be maintained if one also maintains that ordinary obJects are
successions of "primary obJects" which can neither gaif1 nor
lose parts. Such a view is incompatible with any
straightforward interpretation of ordinary modal sentences
along the lines usually suggested by philosophical logicians.
Chapter three looks at pluralism, that is, the view that
distinct obJects could occupy the same place at every moment of
their respective existences. I believe that such a position is
both (1) understandably controversial, and (2) the natural
consequence of attempting to take ordinary modal Judgments
literally. I also argue that an attempt by Wiggins to Make
pluralism plausible by giving a nonmodal argument %or it fails.
Chapter four examines the mereological view according to
which obJects have temporal parts and are related to each other
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as four-dimensional volumes are related in four-dimensional
geometry. I argue that mereology is incompatible with literal
accounts of ordJ.nary modal sentences. This incompatibility has
been embraced by many mereologists who conclude lisa much the
worse for modal properties" and go on to offer conceptualist
explanations of modal discourse based on a mereological
ontology. I sketch one such position according to which modal
discourse is a constrained farm of £ictional discourse.
Chapter five looks at what I call fission puzzles (the
ship of Theseus, split brains p etca) and relates recent work on
these puzzles by Chandler and Nozick to my general concern with
the relationship between theories of ontology and theories of
modality. I conclude th8t while fission puzzles are relevant
to th~ broad issues raised in earlier chapters, the specific
uses which Chandler and Nozick make of the puzzles are suspect.
Throughout the dissertation I contrast re~li8t and
conceptualist tendencies in the various ontologies and accounts
of modality that I examine.
Thesis Supervisor:
Title:
Dr. James Higginbothaa
Associate Professor of Philosophy
PREFACE
During my undergraduate years, the dispute between Kr1pke
and Quine concerning modality was at center stage. This thesis
1s part of 8 long struggle with the issues raised by such
papers as uThree Gradee o£ Modal Involvellant," and "Naming and
Necessity." As I probed aore deeply into the issues, I
realized of course that their works are representative of a
much larger literature which has its own historym While Kripke
and Quine 8re not the aost frequently cited authors in wh8t
follows, their work underlies much of ay thinking and that of
the authors I do cite more often.
My debts are .any.
David Lewis and Richerd Rorty showed great patience with a
struggling undergraduate. Their explanations frequently went
over .y head, but I re.eaber Many of their wordso
Graduate classes on logic, modality, and reference with
Richard Cartwright and George Bool08 were invslusble.
George Smith contributed enor.oualy.
My advisers degerve special thanks. 31. Higginbotham took
over my co••ittee at a crucial time and offered much needed
guidance. Judi DeCew worked closely with Me on every chapter.
My colleagues at the University of New Hampshire o£fered
comments at two colloquia. Rick Wiley and I discussed several
chapters.
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Alix Handelsman £ound stray moments in her hectic life as
an intern and resident to offer an unlimited supply o£
editorial assistance. Much more important was her presence
(in thought i£ rarely in person).
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CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARIES
Kodal logicians a1a to do for modal discourse what an
earlier generation of logicians did for matneastical and Much
practical reasoning: that is. to provide sy.bolizations for the
sentences of ordinary .odal discourse and 8 deductive system
that cap~ur•• the logical relations aaong the syabolizationse
A first step in thia large proJect ia to suggest that there are
.odal properties. or to be aore linguistic. that ~h.
expressions ··it. is possible that ••• " and "it 1s necessary
t.hat ••• II are appropriately treated as traneparen't, unary
operators. 1 For axe.pl_. Just aa
30hn 1s a son o£ Hary#s,
ia conveniently written for logical purposes as~
Son(John.l1ary).
80 t.he ••nt..nc.,
John 18 n.c•••arily a eon of Mary'.,
baa a r8.d1ng which 1. appropriately ayabolized a.~
C Son (J'ohn. Kary) •
Rather surprisingly. the se••ingly innocuous use of
tranaper8nt .odal operator. haa ontological i.plication••
1. S•• longer not. A at the end of this chapter £or a
diacuaaion o£ tranaparency and .odal prop.rti•••
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BeC8uae of what is co.monly c811ed Leibniz's law (if x=y, then
x has a property P if and only i£ y has P)~ what properties
there are bear directly on the ontological question concerning
what obJects eXist. Philosophers who endorse aodal properties
have a larger set o£ properties than do those who reJect modal
propert1ee. As we Sihall see shortly in what I call the statue
I
puzzle~ the additional properties are significant since there
are exaaplea in which the obJect(s?) A and B share all of their
non.odal properties and if 8 distinction is to be made batween
the.~ it Must be on the baeis of putative .odal properties.
The following chapters explore the connections between the '
question whether there are .odal properties and the question
which of ••veral ontological theories is best. The links
between the two i ••u•• are coaplex. A co••itaent to modal
propert1•• con.trains but doe. not det.raine which ontological
theory one aay cona1atently adopt. One conclusion that eagrges
fro. our exploration of th8 i ••u.. is that the use of standard
quanti£ied .odal logic in oodifying ordinary discourse is far
fro. ontolog1cally neutral and that when -the ontological i.aue
ia given proper weight. theories which reject any
straightforward co••it.ent to aoda! propeJ~t1e. appear at least
aa plausible .a do theories wh1~h ••brace .odal properties and
utilize atandard quant1£1ed .odal logic. In other words, an
.aphasia on ontology rai••• intriguing qu••tiona concerning
aadal prop.rti•• and '.erv•• to aot1vat. alternative accounts of
model d1acour•••
-10-
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Quine has £requently argued that there are 1.port~nt
connections between aetaphys1cs and applied Bodal logic. He
aaintaina that r.cent work on aodality--1n pa~ticular, the
thesis that ordinary obJect. pos•••• nontrivial Modal
properties--co••1ts one to a highly problematic version of
essential!•• in th. Aristotelian tradition. 2 I believe
that Quine's thesis is so••what too streng. I shall de£end a
sia11ar thea1s_ whic:h differs fro. Quine's cIa!. in allowing
for one additional ~)oa.1bi11ty: attributing nontrivial Dodal
propertiea to physical obJects leads either to an
understandably controversial version of Aristotelian
•••ential!•• or. £ollow1ng Chishola. to a draaat1c revision of
co••an-sens. ontology.
How are such th•••• concerning the links between ontology
and aodality to be inve.tigated? After all, there is an
snor.aua literature on aodality which pays little attention to
ontology and an .nor.aua literature on ontology which is not
explicitly concerned with aodel1ty. How 1s one to bridge the
gap? My approach will be to note three broad approaches to
ontology and to exaa1ne the characteristic reaponsea within
the•• approach•• to a cla•• of puzzl•• which explicitly link
modality and ontology by containing pre.iees fro. each do.ain.
The three approa~h.. to ontology differ in their treat.ent of
whet I ahall call puta~iY. ca••• of aultiplo occupancyp that
2. Quine••oThr•• Grad•• of "odal Involv•••nt. II 1966.
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is, situations in which there is 8 prima facie argument that
more than one obJect exists at the saae place at the same timee
The :firat." ".anistic," resolution is examined in chapter two
and B ••n~ 5& Chi.hola argu•• ~ to lead to a significant
departure fro. the ontology o£ ~o••on sense and to a coaplex
treataent of ordinary .odal state.snts. The second,
··pluralistic,,·· resolution 18 discussed in chapter three; though
coapatible with .es.ntialisR_ the pluralistic resolution is
understandably cont.roversial. The third, a·.ereolog1~al •••
resolution is incoapatible with any atra1ghtforwsrd acc~unt of
modal properties.
After exaaining the various links between the ontological
question of ault1ple occupancy and the question as to whether
modal propertlgs exist, it will be clear that the modal
question 1s no .ore or less susceptible to an answer than is
the ontological question. And after discussing the ontological
issue, it will be clear how difficult the whole matter is. One
result of this investigation is that we shall attain a clearer
understanding of why the use of Modal logic in formalizing
modal discourse is so controversial aaong philosophers.
Seversl prel1a1nary sections £ollow that will make a Bore
rigorous presentation o£ ay cla1as po.sible. The next two
sections introduce resolutions o£ putative cases o£ .ultiple
occupancy and their relationship to the que.tion of .odal
properties. I by no aeans wish to suggest that ontology 18 the
-12-
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only, or even the central issue in the debate concerning modal
properties and quanti£1ed modal logic. In sections £our and
five, I discuss the connections between the ontological issues
on which I focus and the broad range of issues which divide
realist and conceptualist approaches to the topic. I also
mention several important issues which I intend to leave open.
The chapter concludes with a stateaent of the theses to be
defended in subsequent chspters.
SECTION 1.
MULTIPLE OCCUPANTS OF A SPATIAL VOLUME
Central to ay argu.ent is a threefold
classi£1cation--.on1st1c, pluralistic, and
aereological--of ontological theories. This section
motivates the classification by exa.in1ng several ancient
puzzle••
Since at least the tia. of Heracl1tus_ ontologists have
been concerned with putative cases of what I shall call
multiple occupancy. by which I aean situations in which
there is at lesst a priaa £ac1e argu.ent that two distinct
obJects are in the sa•• place at the saae ti... Because a
genuine case of aultiple occupancy would contradict the
co••onplacs that no two phyaical obJects can be at the 8a.e
place at the 8a8. ti•• , putative cases of aultiple occupancy
hay. understandably provoked extensive inter.at.
-13-
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Consider several putative casas of multiple occupancy.
which are representative of the many examples in the
l1terature. 3
A. Heraclitus stepped into both the river and the water.
On the following day he stepped into the same river but not the
sa~e water. Soa. philosophers aaintain that this 13 a case of
two entities--a river and a quantity of water--which on the
first day occupied the same spatial voluae and on the second
day occupied distinct volu••sa Thus~ two entities can occupy
the sa.e place at the sa•• t1ae.
B. Suppose a statue is created siMultaneously with a
piece of bronze when aolten .etal solidifies in 8 Bold. 4
Though originally the statue and the piece o£ bronze occupy the
ssae volua., the statue 1s not identical with the piece of
bronze since the statue, unlike the piece o£ bronze, is
destroyed when a vandal haa.ere the statue into an a.orphous
lump. In other worda, it is posaible for a piece o£ bron28 to
"outl1vel' the st.atue which 1 t at one t,1_a canst! tuted.
Exaaplss si.11ar in structure to that of the statue and
the piece of bronze are co••on in the literature. A piece of
gold aay be .ad. into a ring_ and then survive the destruction
3. S•• longer note 8 for referencesu
4. See longer note C.
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1.1 MULTIPLE OCCUPANTS OF A SPATIAL VOLUME
of the ring. A long piece of rope may exist prior to being
Rade into a ha••ock. A piece o£ yarn and 9 Bweater might
~o-occupy a spatial voluMe during some but not 811 of their
respective 9xistenceSe
c. The .oat discussed and controversial case concerns
persons and their bodi8a. 5 Tho88 philosophers who maintain
that persona sr. physical obJects auet explain the relationship
between a person and hi. body. If they are identical, how can
a person die (cease to exist?) and yet the body continue to
exist. I£ they sr. diatinct, th8n wa app8er to have ~ cams o£
two obJects occupying thG aa•• spetial volua. at the 8aMe t1aa.
D. A final g 1••• £aa11iar, csss of putative .ultipl~
occupancy raises the issue of so-called scattered and contrived
obJects. No doubt 80•• physical obJects can survive at least 8
bit of scatter: ay watch exists as a scattered obJect for' a
tim. wh.n I r ••OV8 the gle8s face to adJust the hand8~ Other
obJects do not scatter. Richard Cartwright gives the exa.ple
of a aatchbook, which, wh.n 8 .etch i8 re.ov8d, instead of
scattering••i.pl~ contain. on. 1••8 aatch6 •
Now consider a p~rticular .at~hbook, Charlie. R••oVG a
.etch and put 1~ on th. table with Charlie. The .etch 1s no
~. S•• longer note Oft
6. Cart.wright:,,. leScat.t.er.d Things,. I. 1975.
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longer a part of Charlie. But isn't there another obJect.
Harry. which 1. the U au." or ":fusion" of Chdrlie and t..he matcb.
If there is an obJect. naaely. ay watch. that is at times the
sum of scattered parts. what reason is there to suppose that
Harry doesn't exist? What sort of obJsct is Harry? We aight
call him a '·.atchbook fusion. II Of course matchbook fusions are
not co••only discussed. but that is not an argument against
their existence.
Charlie and Harry. if they both exist. are. or at least
were at one t1ae. ault1ple occupants: before the ~atch was
removed. the Matchbook and the aatchbook fusion occupied the
same spatial yoluae. The general point 18 that philosophers
who countenance scattered obJects have good reason to think
that thero are genuine cases of aultiple occupancy.
At this point it 1s natural to think that these
controversial cases of .ult1ple occupancy could be settled 1f
only one had a clear de:finition of the tera "physical obJect."
After all. neither rivera nor aatchbook fusions fit our
pretheoretical stereotyp•• of phy.1c~1 obJects. Unfortunately,
the extenaion of t.he tera ··physical obJect.. 18 auch debated and
ia much at i.aue in discu••ions of ontology and aodality.
Tho•• who d.£end the th••i. that no aare than one o~Ject can
occupy a .petiel yolu•• are inclined to r ••trict the extension
of "physical obJect.. II while those who reJect. the thesis are
inclined to expand the extension and thus to have nuaeroua
-16-
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exaaplea of genuine aultiple occupancy. For example. ona
philosopher aight siMply £ollow ordinary usage in finding it
odd to think 8 quantity of water 1s a physical obJect, while
another aight aaintain thet ordinary language is an unreliable
guide. 7 My own approach to this controversy shall be first
to concentrate on the 1es8 proble.atic exa.plea of
aoderate-sized dry gooda8 and second to discuss the
controversy about the extenSlion o£ the tar. "physical obJect ..
in contexts where it 18 relevant.
SECTION 2.
HONISTIC. MEREOLOGICAL AND PLURALISTIC ONTOLOGIES
Those who de£end what I shall call Monistic ontologies
maintain that despite appearances there are no genuine cases o£
aultlple occupancy involving physical obJects. Each putative
case .sy be shown upon careful analysis to involve at .ost one
legitiaate physical obJeot and one 81aulacrua. O£ course there
is considerable roo. for aon1sts to disagr&e a.ong the.selves
concerning spec1£1c analyses. In chapter two, I examine the
three aoniat approach•• that hdV8 been recently defended by
Vere Chappell, Michael Ay.ra. and Roderick ChisholM. I shall
argue that the .ost extr••• of the thra. Monist poait1ona, that
of Chiahola. 1s also the .oat plauaible.
7. S•• Ayers, 1974, end Quine. 1953.
8. The phrase is £ro. Austin. Sen•• and Sensibilia, p.8.
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Many philosophers. while finding some of the analyses
pro£fered by Monists convincing, doubt that the strategy of
dispelling all putative cases of Multiple occupancy can be
plausibly achieved. Such philosophers typically maintain, for
example, that a ring and a piece o£ gold may be distinct in
virtue of existing for different periods o£ tiae. yet at times,
occupy that saae spatial yoluae. AMong such anti-monists there
is a deep disagreeaent concerning the precise relationship thst
holds 8mong nco-occupants.·1 On the one hand. those who
maintain mereological theories believe that the relationships
a.ong co-occupants are analogous to those aMong geoaetricsl
volu••s: proper part, overlapping parts. etce Quine 1s porhsps
the best known a.ong the aany conte.porary defender. of a
mereolog1cal ontology. On the other hand. pluralistic
accounts, for exaaple. that recently defended by David Wiggins
in his Saaen••• and Subatance9 • involve yet another
account of the relationship a.009 co-occupants.
A clearer pre.entation o£ the d1££erenc8a a.ong the three
types of ontological theories will be possible after the
introduction of several definitions and conventions. Let the
function, y(x,t)~ be the function which yields the spatial
voluae occupied by the physical obJect x at tiae t. No doubt
there are proble.a in specifying the exact spatial yolua.
9. W1gg1n.~ 1980.
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occupied by an obJect (e.g. fuzzy cats), but such questions
play no role in what follows where, for the .ost part, the
question is whether the physical obJects x and y occupy the
same volume. whatever voluae that a1ght be. If the obJect x
does not exist at t, let v(x~t) be the null set~. The
variables "x" _ " y " and "z" range over only pnyeical obJects;
the variable "t" ranges over aoltents of tills. I shall assuae
that every physical obJect occupies space at BOBe tiae, that
is. (x)(Et)[ v(x.t> ~ p l.
As de£1ned above, aoniatic theories contain the intuitive
pr1nciple~ which we shall see is controversial, that no two
physical obJects can occupy the sa•• spatial yolu•• st the same
t1De. I shall refer to this aa the strong occupancy
e£!ncipla. which aay be my.bolized.
(SO> (x)(y)[(Et)(v(x_t)=y(y.t» =) x=yl,
or equivalently.
(SO) -(Ex)(Ey)(Et) [x=y & Y(x,t>=v(y,t)].
On .y claaa1£1cat1on, both pluralistic and aereolog1cal
theori•• allow the possibility that .ore than one physical
obJect can occupy a .petiel yolu•• at a t1... In other worda,
pluralimts and ••r.ologists reJect the .a••tt... heroic efforts
o£ aon1sta to d1apel putative cas•• o£ ault1ple occupancy and
thu.~ to defend the strong occupancy principle. The
non-aon1st_ £or ex••pie, aight asinta1n that the statue i.
distinct £roa thQ piece of bronze tn the 81tuation in which the
-19-
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piece of bronze continues to exist a£ter the statue has been
destroyed. Where pluralistic and ••reological theories differ
is in their accounts of the relationship. a.ong obJects which
co-occupy a spatial volu... For an advocate of thA
••reolog1cal view. the relationships are analogous to the
geo••tricsl relationships that hold aaong n-diaenaional
yolu••• : two obJects. x and v. which co-occupy a spatial yoluae
at a ti•• t aay eith8r ··overlap" or stand in a part-to-whole
relationship ..
•p
a
c
•
part-to-whole
~
",a,
For exaaple. a r!v.r ~nd a quantity of water .ay overlap for an
instant before going their ••parate waye while a ring could be
a proper part of a piece of gold.
The ••reolog1at endor.e. an occupancy principla_ though
on. that 18 weaker than th••on1.t~. occupancy principles
According to the ••r801og1at, while two obJects .ay co-occupy
the s ••• spatial Yolu••• no two obJ.c~. asy co-occupy a
of y and y 1. a part of x. then x and y sr. identical.
Syabolically, th. weak occupancy principle read.,
(WO) (x)(y)[(t)(v(x,t>=v(y,t» =) X=y]R
Both the strong and w••k oecupancy ~r1ne1pl•• g1vG a sufficient
-20-
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condition for the identity of obJects. The strong principle
maintains that co-occupancy at any .a.eot is su££icient; the
we~ker principle aainta1na that x and y Must be co-occupants at
every Ma.rent.
Pluraliatic theories do not contain even th. wesk
occupancy principle. Wiggins. for exaaple. aaintaina that a
statue and a piece of bronze would be distinct obJects even 1f
they were always to occupy the sa•• spatial volu•• and always
have the sa•• phya1cal attribut•• (wG1ght, 8hape~ color, etc.).
A.ked to explain the d1£ference between the 8~atue and the
piece of bronze in a case of coapl.to apat1o-te.poral
coincidence. he aight r.ply t.hat. t.h. terM. "status" and "piece
of bronz." convey distinct ··criterion 0:£ identity'· and that no
one obJect can be subJect to two criteria of identity. Wiggins
••ph.size. the aia11ar1tiea betwe.n this doctrine and the
Art.tot_lien view that at .ost one fora or essence
characterize. an obJect. Asked to defend this view, Wiggins
aight turn, aa we ahall, to a .adal arguaent.
SECTION 3.
THE STATUE PUZZLE
A aore foraa! d1acu••ion of the .tatue and th. pi.c. o£
bronz. ia u••£ul in both aotiYating the distinction b.tw••n
pluralistic and ••reolog1cal ontologie. and in connecting our
thr••£old d1at1nction a.on9 ontologi•• with .odal logic.
-21-
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I shall assu•• that a statue, s~ and a piece of bronze, b,
could occupy the saae spatial volua. at every MOMent.
(t)[ Y(s,t)=Y(b,t> 1.
Is this plausible? W.ll~ God might create a bronze statu~
~ n1h11o and later destroy it. 1£ such a case 18
po.sible. monists. aereologista, and pluralist8 would agree
that the statu. and the piece o£ bronze occupy the aaa. spatial
volu•• at _very .o.ent they exist. nor. realistically, 8
statue and a piece o£ bronze could originate eiaultaneously
when .olten ••tale co.bined and hGrdened in 8 Bold: and they
.1ght be d••troy~d a1aultaneoualy by an axplosion. 10
Adaittedly. th. po••ibl11~y of ai8ultaneouB origination and
destruction 18 rather ••at.ric. but Modal logic involves the
study of po••ibi11ties# not Just likelihoode.
Let: t.he predicat.e" "Luap(_)". apply to ushapeless"
obJect.. There is no need for great precision hera. Suffice
it to a.y that a pi.c. of aaterial 1s a shapeless luap if it
has no recognizable abap8_ that !.~ if it is not & statue, tool
aachine part, _te.
What I ahall call the statue paradox 18 a set o£
independently plausible, though Mutually contradictory,
sentences. The various ontological theories discussed above
requ1r. different solutions to the paradox.
10. L.wia g "Count8rparta of Persona and Their Bodies, Ul 1971_ and
Gibbard, ··Cont.ingent Id.nt.1 ty .. II 1975.. contain this sort of example
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(1) a = the statue
(2) b = the piece of bronze
<WO) (x)(y)[(t)(v(x,t)=v(y,t» =) x=yl
(3) Ct)[v(s,t)=v(b,t)]
QED a=b
(4) OLuap<b)
(5) -OLuap<s)
eLL) (x)(y)[x=y =) (Fx => Fy> ]
(6) a=b =) C(>Luap<b) =) <>Luap(s»)
QED alb
The pr••ise. in first half of the arguaent were discussed
above. The second half of the puzzle is an argument that the
statue is not identical with the piece of bronze since the
£or••r has a .adal property. ··pos.ibly being a lUllp", that the
other do•• not haye. The intuitions behind (4) and (5) are.
(4~) The piece of bronze, b, could survive being
r ••haped (ha•••r.d) into a lu~p~ and
<5') The statue, _. could not survive being reshaped
into a lUMp.
The £or.a11zation o£ (4') and (5') ss (4) and (5), which makes
us. o£ a tranapar.nt, aonad1c operator, follow. the usual
practice in standard quanti£1ed .odsl logic. Leibn!z's law,
the aeh••a (LL), ia also standard in .odal logic; 1£ there is a
-23-
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A contradiction proves no More than that at least one o£
the pre.iees is false. But which one? Here there is much
disagreement. Each of the three types of ontological theory
precludes certain resolutions that are cOMpatible with other
ontological theories.
The statue puzzle illuminates a connection between modal
properties and plura11sa: for pluralists may well see this and
analogous puzzles baaed on cases of aultiple occupancy as
nothing aore than a proof that even the weak occupancy
principls p (WO>, is fallacious. After all_ there is soaething
baffling in thinking that a question of identity turns on
whether the statue and the piece of bronze caae into and went
out o£ existence at exactl~ the 8a.8 aoaent. On such a
view. it 18 the first hal£ of the arguDent that is flawed; a
statue and a piece of bronze are not identical even 1f they
occupy the saa. spatia-temporal receptacle. W1ggins~ a.ong
others. draws this inference. In chapter three. I exaMine the
case for the pluralist's conclusion and argue that it relies on
a controveraial u•• o£ .odal properties. SiMilar modsl
argu••nt. of cour•• play a pro.inent role in the mind-body
debet.. Thero too. 80•• philosophers find the case for Modal
properties 80 co.pell1ng that they us. it in argu.enta favoring
duali••11 •
In contraat to the pluralists••any philosophers find it
11. S•• longer note D.
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absurd to deny the strong and weak occupancy principles. In
reJecting pluralism. a monist would appeal to the extl'eme
plausibility of the strong occupancy principle, namely, that at
most one obJect can occupy a spatial volume at a time. Both
the aonist and the aereolog1at will challenge the pluralist's
belief that obJects could be distinct without at any mo.ent
manifesting distinct physical qualities. Both the monist and
mereologist accept the conclusion o£ the first half of the
arguMent, na••ly, that the statue and the piece o£ bronze are
identical. so they auat £!nd an error in the second half o£ the
puzzle. But where?
For reasons developed 1n chapter £our~ aereologista tend
to question the ~oherence o£ .odal propert1ea~ The sereolog1st
is unlikely to challenge Le1bniz's law, but he will question
whether it 18 being properly applied in this particular
1nstanc.~ A few ••raologista (for exe.pie, Quine in SOMe
_ooda>. reJect the ordinary language aentencea,
(4~) The piece of bronze, b, could survive being
reshaped (ha•••red) into a lUMp. and
(5') The statue. a. could not survive being reshaped
into a luap,
aa pre-scienti£1c g1bb.riah. Oth.r.~ notably David Lewis~
Allan Gibbard and Anil Gupta12 , accept the ordinary
language atat•••nt. but reJect their foraalizations as
(4) (>Luap<b) and
12. S•• not•• at the end of chapter four for references.
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(5) -(>Luap(s).
They offer alternative £orae11zationa of (4') and (5~) which de
not aake use of .odal properties and do not license the appeal
made in the second hal£ of the paradox to Le1bniz~s law.
Like aereolog1ats, sanists auat contest the second half of
the arguaent. But they have no pressing reason to question the
use o£ Modal properties sine. their theory co••its thea to
challenging another assumption aade in the second half o£ the
arguaent, naaely. that there are genuine cases of multiple
occupancy. According to the aon1at, since at most one obJect
can occupy a spatial Yolua., a and b are identical; thu., the
sentenc•• "<>Luap<a)" and "()Luap<b)" auat have the salle
truth-value, and either pre.i•• (4) O~ pre.ise <S) is false.
As we ahall ••• in the next chapter_ th.re are several monist
theorie.. Ayera aaintaina that (5) 1s false. He arguas that
I'being a statue" ia a.rely a contingent predicate which happens
to apply to the piece o£ bronze; in other words, references to
the statue are re£erenc•• to the piece of bronze via one o£ its
~ont1ng.nt properti•• (Just .a on. aay re£er to a person via a
contingent. at.tribut.e aa alt.he ••nator") .13 Chi.hola. who
o££era what I believe are coapelling argu••nts against Ayers'
.ugg••t1on~ propo••• an alternative aoniat analyais according
to which ~h. atatu. puzzl. ie to be r ••olved by maintaining
that the pi.c. o£ bronze 18 no Bor. able to survive the
13. Ay.re. "Individuals without Sortsla,·· 1974.
-26-
I.3 THE STATUE PUZZLE
vandal'. ha••er than 1s the statue.
SECTION 4
CONTROVERSIES A"ONG REALISTS AND CONCEPTUALISTS
The resolution. to the statue puzzle which are explored
below illustrate a .aJor dichotOMy in philosophy, namely, that
between r ••liat and conceptualist treat.ents o£ a particular
doaa1n.
The rough div1810n betw••n realist and conceptualist
tendenc1•• 1a d1ac.rnible within .any philosophical disputes.
In ethics, there are the•• who insist that .oralities are huaan
invention. (or at least huaan genetic inheritances) and those
who think that .orality is to be intuited or diacoverede
A••th.t1ciana concern th••selv•• with the obJectivity of
a ••thetic Judg••nta. "ath.~at!cians and philosophers have long
concerned th••aelvea with the existence of nuabers_ sets, etc.
Math••stiesl realists aaintain that the obJects in question
r.ally exist. while conceptualists (in this cass,
int.uitionist.) have att••pted to aake the "obJects" More
knowable by attributing a .aJor role to invention in
math•••tics. A philoaoph.r aight show conceptualist leanings
in on. do.a1n and realist leanings in another. For exaaple, I
suap.ct that ••ny, even .o~t_ cant••porary philosophers show
conc.ptua11at tend.nc!•• in aestheties (chacun a son gout) and
r8aliat tend_nci•• in ••th••atics, which appears as obJective
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8S anything could be.
I do not ••an to suggest that the distinction between
Itrealist" and "conceptualist" approaches t.o a philosophical
issue is co.pletely clear. Indeed_ its current widespread
usage virtually assures at least slight divergences in
meaning. 14 How.Yer~ I do think that the distinction 1s
au££ic1ently clear to be helpful in discussing various
approach•• to ontology and Nodality_ and I aa hopeful that
current inter••t in the realist-conceptualist dichotoay will
result in further clarification.
The d1chotoay between realists and conceptualists 1s a
s1apli£icat1on, indeed, eoa.thing of an oversi.pl!£1cation even
when the teras are restricted to a particular domain.
Typically there will be 5 nuaber of conceptualist
reconstruction. of what talk about X'. is really about and
there will even be philosophers who aainta1n that there are no
x~s and that discourse about X~a should be elia1nated, not
analyzed or reconstructed. For exaaple, with rftapsct to
vslu.s_ there are a nuab.r of relativist recon8tru~t1on8 of
moral discourse aa well as the .aotivist disMissal.
In hi. survey article, &rIEse.nee and Existence," for t.he
Encyclopedia of Ph110.ophY~ Al.adair MacIntyre summarizes a
h1.tor1~al dispute concerning Modality and essences in a way
14. S•• _ for ex••ple. Davidson, 1974, Du•••tt, 1982, Horwich,
1982, Plant1ga, 1982, Wiggins, 1980, and .any recent
paper. by Pu~n•••
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which .ak•• clear it.a c:onllGc:tion with c:orlc8ptu~11st-rse11at
d1Rputea:
The 8i.take which Hobb•• end Locke aacribed to
Aristoteliani•• was that of confusing the .eaning of
an .xpr•••ion w1~h th. nature o£ the obJect which the
expr•••1on charact.r1z... In til•••p1riciGt
tradition thia .~paration o£ the qu••tiona o£ ••aning
£roa qu••tiona o£ charact.r1z.~1on continuem to b.
1n:fluent1al.
For Aristotle, the ••••ne. o£ an obJect 1. what
£inda expr•••1an i~ tha concept which the obJect
••bodi••• the conc.pt under which i~ auat be
1dent1£1.d .a what it 18. The natural re.pon•• for
.a••one trainod in th•••plriciat t~ad1tion ia to
queation th1a conc.pt o£ an obJ.ct. In any
particular eelS. the question "What is this1" can have
.or. t.han on.' c:orr.c:t anawer- -for instance, "a coat II'
or "a pi.c. o£ cloth. '-15
"a~In~yrc £ocu••• on a £unda••ntal question: To what
••tent do our .odal intuitions depend on £eatur8a o£ the world
and to what 8xt.nt do they re£lect hUMan conceptualization?
Eap1r1c1ata ••phaa1z. huaan conceptualization. This
conceptualist tendency will be ~lear in both Ch1ahola#B monist
ontology and account o£ aoda11ty and in the various
mer.olog1cal accounts o££ered by Quine, Lewis, Gibbard and van
Fraas.en. Each augg••ts a ••na. in which the statue puzzle
should be r ••o!v8cl bl' noting t.hat one obJect can b~ cate~or'~zed
in two £unda••n~ally d1:f:f.rent .. a•••1ngly lI·es• entia.l". ways.
Whether an obJ.ct 1& conc.ptualized .s a piece o£ cloth (8
pi_C. of bronz.> or a coat (8 atatue) will have a profound
.££8Ct on what w. think eould or could not happen to the
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obJect. Both Chi.hola and the .e~.olog1gt. provide
cont••porary 1nt.rpretat1ona of what Hu•• called the aind's
··prop.na1ty to apread it.elf on external obJects. II An oppolling
t.nd8ncy will b••v1dent in plural 1•• which placas conaid.rable
atr••• on taking .odal intuitions 88 literally aa possible.
that 1., .a .acribing .adal properti•• to obJ.cta.
While d1££crent top1~. about wh!~h conc8ptualiata and
real1ata diapute rei•• a hoat of apec1f1c concerna. e nuaber of
patt.rna are .v1d.nt. At this point I shall .ketch the broad
8tra~.g1•• used on each aide. Lat.r chapters will conn8C~,
th••• etratagl•••or. clo••ly with aodality and ontologyo
Thre. c.ntral coaponenta in a conceptualist position are the
:following.
(i) Fir.t, ~h. conceptualist ca•• against any
straight£oward, r8.1iat 1nt.rpretat1on of our d1.c~ura. about
x~. (virtu••• value•• God~ probabilities, ••ntal stat•• ,
un1veraala_ nuabera. quarks, or what have you) stre.s8s the
putattv. unknowabl11ty o£ X~ •• 16 For 8xaaple. one a1ght
wond.r how there could b. knowledge of nuabers since it is
cl.ar 'that we do not. hay. cauaal contact. with ··t.h•••• 17 .
Sia11arly. one wonders about th•••••1ng reaoten.aa of values
and Y1r~u... In d8£.nd1ng .oral ak.ptlci•• , 3. L. Mackie Rake.
what h. c:a11. 11th. argu••n't froa qu••rn••• : 1ft
17. For .xaapla, a.nac.rra£f, ··nath••atical Truth,'· 197311
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1£ therG were obJ.et1v8 vslu•• , then they would b•
• ntit1•• or qua11ti•• or relation. a£ a very atrangQ
_art, utt.rly d1£fer.nt fro. anything Glso in the
un!v.r... Corr••pond1ngly, 1f we WMr. awara o£ them,
1~ would hay. to b. by ao•• cp.cial faculty o£ Borel
p.rc.p~1on or intuition. uttarly d1££erent £roa our
ordinary wav- o£ knowing .v.rything .ls.18 g
Ther. 1. a aiailer conc.~n with aoda11ty .ince Modal properties
are not a ••~~.r for direct 1nap.ct1on.
(1i) In a ~onc.ptu.l!.~ analy.i. of discourso about X's,
d8c1aion procedur8 £or ••tt11ng d1.put•• ~ the broad apactrua of
d1••gr••••nt ~onc.rn1ng X' •• and the larg. ar.a in which
r •••onabl. per.ona eon£••• to having no idea how to resolve the
d1.pu~... Whil. auch ••ove ••y not b. available in the caae
o£ .8th•••tie. or of th.oretical Aci.nc. (in the•• do.sina,
d1••gr••••nt 1. not 80 c.ntr~l a ph.no••non), it 1. ava11abla
and pow.r£ul in auch do••ina aa .thies, a ••th.tics, theology
and aoda11ty. Wb.n po••1bl., it ia alao .aphse1zed that there
ia a p.cu11ari~y in waiting around for further evidence on the
topic: that 1a. wb11•• Ac1.nt1at £requently waits because lithe
£act. ar.n't in," with regard to .orality or aoda11ty, what
£ur~h.r .CI£.Ct..·.. could one wei t. for?
(iii) A conc.p~u.li.t analy.i. of discour•• ebout X~s will
.bout .ore £••111ar ent1t1... The conc.ptualiat 1s likely to
cla1a •• b.n.£l~. o£ hi. an.ly.i. that it clar1£1ea talk of
-~-----~-----~------
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Xga. puts it on a ao11d foundation. 51ap11£i•• our overall
pietur. o£ the world by r.du~1ng the nuaber of funda••ntal
ca~.gor1••• and ••plain. why puzzl•• arc•• 1n the firat placeD
Tho•• who would 1n~.rpr.t our talk about X'. realistically
hay. a gr.at .any r ••pon.... They sr. lik.ly to b_g1n by
maintaining that tbMre i8 • pr••uaption in fayor of
1nt.rpr.ting languag_ r ••liat1cally_ and that no concGptua11at
progra. has .V8r ··proY.n·· t.hat. 'talk about. X'. ne.d be
1nterpret8d otherw1... In br1e£, rea11ma about X·a 1a both
cona1at8nt and plausible. For exa.ple, aoral discours. could
be conatatent (no one haa proven that it 1a inherently
contradictory> and it 18 plauaible to tak& it literally, 1£ for
no other resson t.han t.hat what. i8 ··plausible" 1s socially
detera1ned and auch of society takes moral discourse literally.
Other 1aportant, general strategies for the realist about X's
are as follows.
(1) The realist auat exaaine the particular analysis being
o££ered by the conceptualist. How close 18 the £it between
ordinary talk o£ X'. and the conceptualist's sub.t1~ut.? Moat
likely there will be places at which the proposed
reconstruction appears particularly iMplausible. Hae Reaning
been preserved? It 18 quit. likely that the proposed analysis
is aU££iciently coaplex that one can doubt whether anyone who
talked about X's a.ant what thG analysis in teras Ox Y~a
suggeste.
-32-
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(11) Macki. auggeata that the rea11at#a beat mova !G "to
look for coapaniona lngu11t."19 Suppo•• Mo••one propos••
a conc.ptualist a081y.18 of our diccour•• about X'.~ A realist
counter is to argue that no principled d1at!nctlon can be drawn
so••thing both sid•• interpret realiat1cally. For exaapl•• it
is £requently argued that aoral d1acour•• and ac1enC8 ahould be
equally clear or obacure aince both r ••t on unproven
a ••uapt1ons20 •
(iii) Conceptualist prograsa run the r1ak of being
circular. As a ph11oaopher. th. conceptualist 18 conc.rned
with one or ,another funda.ental do.sin of discourse. and
because the do.ain is fundaaental. it 1s frequently d1££1cult
to success£ully st&P back froa it sufficiently to offer an
analysis which doe. not us. teras £roa the do.ain 1tsel£. The
realist does well to look for circles.
(tv) The realist aust respond to what the conceptualist
takes as a cornerstone o£ hi. poa1tion, naMGlyp the degree of
disagree.ent about X's. A nuaber o£ responses are available.
First, one can ain1a1ze the ext.nt o£ the dis8gr•••ent. With
regard to .oral discourse. thia atrategy usually takes the fora
of aainta1n1ng that people agr.e on general principles but
disagree about the relevant facta. Second. one can note that
19. Mackie, 1977. p.39.
20. For a sophiat1cated version of this srgu••nt se. PutnaM,
R.aaan. Truth and H1atory_ 1982.
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probla•• about X'. are v.ry hard, that we arG atill in the
caye, and progr••• 1. always Glow. Third~ th. confident
r&.11at aight well ••• a •••lve dl••gr••••nt aa £urthmr and not
surpria1ng .vidence of a•••ive 19noranc••
SECTION 5
ONE RIGHT ANSWER?
Ketaphya1ca requires that w. not only ax•• ine the pro8 and
cons of nu••rOU8 coapot1ng th.or1•• , but also that we exaalne
diver•• conc.p~ion. of what constitut•• either a pro or a con.
With 80 .any po••ib11iti•• and ao auch controveray a& to how to
co.pare pO.81bilit1Gs, the que.tion in.Y1tab~y ariae. whether
there 1s one right an8W8r to the i.aue at hand.
Skeptici•• concerning the fruitfuln••• of ••taphyaical
inquiry has a long and honorable history. Philosophers sa
dif£orent as Hua. and Kant ahar8d tb. Enlighten.&nt~8
conviction that .a••thing was deeply aais. in thGir
pred.ce.80r 1e ett.••pta to I'proy. e• the existence of God or
principles concerning the natur. of being. For Kant, Much
metaphya1ca leads inexorably to ant1noa1... For Hua., .oat
••taphy.1cs 1a sophistry and 111u&1on which auat be co••ltted
to the £la••• since it doe. not contain ··any abatract reasoning
concerning nuaber, nor dee. it contain Gny exper1.ental
reaaoning conc.rning .atter of fact and .x1.tenc....21 "ore
21. Hu•• , Enqyiry~ S.lby-B1gge <ad.) 1975, p.165.
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r.c.ntly, th. poa1t1v1ata .xpr••••d cant••pt for aGtaphys1ca
and t.he endleas squabble. a.ong ~h1108oph.r. over ··.oaningl.....
theor1•••
Cont••porary philo.ophere are 1••• opt1a1at1c than were
Hu•• , Kant and th. po.1~1Y1.t. about their ability to d••arcat.
a .peeiel £1eld p ••taphy.1ca. and co••it it to the £la••• of
.ternal antinomy••••ningl•••n••• , or what hay. you. Bradlay'a
witticis., "Th••an who 1. r.ady to proye that ••taphya1ca 1.
1apo••ibl. 1•• brother ••taphy.1c1an with a rival th.ory of
his own22 , I' he. b••n taken to heart. But while
philo8opher. are le•• l1k81y now to think that we can
altogether avoid doing ••taphysica. sk.pt1e1•• haa not b••n put
to reat. In.t••d, .kapt1~1•• haa taken a new £orM_ naaely, th.
b.11e£ that th. ao.t ane can 8Xp.Ct £roa ph11oaophera 1. a hoat
o£ 1ncoapatible, equally plausible theorl•••
R.cently, auch ak8pt1c1•• eoncern1ng th. poa.1b111ty of
finding a unique. correct anaw.r in ••taphya1ca hae found a
nuaber of £orceful advocat•• e N81aon Good.an argue. that there
are a great .any ··ways o£ world••king.·' no one o£ which
repre.ents th. truth23. Robert Noz1ck 24expre8••• a
a1a11ar thought p
There sr. various philaAoph1cal views, Mutually
incoapatible. wb1~h eannot be d1••1••ed or aiaply
22. C1t.d in Rarty. 1967, p.5.
23. Good.an. Way. of Worldaak1ng p 1978G
24. Noz1ck, 1981. p.21.
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r_J_cted. Ph11oaophy'. output is the basketful o£
th••• eda1••ibl. viGw_. all together.
Richard Rorty a.intaina that tho•• who ••• in philosophy
Gnyth1ng .or. than an ongoing dialogue b.tw••n cOMpeting
dr••• of atudy1ng th. aind •• an aeeu~.t. a1rror o£
nat.ure25 • Hilary Putnaa att.ack. ••••tJ~phy.ical
r ••li.... --t.h. v1.w that "there 1. exac:tly on. 'true and coapl.te
d••criptio~ of ~th. way th. world ia'"--and d.£enda an
'11nterna11at.·· perap.ct.1v. which allow. that thsre 18 ".ore than
on. 't.ru.~ theory or d••c:r1pt.1on of the world .11'26 Th••.,
cont••porary de£.nd.ra of th. cla1. that philosophy cannot hope
to attain un1qu. right an.were are o£ten qUick to dissssociate
th••••lv•• £ro. an extr••• r.lativi•• which aainta1na that
every theory is Juat a. good ae any other. They wish to break
down what they ••e aa a powerful and overly sharp diehotoay in
our c:ulture~ naaely. th. diatinction between "obJective·· and
··subJect1vel' discipline••
I too a. skeptical about ••tapbya1cal argu.ents. I 8.
conscioualy 1.av1ng op.n the possibility raised by Goodman,
Noz1ck. Putnaa. and Rorty that perhaps th.re is no one right
answer, no way o£ finally deciding aaong the coapet1ng theories
discu•••d in this th••i.. Consciously 1.av1ng this poa.1b11ity
open in.v1tably ha. an e£fect. on the "ton." of ay writing.
25. Rorty, The "irror of Nature, 1979.'p.12.
26. Putn••• R.'8qD, Trutb and Hi.tory, 1981. p.49.
-36-
1.5 ONE RIGHT ANSWER?
WherM oth8ra sr. con£ident, I aM o£t8n caut1ouo. For the Boat
p8rt_ tho•• writ.rs in the Anglo-Aaericen tradition of
cont••porary ••taphya1ca whose work I exaa1ne write es 1£ there
ia on. right anaw.r which can be found by diligently purauing
one or anoth.r, £requ.ntly 1ap11c1t and not carefully exaa1n.d,
methodology. I auap.ct that th. range o£ defensible answer. ia
80 gr.at p and the criteria £or choosing aaong thea 80
controvera1al and poorly understood that £a1th alone could
aupply one with conviction. What follows 18 not a brief for
one .id__ but an att••pt to critically aurvay a nuaber o£
po••1bilit1•••
Even akeptieal authors haye leaninga. "V own leaning 1.
toward. the•• v1.wa (for ex••ple. Chi.hola and Quine'.> whicb
£ollow Hu.. in "constructing'" physical obJects £ro. ana or
another type o£ fund••ental obJect and con••quently (a.
explained in chapters two and four) reJect aodal properties and
any atraight£orward application of standard quantified Modal
logic to ordinary language.
SECTION 6
THE CLAIMS REVISITED
I •• now in a position to .tate Rore £ully ay .aJor clai••
and how I a1. to d.£end th•••
"y broad ~h... 18 tb. coaplex interconn.ct1ons between
ontologie. and a~count. o£ .odal propertie.. Puzzle. such as
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that o£ the atatue and the piec. o£ bronze illustrate the
linkag_ betwe.n ontolog1•• and account. of .odal proparti•• 8
R••olut1ona to the puzzle auat addr••• central i.au••
conc.rning both ontology and aoda11ty. To clarify the
r ••olut1ona I ••k. a thr••£old cl•••1£1cat1on of ontologie.:
moni.~ic~ ••reolog1cal and plura11et1e. Each po••1b!lity and
it. Bodal con••quenc•• sr. axplor.d 1n turn.
Chapt.r two d1.cu•••• th••ani.tic possibility, na.ely,
that no .or. than on. obJ.ct ~an occupy a apat1al volu•• at a
ti... I £ollow Chi.hol. in arguing that thia p081tion can only
be aa1nta1ned 1£ on& a180 aa1ntains that ordinary obJects are
succ.a8iona o£ "priaary obJects" which can neither gain nor
10•• parts. Such a view 1a 1ncoapat1ble with any
straightforward interpretation o£ ordinary aadal sentences in
t.r•• o£ ordinary obJects and .odal propertie••
Chapt.r three look. at plural1•• , that ia. the view that
distinct obJect. could occupy the sa.. place at every .o••nt of
their r8.pect!v8 ex1atenc... I b.11ev8 that such ft position is
both (1) understandably controversial, and (2) the natural
con••quenc. of atteapting to take ordinary .odal Judgments
literally. I also argue that one att••pt to ask. plural i ••
plauaibl. by giving a non.odal argument for it fail ••
Chapter four axe.in•• ~h•••reo!ogical view according to
which obJect. hay. t ••pcral part. and ar. related to each other
.a £our-di••naional yolua.a are r.lated in £our-d1••ns1onal
g.o••try. I argue that ••reolcgy i. inco.pat1ble with
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straightforward, literal account. of ordinary .odal Bantenee8.
This 1ncoapat1b111ty ha. b.en ••brQced by .any B.reologists who
c:onclud. "so auch the wors. for .oda1 properties" and go on to
o££er conc.ptualiat explanations o£ Bodel d1scour.. baa8d on a
••reolog1cal ontology. I .ketch one auch poa1t1on.
Chapter tty. looke at what I call £1.a1on puzzl•• (the
ship o£ Th•••ua, .pl1t brains, _tea) and relate. recent work on
th••• puzzl•• by Hugh Chandler and Noz1ck to .y g8n.ral concern
with the relationship betw••n theor1•• of ontology and theor1••
of aodelit.y.
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A. I follow Quina'. terBino!ogy. He call. an occurrencm of a
81ngular tera in a atat•••nt purely referential, uii,
roughly .peaking, tho ter•••ry•• in that particular context
ai.ply t.o r.:f.r 'to it. obJect. 8 ' 27 Quin. give. the
.ub.~itut1Yity 8.1vI verit,te of co-re£erential teras as a
n.c••••ry cond1~1on £or a purely re£erent1al occurr.nce~
Taking a hint fro. Ru•••ll~ W8 aay apeak of a
context •• r.f.r.n~iai1Y opaque when p by putting
••tat•••nt I into that context. W8 can cause a
purely r.£Gr.nt1al occurrence in I to b. not purely
r.£.r.n~1al in the whole cont8xt. 28
A context ia tEen.parent 1£ it 10 not referentially opaque~
(1) The nuaber of planets is necessarily greater than 7
1. frequently .aid to b. 8abiguous. 29 The ~ dicta
reading is £.1•• sine. the ••nt.nee,
(2) Th. nuaber o£ planets 18 greater than 7
1. contingent. A aaJor i.sue in this thesis 1s whether there
1. an 1n~.111g1bl. ~ ~ r ••ding which aay be indicated
(3) Th. nuaber of planet. 1. such th~t it is
nec•••ar11y greater than 7.
Thr•• position. concerning the purported ~ ~
27. QUine, "Thre. Grad•• of Nodal Involve.ent, ". 1966,.
pp.1S8-162$
28. QUine, 1966, pp.158.
29. Thia paragraph £ollows Cartwright, "So.e R••arka on
E•••nt.ial1•• ," 1968, pp.615-617.
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r8ad1ng ahould be d1atingu1shed. OnQ view 18 that (3) is clear
and can be ayabolized by_
(4) (Ex) [x nuabera the plan8ta & [](x>7)].
A ••cond view. £8YOr.~ by QUine, challenges the intelligibility
of (4) and augg••t. that the u•• of open sentences such 8S
.e[] (x>?)·· 18 eith.r confused or part and parcel of
'IAr1atot.11an ••••ntial!••• ··SO Chi.hal., Gibbard, Gupt.a,
and L.wia def.nd a tbird po••1bil1ty: contAaporary
••••ntiali.t. are correct in thinking that (1) is sabiguous_
but Qu1n. 1. Qorr.ct in ~rit1c1z1ng (3). A correct rendition
of th. non-Qa dicta reading of (1) displays aore
structure than appear. on the aurface. For .xa.pl.~ Lewis
sugge.ta
(3') The nuaber of planets is such that regarded as a
nuaber it 1. nece••arily greater than 78
aa th. non~d. dicta reading of (1). Chishola, Gibbard,
Gupta. Lewis and o~h.r. challenge (3) at least in part because
of their views on ontology; chapter two discusses Chiahol.'s
approach and chapter £our discu•••• G!bbard~ Gupta and Lewis.
I do not .eke a sharp diat1nction between open sentences
and prop.rt1•• b.cau•• (1) ther. ia no uni£oraity in the
literature I .a aurv.ying and (2) I doubt that the distinction
1. i.portent 1n addr•••1ng -the qu••t.1ona raised by t.his t.hesis.
Each o£ tbe poaitiona addr•••od could be equally well phrased
30. Quin_. 1966. p.174.
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either in ter•• o£ properties or in tera. of open sentences 0
For exa.pl_. a .odsl sentence such aa "John could not be an
alligator'· rai••• the iaau. whether there is a modal property,
··not poasibly an alligator," or whether there is an open
.ent.nce "1 t. 18 not po.sible that. x be an all igator. I.
Chi.hola. Kr1pke. Wiggin., Plantinga31and .any others talk
of Modal propert1•• : Cartwright and Quine 32 carefully
••~h.w talk o£ properties in favor of open sentences. In
either ca•• th. crucial qu••t1on is whether the expression or
put~tiv. property satisfies Le1bn1z'. law,
eLL> (x)(y)[x=y a) (Fx =) Fy)].
I do net ••an to suggest that the diF;Itinc:tion between
propert1•• and open ••nt.nees is insignificant: I suggest only
that it ia not dir.ctly relevant to the ia~ues at hand.
It is i.portent to clarify th. relation.hip between
standard quant1£ied .odal logic and the theais that .oda!
context. in ordinary language have a transparent reading.
"odal logic .ay of cour•• be studied as a purely formal systea.
Aa auch, th. atudy of .odal logic leaves untouched the qusetion
of whetb.r .odal contexts in English are transparent. But
.odal lcg1~ would not hay. received Much attention were it
31. Chi.hola. 1976; Kripk_. 1971, p.140; Plantings, 1974; and
Wiggina. 1980, pp.l09-111.
32. Cartwright. 1971 and 1979; and Quine, 1966.
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thougbt to be s purely r.atheaat!cal curiosity. Most modal
logicians asaua. that the subJect 1s applicable to English, and
that it is app11c8ble in the Bost straightforward and natural
way. The application presupposes that modal contexts are
transparent. Quine haa long atr~88.d that this is a nontrivial
pr••upposition which requires Justi£1cation.
O£ oourS8 it 18 possible that mod~l contexts are
transparent and yet none of the available .odal logics captures
the true logic of .adal ••ntences. Thus. though the
atraight£orward application of Modal logic to ordinary English
pre.upposes that such cont.xta are transparent, the assuBption
of transparency 18 coapatible with a wide range of .odal
logic.. Finally. there are nonatandard .adal logics whose
standard interpretation. do not presuppose the tranaperency
the.i8e
80 Geach'. R.fer9nc9 and Generality (first edition, 1962)
1n1t.ia~.d a large lit.ratur. on Heraclitus' que.tion as to
wh.ther one can atep in the a••• river twice. IBportant
r ••pon••• to Geach wer. aad. by Helen Cartwright ("Heraclitua
and the Bath Water. II 196~) and by W.V.O. Quine (1964) in a
r.v1ew o£ ~••ch~. book.
c. Ar1.to~1. u••• exe.ples of bronze eirel•• and golden
.~.tu•• in hi. gen.ral d1acu••1on of fora and .etter,
n.tapby.icg. Book Z.ta, 10338. Gibbard develope the
-43-
I. LONGER NOTES
exe.pl. o£ a statue .ade fro. & piece of clay in the context of
. modal logic.. nContingent Identi ty,.~· 1975. Burge discusses the
he••ock .ada fro. a piece of rope in "Ma88. Terms~ Count Nouns,
and Change." 1975, p.462. Several views concerning a sweater
.ade fro. a single piece of yarn are exaa1ned in Wigg1ns p 1980,
p.140.
D. Argu••nta ai.llar to those of Descartes and Hobbes
con~1nu. to playa aaJor role in the aind-body proble••
Recently. Kripke. following D••cartes. has chaapioned a .ods1
argu••nt for the distinction between persons and their bodies,
··Na.1ng and Nec•••ity.'· 1972. Fred FeId.an explores several
aoniat repl1•• in th. tradition of Hobb... "Kr1pke on the
Identity Th.si.... 1974. Lewis d.velopa an anti-•••eot1a11st
reply to KrlpkD ba••d on a ••r.olog1cal ontology in
IIlCount..rparta of Persona and their Bodi•• , II 1971.
E. The centrality o£ epiat••olog1cal cone.rna in
conceptual1.t-r.aliat disput•• is frequently noted. Sea for
ex••pl_. Rorty. ~ Linquiatig TurA. 1967, p.39. and Katz,
LeDgu.g_ and Qt~~Ab.t[,ct ObJect•• 1981, p.193.
-44-
CHAPTER II
MONISM, ONTOLOGY. AND MODALITY
This ehapter begins by exaB1ning atteapta to defend the
currently rather un£ssh1onable Yiew~ Mania., according to which
no aore than one physical obJect can occupy 8 spatial volume at
a ti... A.ong the que.tiona addressed ara "What strategies arG
open t.o so.eon. wishing to de£end lRoni••?'· and "WhV is it
currently unfaahionable?·· I argue that .oni•• conflicts with
two qUite plausible principle. governing identity
.~a~•••nt.--principl•• which have played an i.portent role in
ree.nt critic!••• o£ G.ach~. doctrine o£ ralat!ve identity. An
additional obJection ie ra1••d to what I call the
··cont1ng8nt-pr8dic:at." d.£en•• of .oni... I th8n 'turn to
Roderick Chi.hol.~. v.ra1on of aon1••• which I ahall argue 1.
th. on. dofena1ble version. I 8xplorG the connections between
Chi.hol.'. ontology and the i.au•• concerning aodality raised
by the atatue puzzle. Finally. I place Chi.hola'. theory in
p.r.p.c~1v. by nc~ing it. clo•• a1a11aritie•••~•••ing fro.
their co••on ••p1ric1st and eonc8ptualiat background. with a
popular al~.rna~1Y. to .oni••• the ••reological ontology of
£our-diD8na1anal obJect••
Aa Mentioned in chapter cne. the .any putative cases of
ault1ple occupancy po•• a ••Jor difficulty £or sny aoniat
wi.bing ~o d.£end the .~rong occupancy principle,
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II. INTRODUCTION
Tyler Burge is typical o£ non-.o~i.ts who show little patience
with the strong occupancy principle. On his account. one
exaapl. su:f£1c•• to show its implausibility: liS rope and 8
ha••ock (woven £roa the rope alone> asy be spatially
1ndiatinguiahable at a given t.i•• " and not 13. identical." t
Asked to elaborate. Burge would no doubt note that sincm the
rop.~ which exi.ted prior ~o the he••ock. now exists as a
ha••ock. and could a~ain be a sere rope were the ha••ock
unwoven. the rope and the ha••ock aay be distinguished on the
basi. of .any dif£erent t ••poral end Modal properties. For
ex.aple. 1~ would appear to be a atraight£orward application of
Leibniz 6 • law ~ha~ x is not identical with y if x, but not y,
Exaapl•• aiD11ar to Burge'. ca•• o~ the rope and the
ha••ock were given in chapter one: statu•• and pieces of
bronze, quant1ti•• o£ water and rivera. aatchbooka and
aatchbook £uaiona. etc. The aoniat auat take on the d1f'f1cult
taak o£ showing that th••• putative ccunterexaaplea to the
atrong oceupaney principle are appropriately analyzed in
another .anner. Furth.r.or.~ the aoniat analys8s should be at
l •••~ •• plau.1bl••• the alternat1v•• offered by pluralists
1. Burge. ··H... Tera.. Count Noune _ and Change,. II 1975 p P • 462 •
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SECTION 1
MONIST RESPONSES TO THE SPATIAL OCCUPANCY PUZZLES
I sball now 1ntroduc. three strategies ••played by various
monists in de£ending their cIa!. that that no More than one
physical obJect can occupy a spatial yo!uaG at a time.
leal REPUDIATION
A nuaber o£ the axa.pl•• are raJ.ctad by aoniata as siaply
irr.18vsnt to th.ir understanding of the strong occupsncy
princ1pl.. For ex••pl_. Ayera argue. that entities such as
quantitiea of water and quantiti•• o£ clay belong to the
"c:at.egory o£ stuff'· .a oppo.ed t.o th. ··category of' thing .... 2
Having .ad. this distinction. Ayer. cheerfully notes that of
course two dif£8rent phye1cal obJect. a1ght be aade up at
dif£erent t1••• o£ the aa•• stuf£. As noted in chapter ons. I
.a not particularly interested in such disputes concerning the
ext-en.ion of ··ph'laical obJect'· or 1Clthing".·· With regard to
.on1••• the points which I wish to develop can be made without
investigating borderline dispute.. However. in aid••tepping
the•• disputes. I do not wish to a1n1aize their iaportance.
One virtue ~hat ••reo!ogiate ao••ti••• clai. for their position
18 that it pre.ents a uni£1ed account of entities occupying
space and t1•• without n••ding to po.it a Metaphysical (as
2. Ayera, ··Individuals without Sortsl.,·· 1974" p.125.
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opposed to psychological) distinction between categories of
spatia-temporal entities. This is·an important ~rgument that
would need to be addressed in a fuller discussion (Jf Mon1aM.
Locke uses the repudiation st~8tegy in his tr'H9taent of
Minds and bodies. Locke wrote ..... ~never f1nd1ng~ nor
conceiving it possible. that two things o£ the sa•• kind should
I
exist in the aaae place at the aaa. ti.6~ we rightly conclude,
that. whatever exist. anywhere at any t1a. exclude. ~ll Q£ the
seas kind" and is t.here 1tself alone. ·'3 In the relevlsnt
sense. Locke recognizee but three kinds: "We have the ideas of
but three aorta of substance.: 1. God. 2. Finite 1ntel11gencQs.
3. Bodies."4 Thus. on Locke's view. while no two ··bodies"
<also "~arcels of aatter l") can occupy the seae place at the
saae time. the "three sorts of substances aa we ter. the., do
not exclude one another out of t.he Balle plac.... Locke'.
version of the strong occupancy principle thus reJects Qxaaples
involving finite intelligences and their bodies.
1.2 THE CONTINGENT-PREDICATE ANALYSIS
A second strategy ••played by aon1ata in re.ponding to
putative cs••• o£ aultiplG occupancy is to elai. that thero is
a tendency to con£u•• types o£ obJects with contingent
predicates o£ obJects. For exe.ple. a ~o11 of ropa ia uncoiled
3. Locke. E••ay. Bk. II. Ch. XXVII •••ction 1.
4. Locke. E••,y. Bk. II, Ch. XXVII •••ction 2.
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and wound into a lasso. It is natural to claia that there is
only one obJect, a piece of rope, which is charactGr1zed for a
period by t.he contingent predicate, "coil," and for another
period by the predicate, ··la••o.·· According to the second,.
contingent-predicate 'trateg~, it is a a1stake to be a1alGd
by talk of nth. coil" into re1fying coils and thinking that
they are physical obJects which are destroyed by being unwound.
Similar mistake. would be to think that th8re is a distinct
type of eot1 t.y" a ··senat.or" II which 1s 11terally destroyed ",hen
voted out of office" or a "child," which 1s destroyed by
aa'tur1ng. Re:ferenc•• to ··the child" or IIlthe senator" are
re£erences to persons who pos•••• certain oontingent features.
This contingent-predicate ana1ys18 is an i.portant tool
for aonists. Where the aereologist sees two distinct ObJ8ctS_
the aon1st aay clai. that there is one obJect which goes
through a period which the aer.olog1st and pluralist wrongly
re1£y. For axe.ple, Ayera appli•• tho cont1ngent-predicstG
analysis to the ca•• of the statue and the piece of bronze 0
What happens to a statue when a vandal beats it
out of ahapG_ if it ia not deatroyed? And what is a
aeulptor bringing abou~ when he beat. a pi.c. o£
••tal into shape. if h. 1. not creating a statue? In
80 £ar as the•• qu••tiona do not answer the••elvee, a
au1table reply to the f1rat ia that a p1eQ8 of .etal
ia ce••ing to be • atatue. and to the aecond. that a
piece of ••tal is c081ng to be a statu.. We can talk
o£ d••truction and creation 1£ we 11k.~ £or such talk
can b. £airly un••r1ou8_ or at 18.at detachable fro.
considerationa o£ .ub.~.nt1al continuation. I can
create an .y••ore by cutting down a tree or destroy
an •••thetic whole by painting .y houa. red. white
and blu.. W. could .ay that what the vandal i.
d••troying 1•• shape or fora. Non. o£ this give.
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any grounds for arguing that one thing_ the statue,
ceases to ex1at. while another thing. the pisce of
.et.al c::ontinues eXistj,ng. Paperweights are physical
obJects, and it is possible to make paperweights by
scratching patterns on pabblas. but this 1s not a way
of making physical obJects. 5
Note that Ayers readily concedee that our ordinary talk of
"creation" and "d••t.ruct,1on'c 8oaet1asa runs counter to his
metaphysics. but. die.i.see such talk as Merely ••taphor1cal:
aetaphysically, it need not be tsken more seriously than poetic
talk of loat innocence ae tithe destruction of a child."
Another exa.ple of the contingent-predicate analysis is
provided by Fred Feldaan6 who utilizes it in a discus.ion
of per.ona and their bodi... Without co••itting hi.self to
moni•• or .at.rial!•• (in the s.n•• of 80••one who oppose.
per.on/body dual1•• >, F.ldaan not•• that one position that the
aaterialiat could adopt 1. that bodi.s are obJects which. under
certain c1rcu••tanc8s. hay. the add1t1onal~ contingent feature
of being persona, Juat 88 ropes are so••tiaes coilso Such a
position aight b•••pecially attractiv. to 80••one who held a
coaputer .odel o£ aj,nd; per.ona are to bodies as £unct1on1ng
COMputers are to pi.c•• of hardware. Again, talk o£ eoa.thing
going out of exiatence at d••th 1. to be construed
••taphorically: actually. what happ.na is that soa.thing ceases
to £unction.
~. Ayer_. 1974. p.128.
6. Feldaaft" "Kr1pke on the Identity Theory,," 1974, ~.668.
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On any view, so•• co••on nouns are properly spplied to an
obJect only during certain phases o£ its existence; £or
exaaple. the teras ClIboy" and Glantique,," What is distinct,1vQ
about the contingent-predicate analysis is the attempt to
aalnta1n that there is an analogy between the logical behavior
of "boy" and "antique" and t.hat of "statue, II IGha••ock .. II "ring. II
and the other teras which figure in the aultiple occupancy
puzzles. In sections two and three, I shall exaaine two
cr1ticis•• of aon1ata who att••pt to us. the
contingent-predicate strategy quite generally in treataents of
ault1ple occupancy. Roughly speaking, the obJections are first
(section two). that the reaulta of the strategy are soaet1aes
extra.ely i.plausible and .econd (aection three). that the
strategy fails coapletely in ft significant class o£ cases
involving "branching and increase ...
1.3 OBJECTS AS SUCCESSIONS
A third strategy that is u••d by 80a. aon1sts in
~ount.r1ng putative c •••• o£ aultiple occupan~y is to clai.
that what a.y app.ar to b. a .1ng18 obJect is in fact a
succ•••ion o£ clos.ly r81ated obJect.. Relatively
uneontroveraial exaapl•• o£ the typ. o£ succe••ion involved are
co••on. Suppa•• a candle ••lta and the re.ulting puddle of wax
hard.n. and is rolled into a ball. Rather than having one
physical obJ.c~ throughout <.a•• of wax?) WG are inclined to
think in tera. o£ a .ucc•••1on of obJ.cta. Firat there was the
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candle: then the puddle: and then the ball of wax. The candle,
puddle~ and ball o£ wax are composed of the saae wax p but this
does not suffice to aake theD the saae obJect. I suspect tilat
on any view. there are such cases o£ continuous succession
where distinct obJects. which share the bulk of their .attar.
follow one anothere What is distinctive about Monists who
eaploy the succession strategy is their claia that the
spatial occupancy puzzle. can be resolved by noting analogous
succession••
Consider Vera Chappell's treat_ant of the statue and the
piece of bronze. He distinguishes a.ong piece. of bronze: 808.
are .ere pieces of bronze and 80.& are statues. A .ere piece
'-can be bent. dented. or crunched up, and not be destroyed"
unlike a statu....? If the vandal destroy. a statue~ then
he also destroy. the piece of bronze which was the statue and
replacGs it with a .ere lu.p. According to Chappell. the
proper picture of the situation is:
st.atue .ere lump
In differentiating th. contingent-predicate and succession
approach•• it is useful to note their opposing tendencies: the
contingent-predicate analyais of the atatu8 and the piece o£
7. Cbappell. ··!tatter.'" 1973" p.684.
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bronze finds only ~ obJect (the piece of bronze)_ as
oppoaed to the two (8 statue followed by 8 mere lUMp of
bronze) which Chappell recognizes. The contingent-predicate
analysis results in ObJ2cts which last a long ti.e and can
undergo draaatic changes; the Bucces.ion analysis tends toward
ehort-lived obJects which cannot change as auch.
Chappell's t.hought aay be that. obJects are indeed 'Ifora
plua .atter ll and that ....re piece o£ bronze·· and "status" are
distinct for... An obJect i8 de.troyed by the yandal because 8
··fora·· is destroyed. Chappell II S 8Kpos1 t ion of the pos i t 10n ! s
,rather terse. H. aotivates it 1n part by appeal to the strong
occupancy principle. but does not .otivate his reJection of the
contingent-predicate analysis o£ the statue puzzle. nor does he
diacu•• the ca••• (e.g. rop•• and la8sos) .ost clearly
favorable to the contingent-predicate approach. This
oversightS 18 all the .ore puzzling in light o£ a previous
pap.r in which Chappell had h1•••1£ adopted a
cont1ng_nt-predicate analysis in a defense of the strong
occupancy principle.
A further di££iculty with Chappell'. view 1s that the
intuition. to which he appeals sr. hardly coapel11ng aine. they
are ra~h.r •••ily de£u••d by an app.al to H.P. Grice'. work on
convers.tional i.plicatur••• 9 According to Grice, dialogue
8. Chappel1_ "Stu:f£ and Things." 1971. p.74"
9. Ob••rvation by 31. H1gginbo~h.D.
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is guided by the 1apli-::1t lI\utl:.ual awareness of speakers of a
multitude of conYersat1ona~ Maxi.a. The Gr1cean maxim .ost
relevant to Chftppell~s exeaples is. IIMake your contribution as
in£oraative as is required C£or current purposes of the
exc=hanS8> • ··10 Ot.her aaxi..s include ..
Do not .eke your contribution aore 1nforaat1ve than
is required.
Do not aay what you b.11eve is false.
Do not eay that for whieh you lack adequate evidence.
Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
Grice of cours. doe. not think that .peekers always obey the
.ax1•• : ind••d. they can violate. flout. or even opt out froD
the nor.al operation of a aaxiM.ll But such fa11ur•• to
coaply with a .ax!. ar. ~o b. tak.n ••r1oualy; they usually
indicate that tb. ap••k8r do.. not intend to b. taken
literally.
Returning to Chappell's 8xa8pl••• we see the possibility
o£ giving a Gr1c••n explanation o£ why it may be inappropriat~
on 80•• occasions to call a statue a "luap of clay. II A
de£ender o£ the cont1ng.n~-pr.d1c.t.analy.i. a1ght respond to
Ch.pp.ll~. cla1•••• £ollows. V•• , one can well 1.ag108 8
cont.x~ in whicb on. n••d. to aeke a sharp distinction between
••r. luapa o£ clay and atatut•• but this 1s only b.cau•• the
10. Gr1c8 .. '·Logic and Convera.t1on, II 197~" p.67.
11. Grice. 1975_ p.69.
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aituation de.ands that we be infer.at1Y•• and not because there
ie an ontological difference in kind. It is analogous to the
usual convention that we be apec1£ic as to whether the person
who entered the roo. is aa1e or £••a10_ child_ adult_ or
elderly. If' it .ouod. odd or inappropriate to say that Utwo
people Just entered_" when in £act two tbree-year-olds crawled
in unexpectedly, this is not because the statement is literally
false: rather p it ia uninforaative.
Chappell a1ght respond by noting that while it 1s possible
to give a Gricean analysis o£ the distinction aarked in
ordinary usage between --.ere lu.~·· and ·'statue, II it 1s also
po.sibl. to take the distinction .ore .eriously as one
reflecting a funds.ental distinction between two covering
nouns.
Though Chappell'a poaition has b••n useful in 1nt~oduclng
th. aucc•••1on approach, I ahall turn to Chishola in section
four when I take a closer look at tho succe••ion strategy. I
.witch becau•• Chi.hola give. good reasons (see section three,
below) for thinking that Chappell'. approach ia not
au£f1c1ently radical and that it ataya too close to ordinary
language.
Prior to ex.aining Chi.bol.'. aot1vation and defenae of
th. aucc•••1on atrat8gy, I ahall in the next two section.
£1r.t~ cona1der two plausible principl•• which conflict with
all v.ra1ona of .oni••• and ••cond~ consider a ap.c1£1c
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obJection to the cont1n~~nt-pr.d1cateanalysis.
SECTION 2
A BROAD CRITIQUE OF MONISH
I noted earlier a widee~r~:~ ~ene~ that Ronis. can be
rather easily die.i.sed. Having taken a so••what oloser look
at how Boni•• i. de£end.d, I aa now in a position to Qxplicate
further two widely accepted principles which are at least
tacitly appealed to in r_Jecting .oni... One of the two
pr1n~1pl•• con£11cta wi~h the cont1ngent-prodicatQ mtrateg~ and
the other with the succ••sion str6tegy •
The two principl•• Are widely discussed in relation to
P.ter Geach'. doctrine of r.la~1Y. identity. Firat pre.ented
by Geach in the eerly .1xti•• ~ the doctrine generated ~ spate
o£ repli... D••pit. the aany ••r1ou. di££erences a.ong Geacb'.
critic.. I belieye that ther. was a fair degr•• of agreeMent
a.ong philoaopbers on certain be.Ie principl•• concerning count
noun. and 1dentity.12 ftV concern 1. not with Geacn'a
doctr1n_. nor with all o£ th. points o£ agree.ent a.ong tho••
who r ••ponded ~a Geach; rath.r, I aa conc.rned with two
prine1pl.. or •••uapt1ona tha~ are central to what a1ght be
called the standard r ••pon•• to G••cb. Th8 Rain cla!. o£ th1a
••c~1on 1a th.~ ~h... very plauaible principl.. sr.
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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1ncoapat1ble, not only with G.8ch~. doctrine of relati.ve
identity, but with both the contingent-predicato and succession
of obJects analyses offered by aonists. Since the principles
are accepted by many, end £a.11iar in part because of the
controveray concerning relative identity, we ahall have G
b.ttar understanding o£ why so .any conte.porary philosopher's
reJect .onisa.
Three ar!;~.cta of Geach' 8 V iews on 1dent1 ty are relevant
for ay purposes.1 3 Firat. he places considerable stress on
the role of count nouns in reference.
All but a few hardy thinkers would ad.it that if
we hay. to do with a thing, even Juot by naming it or
ra£err1ng to it. there 1. no telling whether waIve
got on to the as•• thing again unless it is
specifiable what aort of thing we aean. 14
Second. he denies that atate••nts with the fora "x i8 the saae
F aa y" are ever appropriately analyzed as "x=y and x 1s an F
and y 18 an F. I'
there i8 no such thing 38 being Just Ithe
.a•• " •••• 15
Third. he aaintains that "x is the saae F as y" is an
equivalence relation that cannot be further analyzed.
it Bake. no sen•• to Judge whet.her x and yare "the
.a•••• ••• unl••• w. add or und~r.tand SOMe general
tera--th. aa•• F.
13. Perry, liThe Sa•• F.'· 1970 contains an excellent exposition
o£ Geacb'. viewa.
14. G.ach. 1977, p.1329.
~5. Cited 1n P.rry, 1970, p.184.
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It aay be useful to begin with a rough account of the two
8ssuaptions central in the usual response to Geach made by his
critics, who frequently laud his e.phasis on the importanc~ of
kinds and count nouns. while reJecting his doctrines concerning
the expression " X is the .a.e F as y." The case of the statue
and the pi_ce of bronze involves two count nouns which are
said. "to convey d1at.inc:t criteria of ldent.1 ty." In
understanding the noun "statuel/' we understand what it would be
for obJects a and b to b. the same statue. And if 8 anrl bare
the sa•• statue, they are identical. Inspection reveals both
that, "piece of b:-onze n and Iistatue" convey criteria of identity
that apply throughout the 11£e span o£ the obJects to which
they apply, and ••cond. that distinct criteria o£ identity are
aupp118d by ".tatue" and "piece of bronze." On this account,
the prabl•• with .oni•• 18 that it ai.construes how count
noun.~ identity and reference are linked.
In th. reaainder o£ this aection, I shall attempt to
£oraulate a .or. care£ul version of the above reply to Geach.
I ahall avoid relying on the probleaat1c notion of 8 "criterion
o£ 1dentity.u16 tly 81. is to sketch Just 80 auch of reply
.a 18 n••ded to reveal the point. of dispute with the monist.
2.1 COUNT NOUNS, COVERING NOUNS, AND IDENTITY
I w1ah to u•• the t.ra count noun sa it is generally
16. S•• long.r not. A.
-58-
11.2 A BROAD CRITIQUE OF MONISM
used in the literature: that is~ a general term F is a count
noun i£ it makes sense to ask, "How many F's are there?"17
For example~ excepting quirky cases of statues composed of
statues, there is a de£initive answer to the question, How many
statues are on the table? There is no answer to, "How many
golds are on the table?"
Some count nouns, which I shall call covering nouns,
apply to an obJect at every moment during which the obJect
exists, i£ they apply to the obJect at any moment. In other
words~ F is a covering noun i£ it satis£ies the schema,
(eN) (x)(Et)(x is an F at t) => (t>(x is an F at t)J.
Exactly which count nouns are covering nouns is an important
issue in discussing monisR; offhand, it is plausible to suppose
that '"physical obJect," "rock," "statue'" and "sweater" are
covering nouns. ExaRples o£ count nouns that are clearly not
covering nouns are "red thing," "obstacle," and '"boy."
What I have called a covering noun, Wiggins would call a
substance sortal (or substance concept>.18 Wiggins
intends his terminology to suggest the Aristotelian distinction
between substantial alterations and mere changes; a red thing
can persist if painted green (a mere change), but a tree does
not survive being chopped into logs (a substantial alteration).
Note however that the covering noun schema, (CN), does not make
17. For a survey of the literature on count nouns see Griffin,
1977, p.23.
18. Wiggins 1980, pp.21-25, 59-74.
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u•• of Bodal not1onae ftV reason for coining the more neutral
tera. ·'covering noun" II is to avoid the•• Aristotelian
connotations because. as we shall see in the next two chapters,
there are aereologists who distrust the Aristotelian
distinction between .ere changes and substantial alterations
while .aintaining that there is a Bigni£icant class o£ covering
nouns. A ••reolog1at 18 likely to aainta1n that covering nouns
indicate the t ••poral "length I' of :four d1Bens1onal obJects but
do not apply to th. obJects e •••ntially.
The tera .Icovering noun" is use£ul in expl icating the
strategi•• aon1ata us. in analyzing putative cases of aultiple
occupancyD Those who favor what I called the
contingent-pr8d1cat. analysis are aa1nta1ning that there 18 a
t.ndency to erron8oualy think that certain count nouns. for
.x••pl•• ·'.t.atue, I' are covering noun.; on this view. there are
£ewer covering noun. than aany philosophers are inclined to
suppa... Tho•• who favor the aucceasion of obJects approach
tend in th. opposite direction" supposing there to be More
covering noun. than one a1ght initially suppoa8.
2.2 TWO POPULAR PRINCIPLES OF IDENTITY
Th. £1rat o£ th. two principles which figure proainently
~n th. atandard cr1~1qu•• o£ both Geach and the .onists is
that." 1£ F 1. Q count noun and the expression Ita 1. the salle F
sa bll 1. true ~h.n~ with the exception o£ elliptical uses, the
expr•••1on I'. 1. an F and b 1a an F and a:::b u 1s true. For
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8xaapl., i£ this Chevy is the saMe car that tailgated .e
ye8t.rday~ then this Chevy is a car which is identical to aD
obJect that is a car and tailgated .e yesterday. Let us
for.uleta the general principle.
(1) 1£ a and b are singular ter•• , and F is a count
noun~ then the sentence "a 18 the sa.a F 8S b'· has a
non-elliptical reading which i.plies that a is
ident.ical to b.
By an elliptical use of lithe aaa. F." I have in aind cases
such as when I point and aay "t.hat". t.he saae car I own ~ II and
Nean that the car to which I aa pointing 1s of the .saG Model
aa ay car. Or when r say. "t.hat'••1' cat" and mesn that.. the
cat to which I aa pointing 18 behaving like ay cat. 19
Copi•• o£ a book. pr•••ings o£ a record, and statues foraed in
the aa•••old can be said to be the sa•• book, record or statue
re.pectively. Principle (I) allows for auch elliptical
readings of I·X 1. t.he sa•• F aa V.·· while positing
non-elliptical usee that entail strict identity.
A slight weakening of (I) allows for soa.what greater
generality. So••••reolog1ata20 aainta1n that the ter.s 8
and b in " a 1. the as•• F as b l • re:fer. at least on soae
occaa1one_ to distinct teaporal parts of on. F. For 8
philosopher who accept. t ••poral parts. auch en analysis would
provide :for a plaue1bl. reading of such ••nt.ences aa "th.is 1.
19. Ex••pl. fro. J18 Higginboth•••
20. Gabbay and tlor.Yc.ik~ IISa••ne• 8 and Individuation, II 1973/1
pp.513-526.
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the sa•• piece of gold I bought 1" Italy but not the seas
ring"' : the .. this" refers to a te.poral part o£ both a ring
(which was net bought in Italy) and a piece of gold <which was
bought in Italy>. Whatever the aerita of this analysis~ it
shar•• with (I) the consaquence that only one F is directly
involved in the relevant readings o£ " 8 is the 88.8 F as b. 1I
An appropriately weakened version of (1) 18,
(I') If a and b ere singular ter.a~ and F is ~
conerat.. count. noun. t.hen there 18 a reading of u a is
the sa•• F as bit which entails either that a=b or
that there 1. an F of which a and b are both partsM
What 18 the status of (I) and (I')? They are extremely
natural and plausible a ••uapt1ona that are frequently and
understandably appealed to without question. Exercisaa in
introductory log1~ books aaaua. that you will treat "1s the
sa•• F as" in the aanner suggested by (!). The extreae
reaiatanc& aet by both Geach and Chiahola suggest the appeal of
the two versions of the principles.
The second principle aa1ntains, loosely speaking, that
covering noun. are ubiquitous and can be identi£ied readily by
co.p.~.nt speaker. of the language. I hesitate to call
anything 80 loo••ly atated a ··principle.·· Perhaps 1twQuld be
bett.r described aa an a••uaption. At any ~ate, it is co••~nly
.ad. and carri•• with it 81gni£icant consequences for monism.
<II) Engli8h contains .any count nouns that are also
covering noun. end a coapetent speaker can
d1a~ingu1.b covering fro. noncover1ng nouns.
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How do we know for a particular F if it is 8 covering
noun? In other word&_ how do we know if it is true £or all K
that if x is an F at one .a.ant. it 18 an F at every .o~ent?
This 1& a d1££icult question and no one would deny that there
are di££1cult cases. But it is roesonable to suppose that
ordinary .peekers .ark the distinction between alterations and
.ere change. in their talk of obJects. Ayers and Feld~8n
clearly realize that they are in the 81nor1ty in suggesting
t.hat the teras ··st.atue" and "person" are not covering nouns,
that ia. that the vandal does not literally destroy the obJect
which 1s the statue and that death 18 not the end of the entity
which 1. the person. It is tbe maJority view that the second
principle would have ua take seriously.
The ••cond a••uapt1on is frequently motivated by drawing
an analogy between th. purported teaporal function of covering
nouns and their clearer spatial £unction. Concerning spatial
ext.enaion.. it 18 rea.onable to a.au•• that there are "rultiss"
associated with a count noun which w. understand 1n tracing the
e~at1al boundar1•• o£ obJ.cts~ Part of understanding a teras
like "roo." or .. bou•••• is to be able to individuate their
.patial fora. For exaaple_ we learn that soaething can be part
o£ the a ••• house without being part of the sa•• rooa. 21
1£ ·'roo." can individuate a spatial yolu•••Maller than that
ind1 el1duated by ··hou••• •• why can't. ...ta'tu.·' delineat.e t ••poral
21. QU1n~on_ The Na~ur. of Things. 1973, pp.70-71, for
botb the spatial and t ••poral clai•••
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boundaries shorter than those delineated by "piece of clayU?
2.3 ANOTHER LOOK AT HONIS"
In this section I shall aeke explicit what may already be
clear. naaely. that (I) and <II) are incoapet1ble with the
,"
various .trategiee suggested earlier for defending monis••
On the one hand, if the Bon1at analyzes putative cases of
co-occupancy in tera. o£ a succe••ion o£ obJects, he will
contradict (I) and .yen the weaker (I'). What advocates o£ the
standard approach to .a••ne••~.tate.ents have in co••on is the
••n•• that. ordinary referenc•• to t.he ··sa... F" entail that
there ia but one F at i.sue. This is not to say that the
aon1at 18 clearly wrong in providing analyses which depend on
succ•••iona os obJects; the point is s1~ply to localize the
ar••• o£ eontrov.ray. on. of which 1. <I).
On the o~b.r hand••upp~•• th. aoniat £ollows the
augg••tiona of Ay.ra and Feldaan; where .any find a covering
noun. th. aonist £inds only a contingent predicate. But this
approach will con£11ct with (II) according to which
diat1nguiah1ng coyering noun. £roa noncov.r1ng nouns is a
••~t.r o£ l1ngu1at1c coap.tence and do•• not require subtle
philoaophical inquiry.
A clo••r look at th. ea.. o£ tb. sweater and the piece of
yarn r.v••la th••xt.n~ o£ ~h. conflict between the second
principle and th••on1.t~. us. of the contingent-predicate
atrat..gy. 1£ "pioce o£ yarn' l and II.waster'· are both covlitr1ng
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nouns. then it ae••• rea.enable to suppose that the piece of
yarn a1ght cea•• to exist whil. the sweater reDsined (imagine
extonsive repairs to the sweater) or that the piece of yarn
reaeined while the sweater was destroyed <through unravelling>.
The point of the example is that a sweater is not naturally
treated as a phs•• of a piece o£ yarn (since it may be
constituted of d1£~.r.nt place. at different tlaes) nor 1s a
piece of yarn plausibly thought to be a phasQ of a aweatGr.
Letting F be a swester and G a piece of yarn. we have a ca.~ in
which F cannot be treated as a phs•• of the G nor vice verse.
Ayers' treataent of the cas. 1s inatructiv8 .
••• it a1ght be thought that in unravelling a£ the
sweater we re.ovo or de.troy one principle of unity,
and by cutting the thread we r ••ove a ••condG Eaeh
operation 1s po.sible without the other, and &0 e~ch
principle o£ unity ••••• independent of the other.
The la~t.r and Rore r.a11at1c view. howGvsr_ is that,
1£ a .wester con.tats of a single thread. then this
••ana only that th. d1£ferent part. of the wool hang
tog.ther in .ore than one way. and 80 have a unity
that 1••or. difficult to de.troy than would
oth.rw1•• be the c ••••
Roughly, the unity or atructura of a sweater knitted
£roa a hundred s.parate threads is d••troyed by
unravelling, and the unity of a single thread by
cu~ting: wb11. the uni~y of a sweater knitted fro. a
81ngl. thr8ad aurv1v•• either operation but not both.
22
On Ayera' view. there wee one obJect. a piece of yarn.
which we. knit into a aw.at.r and r ••alned the sa•• obJect
d••pit. no longer b.1ng a pi.c. of yarn; it r ••ained a
conttnuou__ .at.rial body throughout. Whatever the
22. Ayera 1974, pp.132-33.
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plausibility of Ayers' elata, it clearly entails the reJoct1on
of both ".wester" and "piece of yarn" as covering nouns 0 As
indicated by the title of his paper. "Identity without
SOrtal.... he readily accepts our conclusion that his de£ensa of
aoni•• 1. 1nco.p.~1bl. with the two assuaptions that .any other
philoaophera adopt.
SECTION SU""ARY
This ••ction hae isolated two wid••pread •••uapt1ona
concerning identity and cgunt nouna. and indicated the extent
of the conflict between th••• a8suapt1ons and the strategies
open to .ani.te. While the two as.umptions are hardly proven,
they are well-aot1vated: it ia not surprising that .any
philosopher. reJect .oni•••
SECTION 3
A SERIOUS OB3ECTION TO THE CONTINGENT-PREDICATE ANALYSIS
In the previous ••et1on w. noted that the Monist Rust give
up at le.at one o£ two attractive and plausible principles
r.la~1ng count noun. and identity. We further saw that 80••
aoniats. e.g. Ayers. s.e virtue in their reJection o£ what thGY
take to be an arran.aua theory of identity. Ayera aainta1ns
that concrete count noun. other than "aaterial obJect·· (and its
like) are rest.rict.ion. of ·'aat.erial obJec:t'· in the sens. that
if 'Ia 1. the as•• F aa b U 1. true. t.hen so ia lie 18 the aaa6l
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msterial obJect as b" and that sn F is strictly speaking
created or destroyed only i£ the ma~erial body which
constitutes the F is created or destroyed. I believe tha~
Ayers' conception, unlike Chisholm's, is not only
counter1ntu1t1ve~ but fatally flawed. I begin by presenting
two abstract character1%st1ons o£ the flaw and then develop
several illustrations of the difficulty.
3.1 THE GENERAL PROBLEM AND AN EXAKPLE
The puzzles diacu••ed 1n previous sections May be
characterized as involving the "same aatter with distinct
fora•• •1 Before and aft.~ the vandal's attack.. the saMe bronze
was a coherent whole. The yarn was woven into a sweater, and
then only gradually was the .attar changed through repairs.
Such cases lend the.selves to Ayers' approach. But it would be
highly misleading to concentrate, aa doe. Ayers in his paper,
only on such ca.... The d1f£1cult cases will be ones in which
one see.s to be dealing with the "saae fora but distinct
matter. ,t
It is also uae£ul to think of the dif£iculty for the
contingent-predicate analysis as one of branching. The
'·geo••try·· o£ such ca.es rules out the poaa.1bi 1 i ty o£ say109
that the F and the G stand in a relation analogous to that of
the ••nator and the person.
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ti... -.
The phrase ·'t.he F" cannot be analyzed along the lines o£ "the G
while it 1s an Fl. becaua. there are tiaea at which the F is
either not a G. or at least not the aaa. G aa it was
previously. Sia11arly. "the Gill cannot be analyzed aa &
disguised. eont1ng.n~ predicate o£ the F. And unlike the case
of the sweater and the pi_c. of yarn. there 18 no third
covering noun <.atarial obJect> whic~ 1. plausibly said to
subau•• both F and G.
A detailed axe.ple should aske the.. points 80aewhat Ie••
abatract. Consider again Feld.8n~. suggestion that the
relationship between persons and their bodi.. 1. analogous to
that relation.hip co••on ••nse a... between "senatore and
persons. Roughly .p.ak1ng~ a person 18 a body in working
order. Note again th8 analogy with coaputers which can atop
working without ce.a1ng to exist. Such a view. which FeldB6n
lists as one option :for t.h. ••••t.eria11at, " do•• allow :for a
straight£orward r ••pon•• to th. per.on/body dualist who .aka.
auch o£ ttle £act that bod1•• cont.inue to exist after .ath.
persan ceases to exi.~a·· Pr••uBably. such a aater1aliat would
welco•• the con••qu.nc. that on hi. analyaia. contra De.cart•• ,
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persons cannot exist disembodied. We have already noted one
obJection to Feldman's suggestion, namely, that despite its
formal resolution of a puzzle, it diverges radically from our
firm sense that "person" is a covering noun. But there is a
further difficulty.
We are now in a position to see why the aaterialist
position Just outlined has such difficulty with branching. For
the sake of illustration, let us follow the many philosophers
who maintain these days that persons can undergo
body-transplants, that is, that the same person could have a
different body. Sameness of senator entails sameness of
person, since a senator cannot break away from the person who
he or she is. But sameness o£ persons cannot be analyzed in
terms of sameness of bodies if body-transplants are
possible. 23
transplant ~
person
body
Of course the materialist may revise his position. He
might maintain that the predicate "person" is a contingent
predicate of bodies and that sameness of persons does not
entail identity of bodies but rather a possibly complex
23. This argument appears frequently in the literature on
personal identity. See longer note B.
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.uc~e.sor relation. Such e view simply gives up thm
contingent-predicate strategy and adopts t,ns successor
approach.
3.2 THE PROBLE" OF INCREASE
;
I hope it is clear that efts.a of branching wo~ld pose 8
difficulty for the contingent-predicate analysis. But are
there any convincing cases o£ branching? As noted earlier, a
aon1at .ay well ai.ply reJect caaes involving persons and their
bodies aa irrelevant; or he aight find talk o£ body-transplants
to be silly and unconvincing.
Aa Chiahola not••• 24 th. probl•• o£ branching need not
involve such ••oteric case. as body-transplants. He credits
Aristotle and Aquinas with the central insight. Arimtotle
wrote:
On. a1ght raise this dif£1culty: What ia it that
grows? Is it that to which soa.thing is added725
In hi. co•••ntary on this passage, Aquinas Rakes the point Bore
explicitly.
He [Ar1.to~1.] says therefore first, that, since a
thing grow. by the addition of soaething. the
question atill r ••a1na aa to what it is that is
increa.ed: whether only that to which aoaeth1ng'1.
added. but not what 1. added, or whether both are
1ncreaaed~26
24. E§£8on and ObJ.ct_ 1976, III and Appendic•• A and e.
25. Ari.~otl•• Generation and Corruption. 321a, cited in
Chi.hola. 1976. polS7.
26. Aqu1naa. Expoait1on o~ ~r1.totle'a Treatis. on Generation
.nd Corruption. Book I~c1ted in Chiahola, 1976, p.222.
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Consider again the case of the statue and the piece of'
bronze. Suppose the statue, as originally cast, had a a!nor
de£ect; perhaps a finger was aisaing. At t. a finger is added.
The statue would appear to increase in size: a£ter time t it
contains a bit aore aatter than prior to tia. t. There 1s
another obJect, perhaps we can characterize it as the original
piece o£ bronze, which does not increase. but reaeins the same
size and has a finger attached to ito The "original piece" aay
see. odd. but one can imagine an art historian tracing its
outline and a aetallurg1st COMparing ita co.position with the
co.position of the added finger. At one time. the st8tue and
the original piece occupy the saae spatisl voluae. but at t,
t.hey "branch" and c:o.e to occupy distinct volu... (one of which
is a proper part of the other).
/'
finger added
statue
original piece
As with other caaes of branching. the putative
counterexample to the principle of unique occupancy cannot be
l-saolved using the contingent-predicate analysis. Chiohola
tak•• the axe.ple as evidence for his claim that the SuccQssion
strategy .uat be followed. Many will aee in it yet further
evidence £or the wied,"11 of a four-dillensionsl approach.
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3.3 THE PROBLEM OF SCATTER
Another type of' branching is evidenced by "scattered"
obJects. Recall froM chapter one Cartwright'. clsvQr example
of two ObJ8Cts occupying the saa. spatial volu•• at a tiaQ; he
has ua imagine a matchbook. Charlie. fro. which a aatch has
been reaoved and placed nearbyM Suppo.e. aa seeas natural
enough, that when a aatch 18 reaoved fro. a Matchbook, the
.etch 18 no longer a part of the aatchbookft 27 But this
feature o£ aatchbooks ia by no ••an8 universal. There are
other covering nouns which apply to obJects which can scatter.
Certainly a part can be teMporarily r ••oved fro. ay car, and My
encyclopedia can be widely scattered. Let us invent a count
noun. aatch-book £ua1on. which applies to the au. of the
.atchbook and ita aatchea. even if the aatches are detached.
The volumes occupied by the .atchbook and the aatchbook fusion
diverge over tiMe.
aatchbook £usion
Jlatchbook
On. likely respon.. is to argue that "original pieces" and
··.atchbook fuaions 8 • are extreaely unnatural obJ6lcts ~ Two
27. Cartwright, ··Scattered Things. II 1975.
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replies to this charge of unnaturalness are in order.
First, even 1£ one could draw.s clear distinction between
"natural" and "'contrived" obJects,. how would this help the
defender of the contingent-predicate analysis? Is thB idea to
restrict the strong occupancy principle to natural obJects?
Thus quali£ied. the p~inciple is o£ little interest.
Second. the axa.plea place .aJor obstacles in the way of
characterizing a notion of an "uncontrived" obJect which does
not appeal to huaan conventions. The problea. as Cartwright
notea. 18 that our intuitions concerning naturalness see~ to
depend on context. A statue may increasa in voluae when a
£1nger is attached, but what 1£ a wad o£ gu. is stuck on?
Whether obJects 1ncrea•• or decrease with add1t1ons~ whether
they scatter or fail to scatter with deeresaes. appears to be a
Matter of context and convenience. For the aonist. the proble.
with such a result is that there is no reason why a convention
could not arise that pera1tted two obJects to occupy the saae
place at the 88.8 tiae.
SECTION SUMMARY
I heye argued that the proble.. of increase end decraasQ
reveal the extr••• lia1tat1ona of the contingent-predicate
strategy which soa. aonista use in defendi~g their position.
So•• , especially those who accept the two principles discuaaed
in ••ction two, will see in this yet another reason for
reJecting all version. of .onis.. But nothing in the arguaent
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thus far haa ruled out the possibility that the succession
strategy will. when applied relentleaslyp yield ~ de£ensible
version 0% mania.. It 1s this possibility, most successfully
explored by Chisholm. to which I now turn •
••• all obJects to which we ascribe identity. without
observing their invariableneae and un1nterruptednea.,
are such as consist o£ a succession of related
obJecta. 28
We cannot say. speaking according to the great truth
of thinga. that the aea. whol. is preserved when a
part 1& lost. 29
SECTION 4
ORDINARY OBJECTS AS SUCCESSIONS OF PRIMARY OBJECTS: CHISHOLM'S
MONIsn
Chishol.'a basic idea 18 not un£aa11iar to students of
ph11osophy.30 In their reading of Hu.e, _oat philosophers
were first exposed to the idea that what we ordinarily take to
be obJects~-cha1r•• rocka. statuea. and tr••a--are in fact
successions o£ acre fund••ental obJects, that ordinary talk of
identity involves a great deal o£ 100•• £eigning. In recent
yeara. Chi.hola has been a £orce£ul de£.nder of such a view,
28. Hu••• Treati••• p.2SS.
29. Le1bniz. New E••ays, cited in Chi.hola, 1976, p.145.
30. S•• longer note C for a list o£ the relevant essays by
Chi.hola.
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though without Hu••'. phenoaena11atic overtones. Chisholm's
position. perhaps the .oat fully developed and carefully
critiqued of succ9ssion views. merits a close looko Our
overall goal is to aee how plausible it really 1s and what _.ts
consequences are for issues concerning both teMporal and .odal
properties.
4.1 CHISHOLM' S nKEREOLOGICAL ESSENTIALISK··31
The advocate o£ a 8uccmasion analysis aust answer at least
two basic questions. First. 1£ what we t~k. to be ordinary
obJects are .ere 8~cces8ionap ~h.n what are the funda.ental
obJects which aake up the succession? Second. how is our
ordinary talk o£ obJects and identity related to these More
funds.ental obJects?
For Chishola_ the fundauental obJects are a~-called
"priaary obJects" that aatia£y the principlo of II1aereolog1cal
es.ential!•• ," according to which ~ pr1aary obJGct cannot 961n
. or a 10•• a part w1thout b81ng deatroyed. 32 Conversely. a
priaary obJect p.raiats 80 long as it neither gaina nor la.as
part.. Chishol.'. na•• for hi. approach. ··.ereological
e •••ntiali•• _U underscor•• what he take. to be the nature of
g.nuine phya1cal obJect.; each part. no .atter how ••all. is
....ntial to the continued ex1atenc8 o£ the whole.
31. Chi.hal. l • u•• of ••••r.ological·· d1f£ara froD 81na.
5•• not.. D.
32. Chi.hola, 1976, pp.14S-157.
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According to Chishola, in sorting out our ordinary talk of
obJMcts and re1dentification it ia necessary to distinguish
between the 100s8 and popular and the strict. etru1
ph11osopbic;al senaea o£ the teras u1dentity lD, 11 88• 0 "_ and
lI·obJect'·. Moat puzzle. concerning identity are resolved by
care£ully reaoving aabiguiti•• in the relevant preaises. In
the strict and ph1108oph1cal sensa of identity, no primary
obJect is identical with any obJect other than itself; but in
the loose and popular sense. the priaary obJect which was my
car last year 18 said to be identical with the priaary obJect
which 1. currently ay car_ despite wear and tear_ replaceaent
of faulty parts. chang•• of tire•• etc.
In explicating his view. Chi.hola has u.ed a nuaber of
terns to character1z. the true nature of ordinary obJects. In
an early paper. obJect. in the 100•• and popular sense are
characterized .a "evolving syat••• o£ co.posita CI·· Ordinary
proper na••• are ssid to be. in t.ruth" "g8ner1c na..... for
pri••ry obJect.. JUGt aa in ordinary discourse, & nuaber of
distinct b•••balla Bay wear t.he t.itle_ "'ga.8 ball" (and on
di££erent days d1££erent trains of cara aaks up A.trak~&
··Pat.riot.'·). in the strict and philosophical view of things, as
t1•• pa•••• a nu.ber of distinct pr1.ary obJects wear the title
··Chriat.ie1a ftazda.·· 33 Borrowing froll a asd1eval tradition"
Chi.hola 8o••tiia•• calla ordinary obJects "entia successivs" as
33. Chiahala. 1969. pp.99-100. 131.
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opposed to "entia per se." Froll HUlIle and Russell.. Chishol.
inherits talk of "logical c:onst:r'uct1ons'" and "feigning
identity."3.
It ia u••ful to distinguish between individuation
(singling out an obJect at a .o.ant) and re1dent1£1cat1on
(idenli£y1ng the as•• obJect at a later tiMe). Concerning
. I
individuation. Chi.hol.~. views follow co••on sense: he
certainly doesn~t suggest that in the strict and philosophical
sen•• there are no statues p rocks, automobiles. etc.
Re1dent1£ication is another .attar. Here Chisholm reJects the
view o£ co••on sense. expressed in the first of the two
8ssuapt1ona appealed to by the critics o£ both Geach and
.oni••• ne.ely. that "x is the saa. F as y" normally entails
··X=l'··. He also aa1ntaina that our practice of identifying
d1at.inc't priaary obJects as "the aaae F" 1e highly convent1on8~_
in the senee that there are .any borderline cases and that
within lia1ta, different syate•• of reident1£lcat1on are
po••ible.
4.2 CHISHOL"~S TREAT"EHT OF THE OCCUPANCY PUZZLES
an.· lIlaJor advantage of Chiahola ~ 8 versj.on of monism is
that it p8raits ai.pl. resolutions of the puzzles presented in
.arlier .ection.. Consider the proble. of increase. Ch1ahola
aainta1ne ~b.t a£~.r the addition of thQ finger, it ia only in
34. Chi.hola, 1976, pp.97 .. ,104a
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the loose and popular sense that one can be said to havQ Uthe
saae statue. "35 Concerning tha ship of Theseusjl what is
clear is that strictly speaking, there are distinct ships
before and after the replace.ent o£ partsQ Whether or not one
has Ie'the sa... ship" in the 100S8 and popular sense may well be
indeteraina'te. since our loose practice of "feigning identity"
ad.ita of .any borderline c8a8s. 3G
What if. in the loose and po~ular sense. a statue is
d••troy8d by a vandal? I originally presented the case as one
of two obJ.cta. the statue and the piece of bronze, that
purportedly occupied the saae volu•• at the same time. For
Ch1ahola_ the situation can be accurately described only after
distinguishing a.ong sensea of "obJect II • 37 At .oat one
pr1aary obJect can occupy a yoluae at a tiae. but there is
nothing to prevelnt. CIIS pr1aary obJect £roa be.1ng linked
(idanti£1ed in the 100S8 and popular sensa) with distinct
priaary obJects at later t1aes utilizing distinct cr1teria of
reidenti£icat1on. This is only to note that the relations
·'st.at.ue successorll and "piece of bronze successor" are distinct
relationa according to Chi.bol.. That two entia succasaiv8 p O~
logical conetruct1ona. a1ght occupy the aaa. volume at the saae
35. Chi.hola, 1976. p.157.
36. The ship o£ Th•••ua 1. diecu•••d at length in ay chapter
£1V8. For Chi.hol.'••oat 8xtended discussion of the puzzle
... hi. 1969 artiel••
37. Chi.hola. 1973. pp.600-601.
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t1ae is neither a puzzle nor a reJection of monism when
properly understood.
4.3 MODAL CONSEQUENCES OF CHISHOL"~S MONISft
If ~h1ehol. is correct~ then ordinary language is a very
iaper£ect gUide for ontologists who are interested in what
there is and for philosophical logicians who are interested in
the I-logical i'oras ll o£ teaporal and .odal sentences. Though my
concern in this section 18 with the .adal implicstions of
Chi.hol.~8 .oni••• it ia useful to begin by considering certain
nan.odal contexts. For exaaple a ai.pIe past-tense sentence,
The car u••d to be blue,
which .any philosophical logicians would analyze as,
<Et)[(t < now) & 81ue(c.t»),
requires on Chishola'. view a aore coaplex analysis because of
the likelihood that th. current car 18 not in the strict and
philosophical sen•• identical with the car which usod to be
blue <perhaps the spark plugs have been changed). An analysis
along the lin•• suggssted by Chisholm involves the use of a
relation. " X at t 18 a priMary thing which is a successor car
of the pr1.ary thing y at t~." Sy..boli:zing the successor
relettor. ··C(x,t~y.t")_" the original sentence is equivalent to
(Et)[(t < now) & 81ue<c'.t> & C(c_now#c'.t>].
The original ••nt.nce, d••pite appearancea. does not involve
re£erence to one car; rather. it involves references to a
aucc•••ion o£ distinct priaary obJects~ each o£ which 10 a
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car. 3a
A aia11ar increase in coaplexity occur~ in the analysis o£
.odal sentences. To 8ay that the car could be painted red is
to say that there could be a priMary thing which would be a red
car and a succ••aor of the current cor; that is,
(Et>[<t ) now) & <>(Ec')(Red(c'~t) & C(c.now,c'.t»]
The red successor car in the possible future situation need not
be in the strict and philosophical sense identical to the
current car; indeed. the successor car 8ight never exist.
If Chi.hol.'s ontology of pri.ary obJects and logical
construction. 18 correct. then neither teaporal nor Modal
sentences can be analyzed in any~h1ng like the straightforward
Manner suggested in eextbooks on logic.
Is Chishola an .....ent1a11.t1" After all. he calls his
position ••••r.olog1cal e •••nttalis." and aa1ntains the Ilodal
principle that an obJect cannot gain or lose parts. It is
n.c••aery to distinguish between two thing- which Might be
...ant by ••••mential!••• ••
all the one hand" Chiahol. ia an "essentialist" i:f what is
••ant ia that he aaintaina that there ar& obJects which hsve
80•• o£ their properties •••entially and others accidentally.
Ac:cording t.o t.he pr1nc:1pla of " ••reological essentialisM, II
•
pr1aary obJects cannot gain or 10•• parts, and Chimhol. is
38. Cbi.bol.~. position concerning teaporal contexts is
analogou8 ~o Lew!.' ••odal theory. S•• longer note E.
-80-
11.4 CHISHOLM'S MONISM
perfectly willing to represent such principles by using the
unary .odal operators <> and O.
On the other hand, Chisholm is not an essentialist if what
is a.ent 18 that he believes that ordinary obJects have. at
least roughly, the nontrivial accidental and essential
properties which are reflected in Many philosophers' analyses
of ordinary language. The essential properties endorsed by
Ch1.hola are not those endorsed by the Aristotelian tradition,
which focuses on kind ter... Further~ore~ the essential
proper~1e. Chi.hola advocates are not particularly problematic
within the ••piricist tradition.
SECTION 5
CHISHOL"'S "OHIS" AND QUINE'S MEREOLOGY COMPARED
While there are significant d1££erences between Chisholm's
version of Boni•• and a four-dimensional, mereological ontology
of teaporal parts. such differences should not blind "us to a
nuab8r of deep siailarities. These a1.11arit1es aay be brought
out by noting ••veral ways in which both positions are
plauaible developaents of Hu•• 's reaarks on physical obJects
and identity through t1ae. Both Ch1shola and Quine show
conceptualist tandencies concerning the traditional puzzles of
identity through ti•• and aodality.
(1) Both Ch1shola and his four-di.ensional adversary take
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to heart Huae's talk of success1ona. 39 QUine, for example,
notes the analogy between his own ~·succession of momentary
st..g.... and Jluae ~ s "succession o£ ideas. II The di£ferences
betw.en Qu1ne~a aoaentary stages and Chiahol.~s primary things
are alight indeed 1£, as physicists suggest. ordinary obJects
gain and los. aolecules continuously. In other words. actual
priaary obJects aay be as aoaentary as Quine's momentary
stages.
(2) Both views rely on distinguishing between senses o£
e·ss•••• and ··obJect". Both aaint.a1n that resolving puzzlaa
concerning identity through tiRe requires aore obJects than are
dreeat of in our co••on-••nae ontology. Though the advocate of
a four-diaena1onal ontology countenances even .ore obJects than
does Chishola. the difference aay se•• a1nor compared with the
funds.ental decision to enlarge our co••an-sanse universe.
(3) Chishola £ollows those advocates of a four-diMensional
ontology who aaintain that auch in our practice of
re1dent.1:£1cat1on 1s ··conventional. 1040 They aeem to aean
that with regard to .any puzzling cases there is no fact of the
.atter and that reasonable decisions could be made in Bore than
one way: no a.aunt o£ studying the nature of ships or even of
our "conceptual .ch••••• will re80lve the ship of Theseus. 41
39. Chi.bola. 1969. p.132 ~rld Quine,. "Identity" Ostension.
and Hypo.tae1a.·· 19~3_ p."-
40. Chi.hola. 1969. Ppo97-98.
41. This conceptualist th••• is elaborated in chftpter five.
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Of course neither view is 1ncoapst1ble with the claim that some
uf our individuative and reidenti£icative practices are 80
rooted in our psyches--empir1cal or transcendental--that we
could not act otherwise.
(4) Both views are at odds with substantive theories o£
8saent1a11sa according to which obJects men1£est nontrivial
sets o£ both contingent and essential properties.
(5) Both viewe involve resolving puzzles concerning
ordinary obJect. by reference to entities that are unusual~ at
1.a8~ in the sense that one is very unlikely to have heard thea
discussed except by philosophers. Sellars notes that 8 central
distinction between the ··.an1fest·· (so.e would say
co••an-sense) view of things and the IIscient1f ic·· iMage is that
the aan1f••t 1.age dees not peril! t I·the postulation of
i.perceptible entities. and principles pertaining to them, to
explain the behavior of perceptible things. u42 Though
Quine'••o••nt~ry obJects and Chisholm's priaary obJects are
not i.perceptible. they do go beyond the Manifest i.mage as do
electrons and electro.agnatic £ielda.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
I began by distinguishing three ways--repudiat1on, the
contingent-predicate analysis, and the succession analys1s--in
which .on1a~. have r ••~onded to the traditional puzzles in
42. Sellara. "Phi lo.ophy and the Scienti:£1c Image of Man,'o
1963. p.7.
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which aore than one obJect appears to occupy a spatial volu~e
at a tiae. I explained the current unpopularity o£ monism by
appealing to two plausible and co••on assumptions concernJ.ng
covering nouns which cc,~·•.£licted with the various de£enses o£
.oni... The two aaauaptions have figured prominently in recent
critici••• o£ Geach~8 doctrine o£ relative identity. The
··proble. o£ branching" presented yet a further difficulty for
the contingent-predicate analysis. I then exa.jned Chisholm's
v.rs1on o£ Bont•• , which though it conflicts with the two
plausible aaau.pt1one discussed in section two_ is nonetheless
attractive because o£ its aiaple resolutions of the traditional
puzzles concerning 1d8nt1ty through t1ae. The Dost modal
e1gn1£1cant consequence of Cbishol.~s ontology 1s that there
are no obJects which bave the .odal properties which are
attr1but.d to ord1nsry obJects by thoae 1n the Aristotsl1an
tradition. Finally. I co.pared Chisholm and Quine's views end
found a oonceptua11.t and .ap1rlc1at core of agreement.
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II. LONGER NOTES
LONGER NOTES TO CHAPTER II
A. Though I avoid it_ I suspect t~at the notion o£ a
'Ocr1terion of identity" is illportant and can be made relativoly
pr.c1... There i. an analogy witb talk of lithe rules of
English gra••ar.·· Both the individuation of obJects end the
foraulat1on of gra••atical sent.ncss are extr.aely
sophisticated huaan activities which are reasonably thought to
~')e "rule governed .111 One striking feature of tIle rulGs in each
ca•• is that they cannot currently be written explicitly. Ona
even wonders 1£ lithe rul.... deln~te. one set; might not
different people us. different rule. in aaking
re1denti£1cat1ons. Sur_Iy 80a. wo~k is need~d to clarify the
.at~er. Characterizations of criterion of identity as sketchy
as Geach' .--"That. in accordance with which we Judge whether
identity hold•• II • ·'43--are not tlelp:f'ul e Fortunately II Just
a8 ons can say a great deal about gra••ar without being
co.pletely precis. as t.o what. 18 .sent by lithe r\llea of
gra••ar_" .0 on. ean defend principles relating count no~ns and
identity without reference to "criterion of identity."
Bil There is cona1derable d1scuasion o£ "branching" ca••• in
the literature on personal identity.44 In c~e.a of
43. G••ch, RefGrenCM and Genera11ty_ 1980, p.64.
44. 5•• PQrry, 1975 and Rorty. 1976.
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··Iorain-transplant•• II "the fora (person) 1s preserved while the
mutter (body> 1a changedM Lew1845 give8 th1a as his reason
fc)r thinking that a conteaporary ".atar1aliet II cannot follow
F.ld.an~8 suggestion and give a contingent-predicate analysis
of th. terll "p.raon. OI
c. Chi.hola haa addr••••d questiona concerning .odal1ty and
ontology in a aeri•• of papers over the paat £1£t.en yeara.
Hi. 1967 pap~r, IIIdentity through Po••ible Worlds: 50.e
Que.tion•• •• expr••••• doubts about tho coh.rene. of thG then
fashionable talk of transworld identity. Ch1shol.~8 aonist1c
resolution o£ the traditional prable•• o£ identity through t1ae
first appeared in "The Loa•• and Popular and the Strict and
Ph11oaoph1cal SenaG o£ Identity, ow 1969 and was further
developed in "Proble•• of Identity # I' 1971. The connections
between identity through t1•• and aoda11ty were explored in
··Parts as Eaeer.t.1al to their Wholes .. U 1973,. and ul1ereological
Essential!•• : So•• Further Cons1derations." 1975. An .,xcellent
exposition of the .aterial in the previou8 essays is contained
in Person and ObJect. 1976.
D. Our uauel talk of part. and whole. concerns ordinary
thr••-d1••n~ional obJ8cta. Th. philosophers who I aa calling
mereolog1sta see an analogy betwe.n the u8ual relation of
45. Lewis, "Countarparta o£ Per.ona and their Bodi•• ~"
1972" p.202.
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spatial part-hood and the relation a.on~ four-dimensional
,voluaes which 18 eo••ti.es celled to.poral part-hooda Chishola
calla his position "llereolog1cal esaentialis." because he
claia. that the spatial parts of an obJect are essential to it.
I avoid Chishol.'s use o£ ullereologic:al,," which I reserve for
teaporal parts. Chishola carefully distinguishes spatial and
te"poral parts in Person and ObJect" "'·he Doctrine of
Temporal Parts." 1976. pp.138-147.
~. Chisholm's views on t ••poral properties parallel those of
Ls~'1s on .adal properties. For LCilWis" an obJect is "world
bound" and in "ident1£ying obJects across possible worlds" we
feign identity and use 81milarityo Chisholm's primary obJects
are temporally bound and only ai.1Iar. not identical, to their
successive "temporal counterparts.·' Just as Lewis believes
that the logical form of ordinary .odsl statements is Much ~ore
coaplex than is presented in treatments of standard quantified
modal logic, Chiahola maintains that the logical form of
ordinary teaporal stateMents is .ore coaplex than 19 captured
by the usual treatllent in terms of subJects alld tan",cad
predicates. Chapter four contains a More extended discussion
of Lewis' view.
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PLURALISTIC ONTOLOGIES
Th1. chapter discusses the csss for a pluralistic ontology
of physical obJects and th. extent to which this case relies on
modal argu••nta. Recall fro. chapter one that e pluralistic
ontology is one in which both the Monist's strong occupancy
principle and th•••reolog1st's weak occupancy principle are
£a1•• : in other worda, the pluralist allows thet two distinct
physical obJects might occupy the ea•• apatial voluae at every
Mo.ent of their respective existence••
As noted in chapter one, the statue paradox contains the
basic element. required for an argusent supporting pluralism.
that 1a, one might de£end the following prea1ses.
(1) s = the statue
(2) b = the piece of bronze
(3) (t) [v(s.t> = v(bpt)]
(4) OLua-p(b>
(5) ~<)LuJlp(.)
(LL) (x)(y)[x=y =) (Fx =) Fy)]
.Slid conelude,
QED a~b
QED The strong and weak occupancy principles are false.
Thua, the statue "paradox" ia resolved by arguing that it 1s
nothing aorQ than a countersxaaple to the strong and weak
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occupancy principles. so .anism and .erelogicalism are false.
Of course there is nothing special about the statue and
the piece of bronze: siailar arguments can be made using other
putative cases of Multiple occupancy. I shall call such
argu.ents modal argu.ents £or a pluralistic ontology. This
chapter focuaes on various efforts by pluralists to defend.
circuavent. and supple.ent such modal arguaents.
In section one. I ahall prosent a nuaber of i.portent
considerations frequently cited in support of modal arguMents.
Central points in the defense of the .odal arguaent are first.
that modal intuitions along the linea of (4') and <5') above
are very co••on and powerful. and s.cond~ that the analysis of
the sentences which uses .odal properties is natural. simple
and attractive.
Section two argues that a reliance on modal properties is
central to a defense of pluralisa. The section begins with an
argument designed to show why .odal arguaents are 80 central to
pluralism. I then criticize a recent attempt by Wiggins to
show that pluralism can be defended without 5n explicit appeal
to modal propertiesu Though Wiggins' arguaent fails, he
succeeds in illuminating i.portent connections between
identity. essentialism and pluralisM; these connections are
discussed in section three.
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SECTION 1
A DEFENSE OF THE BASIC MODAL ARGUKENT FOR PLURALISM
The basic .odal argument fo~ a pluralistic ontology may be
conveniently separated into two atepa: £irst. the defense of
the relevant .odal intuitions concerning what could or CQuld
not happen to obJects. and second: a defenae of the application
of Leibn1z~. law to .odal contexts. KV division into two steps
reflects two concerns that critics of Rodal arguaents have
expre.sed: f1ret. that the .odal sentences o£ ordinary English
are pre-scientific gibberish which are far too insignificant to
serve as pre_iss. in a ••taphya1cal argu••nt: and .econd. that
such sentences. even 1f true. cannot be analyzed in a
straightforward .aoner using .adal properties. The division
parallels the distinction b.t~een conceptualists concerned with
X's (in this case modal properties) who would eliMinate
altogether talk of X's and those who believe that analysis and
reconstruction are in order. 1
1.1 FIRST STEP: A DEFENSE OF "OOAL INTUITIONS
Central to the modal arguaent for pluralism are two
specific .odal claim.:
<4') The piece of bronz8_ b. could survive being
reshaped (ha••ered) into a lUMp. and
<5'} The atatu8_ 8. could not survive being reshaped
into a luap.
1~ S•• chapter one_ section four.
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These stateaents are about 8 statue and piece ox bronze. As
not.d in chapter one~ similar argu.ents could involve analogouB
cla1•• about ropes and hamaocks, or aolecules and aggregates of
atoas. D1f£erent defenders of pluralisM may be ~oat
comfortable with different cases of ault1ple occupancy.
A full discussion of (4') and (5')--or any s1a11ar
pair--would involve both a nu.ber of specific points about the
particular case as well as general observations about .Od61
claims. At this point I ahall exaa1ne the general issue: many
of the specifics will be considered in later aactions whQn
alternative analyses of .odal state.ents are discussed.
In eX8Mining the broad debate concerning the obJectivity
o£ modal cla1aa, it 18 use£ul to bear in mind the parallels
with similar debates concerning the obJectivity of stateMants
in such do.sins as eth1cs~ aesthetics, and theology. As I
noted in chapter one, these doaains hays in COMmon 8 running
battle between large nuabers of "realists" and large nUlRbers of
··conceptualists". In each case" tJ nuaber of philosophical
moves are aade by the realists: (1) appealing to intuitions,
particularly intuitions about parad1ga cases, (11) liMiting
one's claiMs, (iii) explaining the lack of s "decision
procedure." (!v) sharply separating fact fro. fiction, and (y)
distinguishing between the truth and what reasonable people
agree about. Let us consider the application by the pluralist
of these general realist the.ea to the case of Modality.
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1. INTUITIONS There is a significant degree of agreeaent
concerning modal sentences. Hodal claias are extreaely common.
The aoda11st notes that people .ake the. all the tiae. Surely
the burden of proof 18 on thoa., aainly philosophers with an ax
to grind, who w1ah to challeng_ the intuition.. Why would one
doubt that a atatu. cannot survive being ha~••r.d into e
shapelesa luap? Why question that a piece of bronZ8 could
survive such a trana£oraat1on? Such clai•••••• the plainest
co••on aenae.
Such app.ala to the plain.at co••on sense are of course as
good a place as any to begin the defense of a position. Note
the parallel with "realist" da£enee of either ethical or
aesthetic cla1•• which begin with an appeal to co••on sense.
Surely_ Hitler's slaughter of the six .11110n was i ••oral.
Surely, it would be wrong to put ownership rights for children
on the parket. Surely. Beethoven's Fifth Syaphony is
beaut1£ul. The realist with regard to either .odsl. aesthetic
or ethical claiss aaintains that his intuitions are clear as
they stand and do not benefit fro. conceptualist analyses or
reductions: along this line~ Kr1pke is fond of citing Bishop
Butler, "Everything is what it is and not another th1ng." 2
ii. LI"ITS The moderate defender of .odal intuitions sets
li.its to what state.ents are known to be true. A defense of
2. l\.ripke, "Identity ~nd Neces@ity;" 1971~ p~160.
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tile .odal atatea.nts <4') and <5'), or an analogous pair, can
certainly allow the possibility that there are other ,Modal
statements that are either not known to be true or are
intrinsically indeterainate, perhaps due to vagueness.
Analogously, one .ay defend the claim that some ethical
state.ants are obviously true without .aintaining that every
ethical statement is either true or false, let alone obviously
true or falsea
11i. LACK OF A DECISION PROCEDURE There 1s a striking
disaia11arity b.tween state.ants in the aore developed sciences
and stat••ents in such do.aios as aesthetics, ethics, and
aodality. It is not unco••on in our culture to hear the
difference described 1n teras of that between the "obJective"
which, 1& baaed on "hard" data, and the lIlerely "subJective, II
which is a matter o£ individual taste. The positiVists aade
much o£ this distinction, and while positivisM in any narrow
sense is dead as a philosophical aoveaent, a distinction
between obJective and subJective do.sins o£ discourse remains
potent. For exaaple, Quine with his eaphasis on physical
theory as the parad1ga of knowledge, follow~ the positiVists in
finding ethical, aesthetic and .odal stateMents problematic.
Cartwright also expresses concern about the basis of modal
JudgJlents:
I see no resaon_ then for thinking essentialism
unintelligible. At the sa.e time, I do not mean to
suggest that it i~ without its perplexities. Chie£
aaong these is the obscurity of the grounds on which
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ratings of attributes as essential or accidental are
to be made •.•• 3
A de£ender of modality must respond to those who claim
that Modal intuitions are aerely subJective. The modallat l s
response again parallels responses that ar'Q frequently made in
ethics and aesthetics. na.ely, that no one has shown_ despite
numerous atteapts, that disciplines which differ markedly from
the paradigM of physics are for that roason deficient. It lRay
Just be that very different .ethodo!og1es are appropriate in
different spheres.
!v. SEPARATING FACT FRO" FICTION The modal argu.ent for
plura11sa assuaes that one can, at least in soaa cases,
distinguish between those tranaforBations through which an
obJect persists and those which destroy 1t5 For exaaple,
someone de£ending a .oda! arguaent for p!uralia. based on the
statue paradox aaintains that 8 statue would persist despite
being painted but would be destroyed by being coapletely
crushed.
In ay discussion of monis., I noted that Ayers questions
the pluralists' view of statues end suggests, instead, that the
tara "statue" be treated aa a cont111gent predicate. MarJorie
Price develops Ayers l obJection. 4 She aa1ntains that the
pluralist is ai_ply not sufficiently iaaginative in considering
3. Cartwright, R., "50.e Reaarks on Essent1alisa," 1968, p.G26.
4. Price, "Identity through TiRe," 1977.
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what transfor.stions obJects can undergo. Consider the claim
that the terM " s tatue U is a covering noun and ttlst a statue
could not becoae a person. Price suggests that there are
counterexaaples to this claim because Aphrodite turned
Pyg.a11on~s statue into a person. naaely. Galatea. And if a
statue can becoae 4 person. why can't it beeo•• a piece of
bronze or Just about anything elsa? Only lia1ted iMagination
could prevent one fro. seeing these possibilities. Or SUPpOSQ
the theo~y of reincarnation 1a true: then a aouas could becoMe
a cat (in its .econd life).
The aodalist'. re.pons. is uno." On his view one Must
distinguish fact fro. fiction, genuine posa~111t1~ froa
.ere Myths that are logically cons1atent. S The
Pygaalion story 1s no doubt logically consistent; in this sense
it 1••elogically possible. 1I But there 1s no valid inference
fro. the extremely weak claim that so••thing is logically
possible to the cIa!. that it is .etaphysically p08aiblse
There is no reason to think that the Pyg.alion story is
anything other than a .ere .yth. S1a11arly. in ethics and
theology it is necessary to disparage a number of competing
theories as .ere .yths. No doubt Price will be skeptical about
the grounds used to separate fact froa fiction. But this may
ai.ply be another way of saying that she 18 not happy with the
intuitive method defended in (1)~ or that she be.oans the lack
5. Kr1pke. "Naa1ng and Neceasity,lII 1972, p.267.
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of & scientific research prograM discussed in (111).
v. SEPARATING METAPHYSICAL FROM EPISTEMOLOGICAL
POSSIBILITY A er1tic o£ the Rodal argument for a pluralistic
ontology aight also obJect, IDBut isn't it pr.suaptuoua to
d1••1sa the theory of reincarnation as a Mere myth. It could.
a£ter all. be true. Before Einstein. people used to think that,
nothing was aore certain than that Euclidean geoaetry correctly
described apao8o" At this point the aodalist needs to
introduce another distinction: call so.eth1ng
ep1steaologically possible i£ it 18 coapatible with the
available 8videnca. 6 The episteMologically possible Bust
be distinguished fro. the aetaphYs1cally poss1bls p Just aa
in science one .ust distinguish between the true theory (which
aay not be known) and the various theories ooapatible with the
evidence.
Kripke ably defends this distinction in his discussion o£
"contingent ident1ties. "7 He argues that if the morning
star 1s identical to the evening star, then they would be
nec••sarily identical. One .sy defend this without cla1aing
that we know whether the aorn1ng star and the evening star are
in fact identical a In 8hort~ if .eta: hysical possibilities are
obJective, then one auat allow that they could be aistaken.
Even our b.at evidence p rationally considered, Might lead us
6. Kripke. 1972. pp.149-51.
7. Kr1pke, 1971, pp.153-163.
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sstray.
A a1m11ar distinction is .ads in ethic. and aeBth~t1cs.
One he. to allow that there _ay be aore to be learned. that
what we now take to be certain could turn out to be false.
The five ~ons1der~tlons and distinctions Just sketched
provide a powerful case ~or taking .adal 1ntu1tions~ cont.re
QUine, vary aer1oualy. Whether this case is eventually
accepted or reJ.cted~ there is little doubt that the reliance
on .odal intuition. in the Bodal argument for pluralism is
plausiblSa
1.2 SECOND STEP: A DEFENSE OF nODAL PROPERTIES
The pluralist ma1ntains not only that the modsl statements
(4~) The piece of bronze, b, could survive being
reshaped (ha••ered) into 8 lump. and
(5') The statue, s, could not survive being reshaped
into a luap,
are true (at least 80ae such pair is true) but further, that
one aay validly infer £ro. the pair that the statue is not
identical with the piece of bronze. What Justi£ies this
in£erence? Why should it be leg1t1aate to conclude in the
above case that the statue is not identical to the piece of
bronze, but not leg1t1aate to draw the same conclusion from the
following pair:
John believes that the statue he bought is beautiful.
John believes that the piece o£ bronze he sold is now
an amorphous luap.
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One can~ot co~clude from these premises that the statue is not
identic31 with the piece sold last year because John may be
mistaken in his beliefs.
The pluralist will be qUick to explain that modal contexts
are transparent whereas belief contexts are not. But this is
only to relabel the problem. Why think that modal contextg are
transparent? A£ter all, &s we bhall see in the next chapter,
Gibbc~d. Lewis~ Quine and other mereologists deny that they
are.
Three considerations favoring the treatment of modal
contexts in ordinary language as transparent are (1) that it
appears to sccord with the structure of English, (1i) that it
appears to be a fruitful hypothesis. and (iii) that the
alternatives are considerably more complex.
these turn.
Let us consider
i. STRUCTURE A maJor attraction of treating modal
contexts in ordinary language as transparent is that it
licenses an especially simple structural analysis of modal
sentences. On the hypothesis that modal contexts rna}' be
treated as unary, transparent contexts* the resulting logical
for•• are especially close to the original aentent '~. which
they match. part by part, qUite closely. This notion of a
··clolle fit" is soa.what Ya9u~. but the basic idea 1s simple,
namely. that other things being equal. an analysis of a
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sentence is to be preferred which "preserves structure" in t.he
sense that it neither adds nor subtracts parts.
that sentence.
(4') The statue could not be clump.
It is natural to think of the sentence as having four parts: a
singul.ar terll. lithe statlJe"; a modal verb phrase. "could be'·: a
predicate phrase" u a lUJIlp"; 3nd a logical operator. "not ...
These £our parts are re£lected 1n the representation o£ (4')
as,
(4) - ~ LUllp (§.).
i1. SUCCESS Treating modal contexts as transparent, unary
contexts appears not only natural but also quite fruit£ul.
Philosophical logicians have been offering foraslizationa o£
fragaents of English for at least fifty years. The great
success story is £irst order quantification theory within which
a nuaber of arguMents may be successfully analyzed. Other
areas of discourse have been more recalcitrant. Standard modal
logic appears to be. at least relatively spe8k1ng~ a success
story. Compare Modal logic with deont1c or eplstemic logic.
The atteapta to forMalize both epistem1c and deont1c logic
using a unary operator have run into numerous relatively simple
counterexamples. By way o£ contrast, the putative
counterexamples to the standard analysis of modal sentences
using Modal logic have turned out to be either fallacious or
extra.ely coaplex, as is the statue puzzle.
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111. COMPARISONS My principal a1m in this thesis is to
compere and contrast alternative analyses of modal sentences
and the ontological assumptions associated with each analysis.
A maJor strength of the straightforward analysis o£ modal
sentences as involving a unary, transparent operator is that it
is siMpler than the alternative offered by the monist,
Chisholm. which involves quantification over primary obJects.
The straightforward analysis is also si.pler than the analyses
(explored in the next chapter) offered by mereologistsc The
defender of pluralism will no doubt stress this comparative
si.plici~y. Though SiMplicity does not by itself settle the
issue~ it is an important consideration and one that f~vors the
standard treat.ents of modal sentences in terms of a unary,
transparent operator.
In conclusion, I have argued that pluralism is plausibly
defended by an appeal to Modal argu.ents. Two maJor steps in
the defense of the .odal arguaent were first, a Justification
of relying on Modal intuitions such as (4') and <5'). and
second~ a Justi£ication of the claim that modal contexts in
ordinary English are appropr1&tely represented using a
transparent, unary operators Since part of the srguaent
involves a co.parison with alternatives, a fuller evaluation of
the arguaent aust wait until the aereologicsl alternative has
been developed. However, even without exa.in~ng all the
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alternatives, it is clear that the modal argument h8~
considerable intrinsic appeal.
SECTION 2
DOES PLURALISM REQUIRE MODAL ARGUMENTS?
My topic is the defense o£ pluralist ontologies and yet I
have £ocused almost exclusively on modality. Are the two
topics really so intimately connected? Perhaps there are
considerations fevoring a pluralistic ontology of physical
obJects that have nothing whatsoever to do with modality. Such
an argument would be welcome to the modalist, for pluralism
would then be an independently defensible position, rather than
a curious consequence of seeaingly unrelated theses concerning
modality. And 1£ no such argument can be found, then pluralism
will appear questionable to those who find the modal argument
unconvincing and think that pluralism is inherently
implausible.
I doubt that there are nonmodal arguments for a
pluralistic ontology of physical obJects. This doubt 1s baBed
in part on having failed to find such arguments in the
literature and in pert on a siMple argument (given below> that
there could not be such an argument. In the next section I
exaa1ne and find wanting an attempt by Wiggins to provide
non.odal considerations favoring a pluralistic ontology;
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Wiggins does what I believe is inevitable, namely, to appeal,
at least tacitly, to the assumption that modal conte~ts have a
transparent reading-
I have spoken rather vaguely of a Dlnonmodal argument." It
may be use£ul to illustrate what I have in mind. Recall that
in criticizing monism, both mereologists and pluralists
appealed to teaporal properties to distinguish obJects which at
one time occupied the same spatial volume: to use Burge's
example, a hammock and the rope of which it is made are
distinct i£ the one existed at 8 time when the other did not.
In such cases, mereologists and pluralists alike appeal to the
transparency of temporal contexts: the argument in no way turns
on .odal considerations. This suggests a way in which the
pluralist might give a non.odal arguMent for his position,
na.ely, by presenting nonmodal properties on the basis of which
two obJects co-occupying the same spatia-temporal receptacle
might be distingUished.
2.1 WHY A NONMODAL ARGUMENT FOR PLURALISM IS UNLIKELY.
There is reason to be skeptical 8S to whether there could
be 8 nonmodal argument for a pluralistic ont~lo9Y. Suppose x
and yare physical obJects which occupy the same spatial volume
at every ma.ent of their respective existences. Since they are
physical obJects, they are composed of atoms (or other
particles). Which ataas? Since x and y occupy the same
spatial volume. it seems they must be composed o£ the saae
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atoms. Similarly, they must have the same weight, the same
shape, the saae color, and so forth. Indeed, since they appear
to have the same physical properties at every moment during
which they exist, there appears to be nothing that could
distinguish thea. except, perhaps, modal properties. In other
words. the pluralist who wishes to give a nonmodal argument for
his position will have 0 base the argument on properties other
than modal and physical properties, but where could he find
such properties? I certainly do not claim to have proven that
the pluralist must rely on modal properties. only that it is
difficult to see what else he might utilize in distinguishing
between co-occupants of 8 spatia-temporal receptacle. 8
2.2 A CRITIQUE OF WIGGINS' ATTEMPT AT A NONHODAL ARGUMENT
The remainder o£ this section deals with a notable recent
atteapt by W1gg1ns9 to present an arguaent for a
pluralistic ontology that does not rely on modal
considerations. I have suggested above that it is doubtful
whether there could be such an argument. thus, it is of
interest to see where Wiggins goes astray. I shall argue that
even i£ we grant Wiggins a nu.ber of controversial assumptions,
his arguaent is £lawed in one of two ways: either Wiggins
si.ply overlooks the alternative o£fered by mereolog1stg, or he
8. This arguaent is frequently Made by .aterialists and
physicalists. See. for exaaple. Gibbard. 1975. pp.192-3.
9. Longer note A.
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begs the question by tacitly assuming that there are nontrivial
modal properties.
As several reviewers have noted. Wiggins~ Sameness and
Substance is a complex and difficult book in which parts of a
detailed argument are likely to appear in many d1££erent
sections and £ootnotes. 10 In what £ollows I criticize a
position which is reasonably attributed to Wiggins on the basis
of the structure o£ SaMeness and Substance. Wiggins
presents his thoughts on identity and individuation in the
first three chapters of his book and begins the fourth chapter p
"Marking the end o£ modal abstinence, I now seek to deduce
certain 'essent1alist P consequences of the theory of
individuation expounded in the preceding chapters." ll
Taking seriously Wiggins' avowed "modal abstinence,," I Shllll
axe.ina the first three chapters of the book~ which contain 4
defense o£ principles which entail pluralism, and see if the
defense succeeds in avoiding what : have called the modal
argument for pluralism.
Central teras in Wiggins' discussion ere "substance
sortal ll and "persistence condition." As noted in the previous
chapter, he uses "substance aortal II tiS I aIR using "cover ing
noun. 1I naaely a general tera, F, which sat1s£lea the schema,
(eN) (x)[(Et)(x is an F at t) => <t><x is an F at t)].
10. Shoeaaker, 1970 and 1981.
11. Wiggins, 1980, p.l03.
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In other words. if anything is an F at one moment it is an F at
every moment during which it existso Wiggins is one o£ the
£oreMost defenders of the two principles discussed in chapter
two:
(I) If a and b are singular terms. and F is a count
noun (substance sortal)~ then the sentence DiS is the
same F as b" has a non-elliptical reading wl"lich
implies that a is identical to b.
<II> English contains many count nouns that are also
covering nouns and a competent speaker can
distinguish covering fro. noncovering nounSe
Aaong nonaon1sts p the assumption that there is a sizeable
clBSS of covering nouns seems unproblematic. It is plausible
to aa1nta1n with Wiggins and many other nonmonists that
··person." .Irock _II "statue _ II end "piece o£ bronze, II are count
nouns, whereas "senator," "boy," IIred thing," and Ukitten" are
not. What distinguishes Wiggins' position fro. that of many
other nonmonists (in particular••ereolog1sts> are several
additional principles governing covering nouns.
According to Wiggins. two substance sortals <! shall use
his tara rather than "covering nouns" in explicating his
position) are disJoint 1f there is nothing to which they
both apply.. For 8x8l1ple, the COIAMOn nouns uc:at lD and "dog" are
disJoint since there is nothing which is both 8 cat and a dog.
Another 1aportant relation a~ong substance sortals occurs when
00& is subsuaed under another. For example, since every
cat is an ani.al. the substance sortal "cst" is subsuMed under
t.he substance sortal " an1.a1. II Wiggins maintains tt'tst in an
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important sense these are the only possible relations between
substance sortals. I shall call this the principle of sortsl
hierarchy since it implies that substance sortals are ordered
in a rigid hierarchy,
(Sortal Hierarchy> If F and G are substance sortals,
then either they are disJoint or one is subsumed
under the other. 12
The hierarchy o£ sortals may be pictured as follows, where
lines represent one aortal's being subsu~ed under another.
The principle of sortal hierarchy is a descendent of the
Aristotelian notions of real definition snd taxonomy. Each
obJect belongs to at .ost one "species" and the species are
subsumed under d1££erentia and genera. The claim that
substance sortals are so ordered is, i£ nothing else,
aesthetically pleasing to those with a taste for structllrem
Why is the prJ.nc1ple of sortal hierarchy controversial?
And how does it relate to the issue o£ a non.odal argument for
a pluralistic ontology? Consider again the case of the statue
and the piece of bronze. If we assuJle that the nouns "statue"
and "piece of bronz." are both substance sortals. then
according to the principle of sortal hierarchy, either they are
d1aJoint or one 18 aubau.ed under the other.
12. Se. longer note 8 for a quali£lcat1on.
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not every statue is a piece of bronze (some statues are made of
clay> and not every piece o£ bronze is 8 statue (some pieces of
bronze are awards or flare lUDlps). Thus,. neither "statue ll nor
"piece of bronze Gi is aubsulled under the other. According to
A:fter all~ one
the principle of sortal h1erarchyp since neither term is
subsuaed under the other. they must be completely disJoint.
In other words. no statue could be' identical with a piece of
bronze and since it is plausible that a statue and a piece
bronze could co-occupy a spatia-temporal receptacle p ·chen. as
Wiggins concludes. both the strong and weak occupancy
principles are false.
Thus far. the argument appears too qUick.
cannot simply assert the principle of sortsl hierarchy. It
seems Just as plausible to maintain that "statue" and "piece of
bronze" provide a counterexaMple to the principle. Of course
the hierarchy principle is attractive and might appeal to our
sense of neatness. but this 1s hardly a decisive argument in
its favor. Other things equal_ I would like my filing cabinet
to reflect unique categories (one and only one eppropr1ate file
for each sheet o£ paper), but why think that the world is any
better organized than my filing cabinet?
Wiggins' remarks on this crucial question are unusually
terse. He thinks that Geach's theory of relative identity,
which he syllbo!1zes by II(R>_" is relevant. W1ggins believes.
as do t~e maJority of philosophers ·who have addressed the topic
in the literature. that Geach's theory is false. I shall not
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dispute WigqillS on this point. What is unusual is his
contention that the falsity of (R>. coupled with the
recognition of substance sortals, supports the principle of
sortal hierarchy .
••• we can expect that~ for every completely
determinate continuant, there will be at least one
aortal concept that it falls under and that
determines a principle of persistence for it. But
the denial of <R) then tells us that, if there are
several such concepts. then they cannot disagree in
the persistence condition they ascribe. 13
And now the denial of <R) ensures that_ if there are
several such concepts, then they will all agree in
the persistence condition that they ascribe to an
individual lying within their extension. (Such a set
of concepts may be called sortally concordant.) For
it is excluded that some entity A might answer to
both F 8nd G. F and G being substance concepts~ and
be the same F as B but not the same G as 8. 1 4
My strategy at this point is to consider two interpretations of
what Wiggins Might Mean be 8 "persistence condition. 1I On the
nonmadal reading, the deniel of <R) in no way supports the
hierarchy principle; a aereologist, say QU1ne~ provides the
relevant counterexample, namely, a theory that reJects both <R>
and the hierarchy pr1nciple~ yet finds room for substance
sortals and persistence conditions. On the second, modal
reading of "persistence cond1tion. u Wiggins is indeed making an
important argument, but it is an argument which presupposes the
eXistence of modal properties and fails to supply an argument
£or pluralisM that avoids the use of the modal argument.
13. Wiggins. 1982~ p.60.
14. Wiggins, 1980, p.65.
-108-
III.2 DOES PLURALISM REQUIRE MODAL ARGUMENTS?
THE MEREOLOGICAL POSSIBILITY Wiggins is mistaken if he thinks
that the denial of (R), together with the view that there are
substance Bartels which convey persistence conditions, implies
that substance sortals are hierarchic811y ordered. To
challenge the implication, one need only display a way in which
the pre.ises could be true and yet the conclusion false. A
mereolog1st can supply such a theory. Quine suggests the
relevant details.
Suppose a aereological ontology of physical obJects. That
1s~ at most one obJect can fully occupy a spatia-temporal
receptacle and there are instances in which more than one
obJect occupies a spatial yolu.e. It is reasonable to assuae
thet there are substance sortals (count nouns) which
characterize the whole ·'temporal length" o£ at least aome of
the obJects. A aereologist could, but need not, question
whether Wiggins' list of substance sortals is correct~ but as 8
non.onist p he is likely to agree that a list similar to
Wiggins' is correct.
The mereologist 8ight of£er r~8sons for the importance o£
substance Bortels very s1.11ar to those offered by Wiggins.
Philosophers have often hoted that our interaction with an
obJect may be sporadlc~ and yet we are quite confident that we
are seeing the saae obJect again. What underlies these
Judgaents o£ identity? One suggestion 1s that substance sortal
"convey persistence cond1 tiona. II For example, when I learn to
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use the term IIrock,," part o£ what I learn is a general criteria
£or the reident1f ication of roclts II
I have sketched a mereological position that is (1)
compatible with Geach's theory of relative 1dentityp (2)
countenances substance Bortels that convey nontrivial
persistence conditions, and yet (3) does not satis£y the
principle of sortal hierarchy. Thus, the short paragraphs 1n
which Wiggins appears to defend the hierarchy principle by
eppealing to the falsity of Geach's theory are either mistaken
(since they fail to take seriously the mereological
possibility) or they contain a suppressed premise. I shall now
argue that the only candidate I caD find for the suppressed
premise involves an illicit appeal to modality.
A MODAL NOTION OF A PERSISTENCE CONDITION
In an important footnote, Wiggins appears to make 4n
addition to his arguaent that the denial of <R) is relevant to
the principle of sortal hierarchy.
If [two substance sortalsl are not finally subJect to
the same individuative principle [persistence
conditionsl. then we are not guaranteed against the
possibility of contradiction of (R) or indeterminacy
if we trace an entity under these distinct
!ndiv1duative principles [persistence conditions]
which (in so far as they are not concordant)
potentially disagree at SOMe po1nt. 15
At another point. Wiggins gives 8 characterization of substance
aortal which 1s far richer than the covering noun schema which
15. Wiggins. 1980~ p.20S.
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he originally suggests is the appropriate test o£ a substance
sortal.
O(!v): F is a substance concept [substance aortal]
only 1£ F determines (with or without the help of
further empirical in£ormation about the class of £'s)
what can and cannot befall an x in the extension of
f~ and what changes x tolerates without there ceasing
to exist such a thing as x. 16
I have emphasized the explicitly modal terms in both cit~tions.
Their occurrence raises the possibility that Wiggins is tacitly
assuming that modal contexts are transparent. How else are we
to construe his talk o£ "what can and cannot be£all an x"?
In the first citation, Wiggins is concerned with what
might happen 1£ we "traced" one obJect using persistence
conditions that "potentisllyU disagreed. I suspect Wiggins has
in aind something like this. His argu.ent is intended to be a
reductio. Suppose it were possible for a statue and a piece of
bronze to be the same physical obJect. x. Suppose x is now in
front of me. Since x is both 8 statue and a piece of bronze.
it aust obey the persistence conditions conveyed by the
relevant substance sortals. Since these substance sortals
convey d1££erent persistence conditions. it is possible that
obJect y could be the saMe piece of bronze as x, and yet not be
the same statue as x, which is absurd. since Geach's theory of
relative identity is absurd.
This arguaent presupposes the transparency of modal
contexts. Note that it requires the intelligibility of
16. Wiggins, 1980. p.G8.
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asserting of an obJect x that it could be the S8me piece of
bI"OnZe wi thout being the salle statue. The ergument l"~duces to
the modal argu~ent that I examined in section one~ namely~ that
8 statue end a piece of bronze could not ra identical because
the piece o£ bronze but not the statue mani£ests the modal
property, "could be a lump." As stressed in the -first aection
of this chapter. such modal arguments are important and not
obviously false. But we had hoped to get fro. Wiggins an
independent arguMent for a pluralistic ontology.
I conclude that Wiggins' effort to defend pluralisa while
observing modal abstinence fails because he either overlooks
the aereological possibility or tacitly appeals to modal
properties.
SECTION 3
CONNECTIONS AMONG BASIC PRINCIPLES
Wiggins does not succeed in giving a nonmodal argument for
pluralism. Nonetheless. there are significant connections
a~on9 the principles which Wiggins discusses. In this section,
my primary goal is to elucidate these connections and use them
both in speculating as to what Wiggins is attempting and in
illuMinating the relations a.ong monisM. pluralism, and
mereology. I use the 1n£or.al term "connections" because I
doubt that the relations can be fUlly £oraa11%ed; the
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connections for which I argue have the form" "Given A it is
much more plausible to conclude B then -8. 111
In explicstlng mania. in chapter two. I noted that many
philosophers (including Wiggins and most mereologists> 8ccept
two basic principles governing identity statements about
physical obJects.
(I) I£ a and b are singular ter.s~ and F is a count
noun. then the sentence 18 a is the same F as bll has Q
non-elliptical reading which implies that 8 is
identical to b.
(II) English contains many count nouns that are also
covering nouns. A competent speaker can distinguish
covering from noncover1ng nouns.
The above principles do not make use of any explicitly
modal concepts; the scheaa defining covering nouns is concerned
only with identity and existence through time, not identity
through possible worlds. But the addition of third assumption
changes the situation.
(III) The modal sentences of ordinery !Qnguage are
appropriately analyzed in a straightforward Manner
using the unary operators <> and C. Quantification
into t.he scopes of the <> - and C -operators is
pera1tted and necessary to ~n~lvze de ~
.adal sentence••
As I argued in ••ction one, a strong csse can be built for
this third principle in teras of ita neturalness and
coaparative s1ap11city. Wiggins of course sccepts <III). Note
that (X) through <III) are not explicitly concerned with
essentiali.m. the hierarchy principle or pluralis.~ aach
appears to be relatively innocuous and independently
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defensible. However, when taken together, the three principles
make 8 significant version of essentialism, the hierarchy
principle. and pluralism all but inescapable. It is this
1nescapabi11ty that I believe both Wiggins and Quine
appreciate. Let us consider in turn the consequences of
assuming (!). (II)~ and (III).
ESSENTIALISIf
By essentialisM I mean the doctrine that covering
nouns could not fail to belong to their bearers:
(E) If and obJect a 1s an F. and F is a covering
noun. then C Fa •
Now suppose so.eone were to aa1ntain (!>, (II) and (III) and
deny <E)D Let F be a covering noun that did not apply
essentially to an obJect a. Like every other F. the obJect a
is an F throughout ita existence. Nonetheless, it could have
failed t~ be an F. Though no F is ever anything other than an
F, soae F'e a1ght be soaeth1ng other than F'a. But this is
abGurd. How could it be that no F ever was or will be a G~ and
yet it could have been the same obJect (without being an F) and
have been a G. The probl•• is that SO.800e who accepts (I),
(II). and (III) will undoubtedly accept for covering nouns the
de d1cto principle
(A) C (x) [(Et) (x 18 an F at t) =) (t) (x is an F at t)]
which .ekes it difficult to de~y the de ~ principle,
(8) (x) [<Et) (x is an F at t) => C (t) (x 18 an F at 't)].
-114-
I,
111.3 CONNECTIONS AMONG BASIC PRINCIPLES
I do not see how being an F could be a necessary condition for
reidenti£icstion through time and £a11 to be 8 necessary
condition for identity in other possible situations.
I en not claiming that (8) follows £rom (I)p (II), (III)
and (A) as a matter o£ logic: it is easy to construct formal
counterexamples to such an 1n£erence. 17 Rather. I aa
claiming that the formal models do not have philosophically
reasonable interpretations.
THE HIERARCHY PRINCIPLE
Suppose the hierarchy principle did not apply to covering
nouns, and yet (I)~ (II)~ (III) and <E> were true. Then there
would be an obJect a which was both an F and a G where neither
F nor G would be subsuaed under the other. But according to
(E)~ F's and G's sat1s£y distinct .adal principles and thus
would ascribe contradictory properties to the obJect a. In
other words_ if being an F entails the possibility of surviving
one set o£ transfor.atione~ and being a G entails the
possibility of surviving 8 distinct set. then there would be
trans%ormat1ons which any obJect which was both an F and 8 G
could both survive and not survive. For exa.ple. if statues
are essentially st~tu.s and pieces of bronze are essentially
pieces o£ bronze~ then no obJect could be both a statue and a
piece o£ bronze aince it would both survive and not Burv1ve
17. See longer note C for a aiaple .odel theoretic
counterexaMple.
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being squashed~
The above argument is the one which I attributed to
Wiggins when I accused him of tacitly appealing to modal
principles: he explicitly endorses (I) and (II>, but 8190 makes
inexplicit use <III) and <E).
PLURALISM
If (I) and (II) are true_ then I do not see how one can avoid
concluding that there are distinct covering nouns which at
times apply to SOMe o£ the saMe spatial volu~es. The multiple
occupancy puzzles discussed in chapter one provide a number of
such examples. But as argued above_ if (1)_ (11)_ and (III)
are true. then distinct covering nouns must be associated with
distinct obJects. Since there is nothing to prevent an F and a
G froa occupying the saae spatia-teaporal receptacle (as in
Gibbard's statue puzzlo), pluralism is true.
Quine haa long aainta1ned that quantification into modal
contexts leads to the ".etaphysical Jungle of Aristotelian
essentialism. tl18 The argument above shows one sense in
which Quine 1s clearly right. A basic assumption made by Moat
modal logicians, (III)~ along with a very plausible theory of
covering noun•• (1) and (II)_ leads naturally to essent1alis~
with regard to covering nouns~ the hierarchy principle and
plura11sa--doctr1nea that an empiricist like Quine naturally
18. Quine. 1966. p.174.
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characterizes as an "Aristotelian Jungle." On my
interpretation o£ Quine's remark, the suppressed premises are
(I) and <II). But it 1s not surprising that Quine tacitly
assulles these premises since he has at times argued e'. ~ 1 ic1 tl y
for them. Quine would have us avoid Aristotelianism by
reJecting <III) and keeping (I) and (II).
In section two, I argued that Wiggins was mistaken if he
thought that essentialism, the hierarchy principle, and
pluralism followed from (1) and (II) alone. He must be tacitly
assuming (III). A great merit of Wiggins' ?saeness and
Substance is that it contains the materials for a defense of
(1). (II) and (III) as well as an exploration of their
consequences.
On My reading. Quine and Wiggins agree that (I), (II), and
(III) lead inescapably to essentialism in the Aristotelian
tradition. though of course their receptions of this conclusion
are diametrically opposed. FurtherMore. both authors accept
(I) and (II). The focus of disagreement is <III).
This thesis is organized around the threefold
div1s1on--mon1st, pluralist. and mereological--among
ontological theories. Considering the argument fo~
essentialism and pluralism based on (1), (II) and (III)
provides a soa.what d1f£erent perspective on the division.
Wiggins and other .odal realists in the Aristotelian
tradition defend all three of the principles. Chisholm
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believes that what we ordinarily call obJects are really
successions of primary obJects; in the strict and philosophical
sense of identity, principle (I) is not true.
(!) I£ a and b are singular terms, and F is a count
noun. then the sentence 111.1 is the same F as b" has 8
non-elliptical reading which implies that a is
identical to b.
Ayers uses the contingent-predicate strategy_ which I found
wanting. to challenge,
(II> English contains many count nouns that are also
covering nouns. A competent speaker can distinguish
covering froM noncovering nouns.
Quine and other Mereolog1sts p whose work is examined in more
detail in the next chapter, reJect:
<III) The .odal sentences of ordinary language are
appropriately analyzed in a straightforward manner
using the unary operators ¢ and [J. Quantification
into the scopes o£ the <)- and CJ -operators is
pera1tted and necessary to analyze de ~
Modal sentences.
I have argued in this section that (I), (II), and (III)
fora 8 powerful trio that leads to a substantive version of
essentialisM. Far fro. disputing this connection, the authors
I exaa1ne appear to endorse it by £ocusing their energies on
(I). (II)~ and (III).
-118-,
III. LONGER NOTES
LONGER NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE
A. Wiggins has concerned hiasel£ with a broad range of
problems concerning identity through time, personal identity,
reference and modality in his two books, Identity and
Spatio-Teaporal Continuity, 1967_ Sameness and Substance,
1980: and nUMerous articles.
8. A More careful formulation of the hierarchy principle
would require a distinction between genuine and contrived
"substance sortals." To see this. let F be "is either a pig or
a rock" and G be uis either a pig or a tree." The predicates F
and G both satisfy the covering noun scheMa and yet they
violate the hiorarchy principle in that neither is subsumed
under the other and they are not disJoint. I think that
Wiggins would say that the predicate lIis a pig or a tree,"
unlike the predicates "1s a pig" and "1s 8 tree .... has uno
autonomous 1ndiv1duativg force of its own, and must be
variously 8upple.ented~ where it appears in contexts of
ident1£ication, according to the kind of individual in
question." 19 Since.v interest lies elsewhere. I simply
grant Wiggins that pigs fora a single kind while the set of
pigs and trees does not.
19. Wiggins. 1980. p.63: see also n.1S, p.144-45.
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c. To see that
<B> (x)[(Et)(x 1s an F at to) => C<t><x is an Fat t)]
does not follow fro.
CA) 0 (x) [(Et> (x is an F at t) =) (t) (x is an F at t)]
consider a model in which there are two wo~ld9 but Just one
i
obJect. The obJect is an F at all tiaes in' the first world and
a G at all tiaes in the second world.
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MEREOLOGY, REDUCTIONISM, AND MODAL PROPERTIES
This chapter addresses severel connections between de
~ modality and mereological ontologies. Adequate
treatment of the two requires that we discuss a third position,
modal reductionism, which can be traced at least as far back as
nominalist concerns with natures and ·~niYersals. The
;
connections among~the three which are discussed below are (1)
the virtual logical incompatibility between mereology and a
straightforward reading of de ~ moda11ty_ (2) the
traditional contrast between taking de ~ modality
literally (modal realism) and modal reductionism: and (3) the
possibility of giving an account of de ~ modal
contexts which is cOMpatible with a mereological ontologyD
SECTION 1
THE INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN MEREOLOGICAL ONTOLOGIES AND DE RE
~ODALITY
This section further develops a the.e from previous
chapters, naaely, that there 1s an 1nco.patibi11ty between
mereological ontologies, which satisfy the weak occupancy
princip16,
(WO) (x)(y)[(t)(v(x,t>=v(y,t» => x=y]~
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and 811 but the most unusual accounts of de ~
modalities. In other words~ those who adopt a mereological
ontology cannot, at least not without making implausible
assumptions, also attribute de ~ modal properties to
such obJects. While there is some overlap between this section
and the previous chapter, I hope the difference in emphasis
Justifies some repetition.
1.1 PATTERNS IN THE LITERATURE
Consider first a bit of clrcuastsntial evidence. As a
generaliz8tion about the literature. it is sa£e to say that
those philosophers who have adopted 8 mereological position
have reJected the attribution of de ~ modal properties
to obJects. For example 6 Quine, Goodman, Gibbard, Gupta and
Lewis have taken this position. 1 Quine and Goodman show a
general scorn for modal contexts. Lewis, Gibbard, and Gupta
see a need for extensive paraphrasing of modal discours6 if
their mereological position is to be defendeda CeO. Broad
(discussed below) is an interesting exception to the rule: he
b~ys consistency at the price o£ maintaining that nothing could
be in any way d1££erent froM what it is or was. Conversely,
philosophers who have explicitly accepted de ~
modality and considered ontological puzzles, reJect
mereo!ogical ontologies. Exaaples are Kripke, Shoemaker and
1. See longar note A.
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Wiggins.
Of course I don't mean to suggest that examining patterns
in the literature constitutes an arguments But it does suggest
that there is an arguaent which would explain the pattern.
Three such explanations follow.
1.2 A MORE FORMAL ARGUMENT
Consider the general £eatures o£ the statue puzzle. If
one adopts a aereological approach to at least one of the many
putative cases o£ multiple occupancy, then there are cases in
which an F and a G occupy the same spatial volume at one time.
And if they co-occupy a volume for one moment. what is to keep
thea £rom co-occupying the volume at every moment? If we
assu~e 8 mereological ontology, then the F and the G are
identical. But the co-occupancy puzzle arises because F and G
are distinct kind teras whose members characteristically
survive different sorts of transformations. Something could
have happened to the F which could not have happened to the G.
But this violates our assumption that the F and the G are
identical.
Soaewhat .ore £oraally, let us aSSUMe ~ith the mereologist
that for 80ae choice of kind torms F and G,
1. A = the G
2. 8 = the F
3. <t)[Y(A.t>=v(B.t)]
4. A = B,
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and for some choice o£ a d1££erentiating property P(_>,
5. <>P(A)
6. -OP<B).
A contradiction follows using Leibnlz's law,
7. A=B. =) [<>P(A) (=) ¢P(B)]
8. A .. B
The mereologist concludes that the di%£iculty lies in
attemptilig to apply Leibniz's law in .ada1 contexts.
Several ways in which a mereolog1cal ontology might be
thought to be consistent with the attribution of modal
properties .erit discussion.
First, one might try to get around the above argument for
inCOMpatibility by claiming that there are no suitable covering
nouns~ G and F. Judith Tho.son expresses doubt on this
score. 2 But this would be challenge a principal motivation
for a aereological ontology, namely. to resolve in terms of
parts and wholes at least soae of the traditional occupancy
puzzles. That is, 1f a typical relation among F's and G's is.
G
".-...... .A.-....... ~.....
.....------.---.......------F
then there aust 80•• events which tera1nate F's, but not G's,
as well as events which tera1nate both. A!.ld if there are
2. Tho.son, "Part-Hood and Identity Across Tiae,1I section 7,
forthcoMing. See longer note B.
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events which terminate both F's and G's~ then I don't see how a
mereologist could avoid concluding. that it was at least
p06sible for an F and a G to occupy the S8me spatia-temporal
receptacle.
A second attempt to circumvent the general argument baaed
on the statue puzzle would be to argue that thel"e is no
suitable di££erentiating property, P(x), to be used in the
premises
5. <>P(A) and
6. ~¢P(B).
There are at least two ~ays to defend such a view, but neither
de£ends the use of ordinary modal intuitions to guide
8ttributions of de ~ modality.
A first way of de£ending the lack of a suitable
di££erentiating property 1s to maintain that the only necessary
attributes of material obJects are those possessed by every
material obJect; for example, logical properties such as IIbeing
red or not red" and perhaps properties such ~2 "t\elv1ng a mass"
or "having a position. 1I On this view, it would be a mistake to
say that a statue could not survive being hammered into a lump
of bronze--anything could be anything. Clearly such a theory
is 8t odds with the ordinary modal intuitions which modal
realists have tended to honor. Further.ore, even if one did
believe that in the strict and philosophical sense anything
could be anything, the issue would reMain as to how beat to
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account for ordinary modal intuitions. The point is not that
it is impossible to cOMbine a mereological ontology ~!th 8
theory of de ~ .adal properties. but that such a
combination could only coae at 8 price most philosophers have
found unacoeptable.
The £irst suggestion trivialized modality by severely
restricting the quantity and types o£ necessary properties.
The ascond suggestion goen to the opposite extre.e: every
property o£ an obJect is either necessary or impossible. There
are no contingent features of the world, and thus~ there is no
d1££erentiating p~operty P(x) to be used in premiaes (5) and
(6) of the arguaent. Such a position is not inde£ena1ble.
C.D. Broad appears to de£end it with an ingenious
argu,ent. 3 The world is completely deterained; nothing
could have happened ~ther than it did. To the suggestion that
initial conditions might have been distinct. Broad replies that
this might be so, but under different conditions there is no
way of saying that there WQuld have been the sa.e obJects.
Broad's a~gu.ent, which he develops at length, raises a nUMber
of issues. but for .y purposes. the ~ain point is as a~ove:
even 1£ de£ens1b1e, the view that nothing could have been other
than it is is very much at odds with what most de ~
aodalists have wanted to Maintain and leaves unresolved tho
matter of ordinary intuitions.
3. Broed_ An Exaaination o£ McTaggart's PhilosophY, 1933.
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It 1. use£ul to talk of Modalis. in the Aristotelian
tradition. The Aristotelian thinks that some nonlogical,
nontrivial propert1~a are contingent and others necessary 0 Of
course there is room for auch disagreeaent 8a to which
properties fall under wh1ch category. The two views considered
above are not in th. Aristotelian tradition. The one finds
too .any contingent properties (all properties except
tautologous properties are contingent) and the other finda
~ contingent properties. So long as the Aristotelian
advocates a aixture of necessary and contingent propert JS. his
view is 1ncoapatible with a aereolog1cal ontology.
1.3 UNUSUAL OBJECTS AND "ODALITV
A further incoMpatibility between a mereolog1csl ontology
and .odelia. in the Aristotelian tradition is seen by
considering the ..any unusual "obJects" that ere included in 8
mereolo91st~s ontology. Having chosen 8 mereolog1cal position,
one is teapted to aaintain that the proper parts of o~Jects are
themselves obJects. For exe.pIe, Just as the statue is an
obJect which overlaps with the piece of bronze between tl
and t2, there is an "unnatural" obJect, X. which overlaps
with the statue but does not last so long.
statue
,
piece of bronze
•
A ••reolog1st need not andorsG such obJects, but it/is little
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surprise that so .any do. After all, having opened the door
for proper parts which are singled out with s covering noun,
there is no reason to think that other parts could not alao be
singled out. Let us suppose that the aereologlst makem this
likely move: there is now a further difficulty with attempting
to co_bine a theory of de ~ aodality with the
mereologiesl ontology, naaely, that ~.le modal attributes of
these "unnatural" obJects are exceedingly obscure. Could the
temporal first half of a house have been the second half?
Could 8 momentary teaporal slice have lasted longer? I do not
see any clear way o£ answering such questions.
Mereologists are also inclined to maintain that 1f x and y
are obJects, then so is the uBum" of it and y.4 Again, the
modal properties of such obJects are obscure. What chang~s
could the sum of Ronald Reagan and the Ei£fel lower undergo?
In brie£. the mereologist is likely to have numerous
obJects in his ontology to which modal properties are not
readily attributed. Fro. the ~ereological perspective. the
distinction between four-dimensional entities about which we
converse and the other, "unnatural" entities 1s a complex
matter of human psychology and convenience. A similar
relatiVity to hUMan concerns will enter the aereo!ogist's
account of modality. This contrasts sharply with the
Aristotelian £or whoa .odal properties are a.ong the
4. See R. Cartwright .. "Scattered Things,." for G careful
discussion of aereological "SUlAs."
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significant features of the world.
1.4 INCOMPATIBILITIES IN SPIRIT
Finally. there are at least two ways in which the general
considerations given in favor of a mereological ontology
con£11ct with those favoring a realist approach to modality in
the Aristotelian tradition. These conflicts reflect a great
difference in spirit. if not in logic. This section builds on
my observation in chapter two_ section £1ve that the ontologies
of Chisholm and Quine have a great deal in co~mon despite great
differences in detail.
First, the aereologist (like Chisholm) is willing to stray
further £rom ordinary language and pretheoretical intuitions
about ontology than is an ontologist in the Aristotelian
tradition. Wil£rid Sellars5 draws a use£ul distinction
between the "manifest" and "scientific" images o£ the world.
The raani:Eest (also "common-sense") image is populated with
persons. Aust1n#s "moderate-sized specimens of dry goods,"6
plants, animals, and the other obJects o£ norMal discourse.
Among their noteworthy attributes are that they are colored,
textured and persist through tiae. According to Sellars, each
"1.8ge" is a proper obJect of philosophical re£ .... ection as is
the question of the relationship between the two. The manifest
image, far fro. being a hodgepodge of fleeting and
s. Sellars~ 1963~ chapter 1.
6. Austin. Sense and Sensibilia. 1962. p.8.
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contradictory intuitions, is a sophisticated, law-governed
network; ita structure is unveiled only with difficulty.
The central d1£ference between the manifest and scientific
images is not that the former ia undisciplined but that "it by
8t1pulat1on~ does not 1nclude •.. the postulation of
imperceptible entities, and principles pertaining to the~. to
explain the behavior of perceptible things.,a 7 Sellars sees
the mani£est 1~age as being one of "the poles towards which
philosophical thinking is drswn." S There is a correct and
an incorrect way of describing this obJective image that we
have and Uthe eo-called uanalytic" tredition in recent British
and American philosophy, particularly under the influence o£
the later Wittgenstein_ has done increasing Justice to the
manifest iJlage.--
Even this brie£ sketch o£ Sellars' distinction is
sufficient to suggest 8 difference in spirit between
contemporary mereologists, who for the most part look to the
scientific image, and contemporary ontologists in the
Aristotelian tradition, who for the most part look to the
mani£est image. A concern with the man1£est image leads
naturally to placing considerable weight on both one's ordinary
modal intuitions and one~8 initial sense that a mereological
ontology is bizarre. A concern with the scienti£ic image
7. Sellars. 1963, p.7.
8. Sellars. 1963, p.14.
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prepares one for the wholesale reinterpretat10n o£ common-sense
intuitions and for the acceptance of counterintuitive
ontologies.
A second and related difference in spirit between
mereolog1cal ontologies and ontologies in the Aristotelian
tradition is apparent in their relations to the empiricist
tradition. Empiricists give priority to the occurrent,
physical qualities of obJects. The pattern is evidenced by the
classical elftp1ric1st~s concern with "ideas": the turn of the
century concern with sense~data; and Quine~s ··stimulus
meanings" and "occasion sentences." nodal properties are not
the sort of occurent~ physical quality that eMpiricists have
stressed. However, mereology fits neatly with the view that
obJects are dif£erentiated and individuated on the basis of
occurrent. physical qualities. Empiricists will respond
sympathetically to the quest1on~ "How could s statue and a
piece o£ bronze be d1££erent i£ they had all the same physical
qualities at every mOllent of their existences'?"
Not surprisingly, mereolog1cal ontologies have been most
appealing to those philosophers who look to science and the
empiricist tradition for inspiration while modal properties
have been especially popular among philosophers who place ~n
emphasis on ordinary language and common-sense idioms.
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SECTION 2
TWO MEREOLOGICAL ACCOUNTS OF MODALITY: QUINE AND LEWIS
My result thus £sr has been purely negative, namely, that
there 18 an 1ncoapatibility between 8 mereological ontology and
any attempt to take literally ordinary Aristote118n de
~ intuitions. To leave things here would siaply leave
modal discourse unaccounted for. It is reasonable to wish for
something more. This section responds to the modal views of
two well known mereologists--Culne and D. Lewis. Finding both
of their views unacceptable, I shall explore an alternative in
section three.
2.1 QUINE ON THE ELIMINATION OF MODALITY FROM RIGOROUS
DISCOURSE
Quine's response to modal puzzles is to say so much the
worse £or aodality.9 He sees no reason to give an account
of ~ ~ modality; instead, he would ignore it.
Quine e.phasizes science. His approach to metaphysics is.
roughly speaking, to exaaine the ontological commitment of
scientific theories after they have been foraa112ed in
canonical notation. Quine aaintains that modal idioms are not
called for in scientific discourse and are too obscure to have
any place in the canonical language.
9a Here and below I £ollow Word and ObJect, 1960.
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But there are at least two reasons why even philosophers
who think o£ ontology purely in terms of physical theories
might show more interest in modality than Quine does.
First, as was noted in the previous chapter, even 1f
modality is a £orm o£ obscurity, it is a particulariy common
for. of obscurity, one about which most individuals lappear to
have .any strong intuitions and about which dispute 1s
possible. As defenders of pluralism and modal arguments
stress. there is no evidence that one is dealing with random~
nonsense symbols.
A Quinean a1ght reply that astrology too is an extremely
systematic subJect. yet once one sees that it is mere fiction,
there is no philosophical reason to study it.
But perhaps 8 more appropriate analogy is with moral
discourse. Like modal discourse~ ethics i.s a subJect o£
perennial concern to philosophers and not one that even Quine
would see as "unph11osophical" even if he sees 1 t as 1rre levant
in "limning the ultimate structure o£ reality.1I The point ie
that many philosophers see themselves as explicating our
co••en-sense conceptual scheme. and such an explication need
not lose all interest simply because the scheae is
"unllcientif1c. ,.
Bas van Fraaesen gives a second good reason for. not
dis.Lasing modal discourse as philosophically uninteresting,
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namely, that contemporary science makes extensive use of
probability, 8 concept which is closely linked to
modality.l0 Van Fraassen's point is that modal-like
concepts are at the heart of contemporary science and that a
concern with aodality is a natural step in examining the
conteaporary language of science (Quine's main interest).
Two connections between probability and modality are
noteworthy. First, there is a close parallel between saying an
event is physically i.possible and saying that the probability
o£ its occurrence is zero; siailarly, an event is possible if
the probability o£ its occurrence is greater than zero. Second
(and this point is of special relevance to Quine's program),
probability contexts are not extensional. Let t abbreviate
the singular term. lithe percentage of el~ctrons which pass
through the slit," and let "Prob<P> = x" abbreviate "the
probability that P is x." To see that probability contexts are
not extensional (substitution of co-referential singular terms
need not preserve truth>, note that both
t = 50".. and
Prob<t = SO~) = 50~
could be true and yet it is £alae that
Prob(SO~ = SO~) = 50~.
Thus. probability sentences suffer fro. the same purported
de£ects that Quine finds in modal and belief sentences.
10. van Fraa••en, Ihe Scientific Image_ 1980~ chapter 6.
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Despite his close association with Carnap, Quine has shown
curiously little interest in the nonextensional character of
probability contexts. But .any other philosophers of an
empiricist bent have been interested in this, and their
interest has been spurred, at least in part, by a Quinean
preference for extensional languages and an ontology of
physical obJects and occurrent~ physical qualities. 11
My point is not that conte.parery science is co•• itted to
irreducibly probabilistic statements <conceptualist reductions
are frequently suggeated)_ but that whether it is so committed
is an extreaely difficult question which requires serious
examination by philosophers. In brief. modal-like idioms occur
in contexts aore faailiar to contemporary scientists than
Aristotle's Metaphysics and Anselm~s ontological proof.
2.2 LEWIS: EXPLICATING MODALITY IN TERMS OF SIMILARrTV AMONG
POSSIBLE WORLDS
David Lewis is a Mereologist who takes modality seriously.
The basic features of Lewis's metaphysics are £ami11ar. 12
There are other possible worlds~ like ours, only not actual.
ObJects are 1n worlds. Each obJect is in one and only one
world. ObJects in distinct worlds. though not identical. can
be aiailer. Modal etateaents are to be explicated in terms of
11. See Weatherford. Philosophical Foundations of Probab11it~
Theory, 1982. for an overview.
12. Lewie. "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Kodal Logic," 1968.
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quantification over possible worlds and counterparts. What
vagueness there .ay be in our modal intuitions corresponds to
the vagueness in the siMilarity relation among counterparts
which underlies our .odal intuitions.
I have little to add to the most frequent criticisms made
of L.&wis. First~ his ontological cOllaitJlents are
extraordinsry.13 I ai.ply do not believe that are other
possible worlds which lIare the same sort of thing as the actual
world. II Second, I sa un.oved by purported "explications'" o£
poss1b11ityp aean1ngs, counterfactu~ls, etc., in terms of
functions among possible worlds since the explications analyze
the obscure in teras of the .ore obscure. Third. Lewis's
program ae.Me to suffer fro. internal di££iculties which make
it unlikely that the notion of similarity can do what he asks
of 1t. 14 Finally. if there are other possible worlds
("ways things might have been">. Kripke is surely right in
claiming that the saae obJects can exist in more than one o£
thea. iS In other words. 1nso£ar as I understand talk o£
other possible worlds and obJects being in them. Lewis seeMS
mistaken as to how they work.
Lewis's papers .erit close reading. While often fantastic
13. Stalnaker, IIpossiblQ Worlds~" 1976.
14. Bowie. lI-The Sillilarity Approach to Counterfactuals,,11 1979.
is. Kripke. 1972~ pp.266-67J see also FeldDlon" "Counterparts.lI~
1971.
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in both their aasuaptions and conclusions. they contain e
wealth of detail. One detail is of particular importance in
the next section.
Upon noticing puzzles like the statue puzzle~ Lewis
o££ered a significant aodi£1cat1on o£ hie counte~p8rt
theory.16 Instead o£ Just one counterpart relation, Lewis
-presents distinct counterpart relations for distinct covering
nouns. Consider our piece of bronze which is also a statue.
Lewis's view is that regarded as a statue it has different
counterparts in soa. worlds than when regarded 8S a piece of
bronze. Iap11c1t in de ~ sentences are indications as
to what sort of counterpart one is considering.
Lewis's suggestion that referential positions in modal
contexts be relativ1zed to coYe~lng nouns has a number o£
antecedents. First, it 1s a philosophical coamonplace that
Judgaen~s of sia11arity are relative. sometimes implicitly, to
criteria of eiailarity. Two cars Might be siailar in
appearance but very dissimilar in performance. Since Lewis
would treat aodality in teras of siailarity, it is natural that
he should see a need to be explicit concerning the type of
siMilarity involved. Second_ Geach had earlier suggested the
relativization of referential positions to covering nouns was
necessary even in non.odal contexts. While the mereologist
see. no need to .eke such a relativi2stion in the case of
16. Lewis. ··Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies,. II 1971.
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ordinary identity statements, the idea was in the air.
Third, as noted in chapter two, there are parallels
between Lew1a~s account of modality and Ch1sholm~s account of
identity through tiMeo Recall that for Chisholm, so-called
pr1aary obJects can neither gain nor lose parts. Ordinary
obJects are ··logical fictions" and apparent re£erences to them
are to be contextually defined in teras of references to
sequences of primary obJects. Just as for Lewis. the question
a8 to whether x is a counterpart o£ y is relative to a covering
noun. so too for Chisholm it is possible that two primary
obJects be part of the saae ordinary statue without being part
of the eaae piece of bronze (in the loose and popular sense).
Lewis's idea of relat1vizing singular terms to covering
nouns is an intriguing one that will play 8 role in the next
section.
SECTION 3
SKETCH OF A CONCEPTUALIST ACCOUNT OF MODALITY
In this section I wish to sketch what I believe is a
promising mereological position which both takes modal contexts
more seriously than does Quine and yet reJects Lewis's ontology
of possible worlds. The general goal is to explicate 8nd
analyze ordinary .adal intuitions in a Manner which is
co.patible with a .ereological ontology and does not ~ppeal to
irreducibly Modal concepts. The conceptualist prograM which I
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shall outline £ollows others in attempting to add detail to
such time-honored slogans of no~!na11sts and empiricists ss_
"The onl y nec:ess1 ty is verbal necess1 ty" II and "What is though t
to be the essence of an obJect is really Just one particularly
revealing way of describing it."17 I .eke no claiM to
uniqueness; it is entirely possible that there are a number of
ways. differing in what 1s considered 8 philosophically
acceptable non.odal base. of giving a conceptualist reduction
of .odal discourse.
3.1 THE BASIC IDEA
The basic idea is that possibilities are really Just
"stories" (to use a somewhat denigrating term) or "theories"
and ....odels·· (to use a aore digni£ied teras). When we talk
about what a1ght have happened we are exploring the
rami£ications of a set of assumptions. Not Just any story (or
Model. or theory) is relevant; au? .odal discourse embodies a
complex set o£ constraints on what assumptions are worthwhile
and peraiss1ble. Different modalities (technological and
financial possibility, aetaphysical necessity, logical
possibility. etc.) correspond to different sets of assumptions.
For the Modal realist. modal properties are 8 fundamental
feature of the world; their existence and nature is a matter
£or exploration and discovery. By contrast, the conceptualist
17. See longer note C.
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analogizes our modal d~scourse with other practices which do
not involve the discovery o£ genuine properties.
For example, as literary critics o£ten stress, fiction
writing involves the creation o£ "new worlds··:
We should always remember that the work of 8rt is
i~variably the cre8tion of e new world, so th~t the
first things we should do is to study that new world
as closely 8$ possible, approaching it as something
brbnd new. having no obvious connection with the
worlds we already know. 18
These new worlds have £actual assumptions and rules all
their own. Nowhere ia this clearer than in science f-icti.on
where one "eases the throttle back and Jumps into hyperspace. 1I
Furthermore. the writer is given enormous leeway in what world
he wants to create; readers are more likely to be disturbed by
any internal inconsistency displayed by t.he author than by
unusual b8ckground conditions. My aim in mentioning these
familiar points is simply to eMphasize that we are perfectly
capable of constructing and working with sets of assumptions.
If ~ modal realist insists on a sharp line between ··genuine
posaibility·· and ·'mere fiction. II at least he must acknowl~dge
that the construction of mere fictions is an ongoing~ coherent
practice.
A sscond practice of relevance is the scientific
investigation of erroneous theories .
••• we are Much aare flexible in language use than
.any philosophers see~ to assu.e: we are quite uaed
to suspensions of belie£ or of conceptual commitment
18. NabokoY_ V•• Lectures on Literature, 1980, p.l.
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in dialogue with adherents of theories which we
personally do not 8ccept. 19
Note that such investigation o£ten involves exploration o£
"physically impossible" phenomena. that 1s, phenomena that are
incompatible with our current theories.
3.2 DE DICTO AND DE RE
It is useful to begin with de dicto statements and
[
l1li;
expand to include de ~ contexts. I accept a rather
simple account 01 de dicta possibility, namely, a
sentence is possible if it is logical consistency with general
laws. 20 To ask whether sOMething is physically possible is
to ask whether it is consistent with the laws o£ nature. To
ask if it is technologically possible is to add to the set of
constraining laws with which it muat be compatible.
<>5 if£ Consistent(S & Laws}
RELATIVIZATION AND SINGULAR TERMS
Simply adding singular teras does not yield a plausible
theory. For exallple .. since the sentence DeDrew is a rocko, is
logically consistent with the laws of neture <which make no
mention of particular individuals) one would have <>Rock(Drew)
or even <>Drew=2. Such 8 notion of de ~ modality~
solftetimes called "logical possibilityu,. is far off the mark 1:f
19. van Fraassen, 1980, p.202.
20. See longer note D.
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our concern is with explicating ordinary intuitions. But we
can add to the consistency set particular facts about the
obJects in question. Suppose c is the only singular term
occurring in P. Then,
OPe iff Consistent(P & Facts(c) & Laws).
The statue puzzle and our discussion of Lewis suggest at
least one fact that ought to be included in Facts(~), namely.
an applicable covering noun. 21 To say that an obJect.
regarded as a statue, could not survive being crushed is to say
that its survival would not be consistent with one general
persistence criterion £or statues, namely, that they not change
shape draaatically.
THE NECESSITY OF ORIGIN AND BRANCHING
Kripke e.phasizes intuitions which can be h8ndled by Lhe
inclusion of more information in the "Facts(_)" predicate.
ObJects could not have had origins much dif£erent fro. those
they 8ctually had. I could not have had different parents. I1y
work table. if it was originally wood. could not havs been
fashioned froM another material. Such intuitions can be
acco••odated in the consistency scheme by insisting that
Facts(a) include not only 8 covering noun but also data on the
obJect's origin. Quite a £ew philosophers have suggested a
branchinq condition according to which a world w contains
21. See longer note E.
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an actual obJect c only if w began to differ from the actual
world at some tiMe a£ter c came into existence. 22
3.3 QUESTIONS AND REPLIES
1. Question: Does the consistency approach to modality
sketched above reduce the de ~ to the de
dicto?
The question can be made more precise in at least two
ways. First. would a consistency theorist recognize a
distinction between what are often called the de ~ and
de dicto readings of modal sentences? Yes. The scope
distinction in
Consistent ( Laws & The nuaber of pInnate = 9 )
reaains significant. On the narrow scope readin9~ it is false
(the laws of nature do not dict8~e t~~ exact nuaber of planets)
while on the wide scope reading it 16 true (the sentence "9 I
gil is inconsistent with the general principle, II(X)(X=X)"). On
a consistency account, de ~ statements are about 8
speci£1c obJect and their truth value is sensitive to the
particulars o£ the obJect's history and kind.
A second reading of the question stems fro. Quine's habit
of reading de dicto statements (the "first grade of
modality") as analytic. or true in virtue of aeaning. 23
22. See longer note F.
23. Quine,. I"Three Grades of Modality." 1966 ..
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The consistency interpretation does not reduce de re
modal claims to analytic statements. One reason is that the
laws of nature on which the scheme deperlds are not clearl y
analytic. Similarlyp the most general metaphysical and
mathematical truths ere not, as Quine has argued_ meaningfully
said to be 8nalytic. For example, the Mereo!ogists claim that
two physical obJects could not occupy the same spatio-temporal
receptacle does not appear to be true in virtue o£ the meaning
o£ the words.
2. Lewis considers the view that lI#possibly A' means that A
is a consistent sentence," and concludes that the view is
··either circ:ular or incorrect. '·24 Is Lewis's obJection
relevant to what I aa calling the consistency approach?
Lewis's obJect-ions are not relevant. but to see this it is
necessary to cite fro. hi. at length.
But what is consistency? If a consistent
sentence is one that could be true, or one that 1s
not necessarily false. then the theory is circular:
of course one aay be More artful than I have been in
hiding the circularity~ If a consistent sentence 1s
one whoa. denial is not a theorem of some specified
deductive systeM, then the theory is incorrect rather
than circular: no falsehood o£ arithmetic is possibly
true, but for any deductive systea you care to
speci£y either there are falsehoods among its
theorea. or there 18 80ae falsehood of arithmetic
whose denial is not a.ong its theore.s. If a
consistent sentence is one that comes out true under
aoae assignment of extensions to the nonlogicsl
vocabulary. then the theory is incorrect: some
24. Lewis, 1973, in Loux, 1979, p.183.
-144-
IV.3 A CONCEPTUALIST ACCOUNT OF MODALITY
assignments of extensions are impossible. for
instance one that assigns overlapping extensions to
the English terms IDpig" and "sheep".
The view that Lewis is cr1tic:i:z1ng reduces II(>A II t~
"Cons1stent(A)" which di£fers from the analysis in terms of
··Consistent(Laws & FactsCA) & A)". Lewis is surely right that
it would be circular to analy2s consistency in terms o£
possibility, but that it no part of the consistency approach.
Nor is Lewis's appeal to Gode!'s Incompleteness Theora.
relevant to the consistency approach~ since there is no
requirement that the set of laws be ax1omat12sble. If every
truth o£ arithaetic is in the Laws sentence, then whether or
not II <>A I. is true is sOllet1aes £orm.all y undecidable" and
sometimes practically undecidable in that it ~ould require more
coaputer t1ae than is available in a finite universe.
3. How does the relat1vizat1on work? What happens when I
regard this coaputer as a rock? Could this boy, regarded 8S a
child~ beco.e an adult?
The coaputer is not 8 rock and the question is, to use an
old phrase~ a category mistake. Philosophical logicians have
explored a number o£ ways of treating .. is!ires sucl~ as liThe
present king o£ France 1s bald": one could follow Russell in
saying they are false, or Strawson in saying they are
indeterminate.
In asking about John, regarded as a child, one is failing
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to mark the distinction between contingent predicates and
covering nouns. The consistency approach £allows Wiggins and
others in noting the distinction between merely contingent
predicates and covering nouns.
4. Couldn~t I have been conceived a few minutes eGrlier~ i~
for example, the spera £rom which I descend had been a somew~~at
£aster swimmer? Vet the branching condition appears to require,
that I would not exist in situations which di££ered £rom the
actual situation at times prior to my conception.
The branching condition may be too strict. What we count
as a sUfficiently rich story to be 8 story about an actual
individual is an eapirical question. Perhaps it suf£ices that
the same egg and spera be involved? Gupta suggests that we
allow "there to be alternative pasts branching from future
moments.··25 It would not be surprising if the question
whether or not one is dealing with the "same F U in 8.
particularly di££icult situation 1s indeterMinate Just as
whether a novel is about an actual individual is sometimes a
di££icult question left to the courts.
My intuitions in this area are not as firm as SOMe people
report. 26 I see no reason why I couldn't have had p8rents
other than the one I actually had.
25. Gupta~ 1982. p.S22.
In working out a
26. S1ailar doubts are expressed in Chomsky~ 1975, p.49.
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consistency approach. one might try to specify not only the
clear cases but also the £actors which contribute to
uncertainty.
5. It is common in the literature on modality to see the
central metaphysical issue posed as nWhat are possible worlds?"
One is told to choose between accepting an ontological
commitment to possible worlds or reducing them to some other
sort o£ entity, I'ersatz worlds," to borrow William Lycan~s
phrase. This stark choice, which assumes the necessity of
taking possible worlds seriously, is sometimes preceded with a
litany of the .any results produced by two decades of work on
possible-world se.antics.
By positing nonactual worlds or states of affairs, we
aay achieve our fa.ilier but still remarkable
reduction o£ the alethic aodalities to quantifiers,
formulate Tarsk1-style semantics £or propositional
attitudes and hosts of other troublesome
constructions. display the otherwise mysterious
connections between Fregean senses and linguistic
meanings. illuMinate the pragMatics of
counterfactuals. and provide a rigorous for.at for
the theoretical study of decision mak1ng. 27
I see no reason why the conceptualist should feel
coapelled to accept the challenge. Without condemning the work
of possible world semanticists, one can doubt the fruitfulness
of defining Illleanings" 88 certain funct,1ons between "possible
worlds" and extenaions# or of analy2ing counterfactuals in
27. Lyc8n~ 1979. pp.274-75.
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teras of similarity among possible worlds. Such theories have
not proven so £ruit£ul that anyone. who o£fers an analysis o£
modal discourse is obliged to o££er a substitute £or possible
worlds. It may well be that philosophers taking a
conceptualist position along the lines sketched above will have
to £orsake the fruits of possible world semantics; I suspect
they"ll say "good riddance."
6. As was eaphasized in chapter three,28 one virtue of
taking modal contexts literally is the simplicity of the
approach. The consistency account ettr1butes a very complex
£ora to seemingly simple stateMents. Why think that ordinary
speakers mean anything so complex?
First. it Must be readily conceded that the consistency
account is ~ore complex than that offered by those who would
take de ~ Modalities literally and that other things
equal. the simpler account is to be preferred. But other
things are not equal. The consistency account is motivated at
least as much by deficiencies in the opposition as by its
intrinsic attractionSe
Second~ the consistency approach is certainly not
co••1tted to the claim that when people assert <)Pc they are
actively entertaining the sentence, Conaistent( Pc & Fact1\(c)
and Laws )_ if for no other reason than that not all the lawe
28. Chapter three~ section one.
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or facts are relevant to each claim. Support for the view
comes £rom the observation that when an assertion, <>Pc, is
challenged. discussion turns to particular facts about c's
make-up and general principles. I£ you tell me that it is not
possible to build a computer aa versatile as the human mind, I
want to know what constraints you have in mind.
Fin811y~ something like the consistency theory is
frequently used even by advocates o£ modal properties.
for example. distinguishes between metaphysical and
Kripke.
epistemological possibility, where the latter is explicated in
terms of consistency with what is known. But if such an
interpretation 1s reasonable £or some contexts, there is no
reason to reJect it out of hand as too complex for others.
7e Isn't the consistency approach really Just an
uninformat1ve cheat? The "Laws" sentence and the IIIF'acts ( )~.
predicate merely summarize certain modal intuitions without
explaining anything?
This question highlights a fundsMental issue that the
conceptualist aust at least acknowledge. There is a long
tradition in philosophy of purporting to explicate one or
another ph1106oph1cal concept by an appeal to Modal concepts.
For example, attempts to distinguish genuine scientific laws
froll mere coincidental generalities are often based on arl
appeal to physical necessity.29 Any philos~phical concept
29. Recent examples include Brody, 1980, chapter 6, and
Fisk. 1973~ chapter 4.
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as basic and ubiquitous as modality will be linked in numerous
ways with other basic concepts. If one philosopher attempts to
explain or analyze X's in terms of V's and Z~s~ it should come
as no surprise i£ another turns the tables and says Z's are to
be expla~~.ned in terms of X' sand Y' s. In taking as fundamental
the conc~~ts of a law and consistency, anyone defending the
consistency approach must reJect requests to explain these
notions in more fundamental terms.
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LONGER NOTES TO CHAPTER IV
A. Explicit endorsements o£ mereological ontologies coupled
with reservations about the coherence o£ any straightforward
attribution o£ modal properties to physical obJects may be
found in Gibbard_ 1975: Goodman. 1955; Gupta~ 1980: Lewis,
1971; and Quine p 1960.
B. Thomson's skepticism may be fueled in part by the
difficult question on which her example of the putative
multiple occupancy of a spatia-temporal receptacle depends:
could a piece o£ ice that originated in the shape of a house
have been the same piece o£ ice had it originated as a
ship.30 Cases in which an obJect is supposed to have an
origin radically different from the one that it actually had
are notoriously problematic. My treatment o£ the statue and
the piece of bronze does not assume that the same piece of
bronze could have originated as a sword; rather, 'the point is
that having originated together, there are transformations
which the piece o£ bronze but not the statue can survive.
c. Noteworthy recent attempts to explicate modal discourse in
a way coapat1ble with an eapiriciat ontology are Elgin, 1983;
van Fraa••en~ 1977, 1978, 1980: Glbbard~ 1975; Goodman, 1955:
30. Tho.son. 1982. section 7, forthcomingu
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Gupta~ 1980; Kvart~ 1982; Mackie, 1974: and Mondadori and
Morton, 1976.
Conceptualist concerns with modality have a long history:
see "aclnt~re. 1969 (cited on p.19 of this thesis)~ and van
Fraassen, 1978.
D. The consistency approach is an amalgam of idees in the
literature.
The close connection between consistency and modality has
long been recognized. One expression of this idea is in the
claim that possible worlds are nothing but maximally consistent
sets of sentences. Carnap's "state descriptions" are one such
approach. Hintikka also £ollowed this approach. Other
philosophers have preferred to speak o£ consistency a~ong
propositions.
George Boo10s. Robert Solovay and others have explored in
detail the behavior of consistency predicates of Godel numbers
within formal systems: see 80010s. 1979~ for a bibliography of
mathe.stiesl work on consistency predicates in formal systems.
E. The relativizat10n of open, referential positions insid~
the scope of 8 quantifier was suggested by Lewis as a way of
dealing with aultiple occupancy puzzles. Gibbard and Gupta
follow Lewis. Kvsrt has recently aade such a suggestion. His
motivation is, roughly speaking. epistemological; cross-moment
identification is relative to covering nouns. and he aims to
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make cross-world identity no A9SS mysterious. As noted
earlier~ Geach suggests that all referential positions need to
be relativ1zed and Chisholm~s position also requires that much
ordinary talk be construed as involving at least implicit
gUidelines £or when two prima:r", obJects are the same in the
"loose and popu 1ar sense."
F. The branching condition is suggested by Brody. 1980,
pp.116-123; Gibbard. 1975_ pp.196-197: and Mackie. 1974*
pp.551-559. The proposal that particular facts about obJects
are involved in de ~ propositions can be found in a
nuaber of places: exaaples, Nelson Goodman. 1955, and Mondador1
and Morton, 1976.
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CHAPTER V
FISSIONS. MODAL PROPERTIES, AND ONTOLOGY
Among th••oat popular puzzl•• in the recent literature on
identity are those involving split brains, divided a.aebaa,
1
machine. that duplicate persons, distinct ships which
"originate" together, etc:. What the•• exe.plea have in co••on
is that one F 1s followed by two F'. in such a way that it is
puzzling as to whether either of the subsequent F'. ia
identical t.o the or1gin,tJl F. The•••8fi.a101\ puzzles·· are
usefully d1agra••ed by branching lines. with ti•• flowing
towards the right. 1
A
B
c
The fie.ion puzzle. have fighred proainently in the rec.nt
literature on .odality and on the nec•••ity o£ identiti•• 1n
particularc 2 Chandler appeal. to auch a puzzle in arguing
t.hat not. all na••• are. aa Kripke cla1.s_ ·'rigid
designatora. "3 Nozic:k u••s £1saion puzzles to chall.rige
1. Significant contributions ~onc.rn1ng fie.ion puzzle. are
Sho•••ker. Self-Knowledge and S.lf~Id.nt1ty_ 1962_ Williama,
PrRbl••• oftbe Se1£. 1973~ and the .a.aye by Lewis. Par£it,
P8rry" and Wiggin. in Rorty (ed.). Th. Ident1ttea of Persona,
1976.
2. See longer note A £or a characterization o£ rigid
d••ignatora and the nec•••ity of idGntit1•••
3. Chandler, "Rigid D.signation,," 197~. pp.363-369.
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v. INTRODUCTION
Krlpk.'. views on the necessity of identities. 4 Wiggins
turns the tables and appeals to the necessity of identities in
disaissing treataents of the puzzles along the lines of
Chandler and Nozick. 5
This chapter exaaine. these various connections that are
suggested in the literature between the f1.810n puzzles and the
straightforward interpretation of ordinary de ~ modal
sentence. aa involving the attribution of 4 .odal property to
an obJect. Th8 chapter haa two maJor focuses.
(1) The £1rst connection between £1••10n puzzles and
modality which I explore ia v.ry broad. Fi••ion puzzle. figure
pro.inently in argu••nta for two ~.pir1c1.t ontologies
discussed in previous chapters: the four-di ••naional_
aereological ontology of teaporal parts (Gibbard, Good.an.
Lewis. Quine.'etc.) and the aucceas!onist ontology of pri.ary
obJects (Chiahola_ Locke?~ Hu••?). The puzzle. illustrate both
con£usions and conflicts in our Judg••nta conc.rning
cro••-t••poral 1d.ntificat1ona. The•• confusions and conflicts
call for .xplanation_ which 18 what the eapiriciat ontologists
in the tradition o£ Hu•• purport to do. I argued in previous
chapt.rs that both aucc•••ioniat and ••reo!ogical ontologie.
are incoapat1ble with a .tra1ghtfo~W8rd, literal reading of
4. Noz1ck, Pbilo80pbk9a1 Explanation., 1981, p.659.
5. Wiggins. 5•••0 __- .»4 Subatance, 1980, p.208.
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Ve INTRODUCTION
ordinary .oda1 ••nt.n~.8.6 Thus, one connection between
the fission puzzle. and current york on Modality is that the
puzzle. are a significant .l••ant in the defense of ontologies
which are 1ncoapatible with .odal reali.B.
(II) The second £ocua o£ this chapter ia on recent work
by Chandler and Nozick. They Maintain that a proper analysis
of certain puzzle. reveal. counterexaaples to the necessity of
identities and related principles. Since the neoess1ty of
identities is central to the straightforward reading of de
~ contexts. 8 clear aDd cOMpelling counterexaaple would be
signi£icanto 7 But the analysis and .xaaple. offered by
Chandler and Nozick are far froM clear or co.pel11ng. There
are ••veral reasona to b. auspicious of ··resolutions" to
£1a.ion p'lzz1ea: £1rat, they depend on int.uition. 1n a region
where vagueness and conflict are raapant to an .yen greater
extent than usual: ••cond_ the criteria for a resolution Gr.
uncl.ar~ and third_ there are .everal d1f£erent resolutions
available. Further.or., the particular proposal of Chandler
and Nozick i •••p.cially probl••atic.
A brief look at Lock.'. tr.at••nt of identity will place
this chapter in historical perspective. Locke di.cu•••• three
6. See chapter two, ••etian four, and chapter four, 8.c~ion one.
7. Se. longer note A for an explanation of the connection
b.tw~.n the nec•••1ty o£ 1denit1•• and .adal prop.rite••
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different (though related) proble. areas involving
individuation. Firet~ there are the puzzles that concerned us
in p~evious chapters which involve aultiple occupency of a
single voluae by obJects of distinct k1ndB~ In particular,
Locke considers "wherein an oak differs froll a laa•• of
matter."e Second. there are puzzles concerning identity
through tiae. Locke for••hadows conteaporary discus.ion of the
i.auea in his analyses o£ ·'.a•• body," "sa•• plant," " saMe
aoo. 11 and ··s••• per.on.·· Here ws find the "soul of a prince"
entering the body o£ a cobbler, split personalitiQa. and the
doctrine t.hat "person" 18 a forena1c: tera. 9 The £1••100
puzzle. are one aspect o£ th1a cluster of concerns. Th1rd~
Locke expr..... skeptic!.. concerning the relationship a.ong
obJects. I·X 18 of the aa•• kind aa Y.·· Are kind" a8.ociated
with Ari.tot.lien 8 •••nc•• ~ or are they huaan artifacts? Hare
we find concern with the ··boundari•• o£ the apeciee·· and
aon8t.ra with the head of a Dan and the body o£ a hog. 10
Lock.~. cat_gorization ia still helpful. Significant
r8cent critic!••• o£ th. r.v1val of .odal real i ••• which haa
£louriahed with the advent o£ po.sible world_. have taken off
£roa ••ch probl•• are.. I ahall not cona1der the third area 1n
this di••ertation~ though a nuaber of argu••nta in the
8. Locke ~ E•••y, Book II~ p.443.
9. Locke_ i_say. Book II pp.4S6-467.
10. Lock_. E•••y, Book 111_ pm78.
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literature are very interesting. 11 It 1s to be e~pect&d
that critics of the .odal reel is. and standard quantiiied modal
logic will build on Locke's concerns. Locke saw himsolf 8S
following Boyle in opposing the adv~rsG influence of
Aristotelian ••taphys1ca on 8c1ence. 12 Since the
Aristotelian character of the new eseential!s. haa been
frequently noted. it 18 only n~tural that critics of the
moveaent should turn to the a ••inal discus.ions o£ Locke and
the other early ••piriciata.
SECTION 1
INVENTION VERSUS DISCOVERY AND THE SHIP OF THESEUS
In th1a ••et1on and the next, I argu8. with reference to
the paradigaatic 8xaaple of the mbip of Th•••us. that (1) our
ordinary intuition. concerning 1d.ntity through t1•• lead to
contradiction. wb.n confronted with ••at.ric fi ••1on puzzle.,
and (2) that th.r8 are a nuab8r of ••na1ble, coneistent
approach•• concerning how W8 a1ght apeak about 8uch situationa,
no ons of which 1. cl••rly '·carr.ct'·. Th••• are not original
clai•• but they Gr. worth developing in 80•• detail aince th.y
provide aupport. which I hope to explicate. for Huaean
ontolagi••13 and sr. i.portent preliainaries to exaaining
11. s•• Ror~y. 1979, duPre, "Biological Kind. and Natural
Taxa.'" 1981. and Wileon,. ··Pr.dicat. Iteets Propert.y,.I" 1982.
12. Ay.ra" ··Locke veraua Ariatot18 on Natural Kinds," 1981 ..
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the elai•• of Chandler and Nozick.
1.1 THE SHIP OF THESEUS
The ship of Th•••us provide. a frequently discussed entry
point. Hobbe., who borrowed the axe_pl. fro. Plutarch. ia
concerned with the que.tion "in what .en•• it aay b. conceived
that a body 1& at one ti•• the ea•• , at another ti•• not the
sa•• 88 it was fora.rly.·· The exsaple of the .hip ia intended
t.o challenge t.he theory that ··pr•••rvat.1on of for.·· 18 a
sufficient condition £or identity through tiae.
According to the .econd op1n1on~ [pr•••rvetion of
£oral, two bodi•• 8xiating both at once, would be one
and the sa•• nu••rical body. For 1£, for exe.ple,
that ship of Th•••u.~ concerning th. di££erencQ
whmreo£ aade by continual reparation in taking out
the old plank. and putting in n.w~ the aopbiatera of
Athena W8r. wont to dispute, were, a£t.r all th.
planks were chang8d. th. ae•• nu••rical ship it wa.
at the beginning; and i£ &0•• aan had kept the old
planks •• they were tak.n out, and by putting th••
a£terward. together in the aa•• ord.r, had again Bode
a ship of th... thia g without doubt, had a180 b.en
the a ••• nu••r1cal .hip with that which was at the
beginning: and 80 there would have b••n two .hi~
nu••r1cally the a ••• , which ia abaurd. 14
H.r. ia • diagraa of the aituation:
A
B
c
R.~.ll £raa chapt.r ~wo that Chi.hola, ••ong othera, qu••~1on_
14. Hobb••• D. CorpoE•• pp.136-37.
is. Ch.p~.r two•••c~1an. two and fouro
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not to reJ.ct this p08.1bi11ty out of hand, it 1s uoeful to
sy.bolize ··1s the sa•• ship" \11th a neutral sy.bol, 11::5:::". The
absurdity to which Hobbes alludes aay be eyabo11zed by the
contradictory s.nte~ce••
(1)
(2)
(3)
(ER')
QED
B =5= C
A =5= B
A =S:s C
··x=S=y" 1. an equivalence relation.
8 =s= C
where an equivalence relation 1& any relation R satisfying for
all x. y_ and z the condition.:
(re£lex!vity> xRx
<ay•••try)
<trana1tivity)
xRy => yRx
(xRy & yRz) ~) xRz
The puzzl. haa aurv!ved 80 long becaua. each of the
contradictory pr••ia.a 1. 80 inherently plausible. The
coapl.t. di.a••••bly and r.a••••bly of obJect. 1s a faa!lier
.nougb ph.noa.non. Soldiers are for.ver having to tear down
their r1£1•• into the ••all••t po.aible piec... clean the
pi.c•• ~ and th.n att••pt to r8aa•••ble th•• ~ The Star Trek
proc••• o£ "b•••ing" obJ.cta £roa plac. to plac:e haa captured
the i ••ginatioD of ph1108ophical writGr8. 16 "us.u•• and
hi.torie.l village. sr. filled with obJects that have baen
tran.por~.d pi.c. by piece. Th. curato~. at the Athena Mu••ua
16. 5•• H1rach. lb. Concept of Id.ntit~, 1982. chapter 7 for the
ap.c1£1c ex••pl. and an exc.ll.nt g.neral diacu••1on.
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would no doubt want Theaeus'. "original II ship" nad. up of the
original parts. But the ehip#. captain, who had sailed and
aa1ntained the ship for yeara. aight rea80nably clai. to be
op.rating the a.a. ship_ He too would have a strong csse.
Certainly we apeak of the alsa•• car.·1 even after year" of
replacing parts. Such talk .how. 110 particular concern wi th
I
the total a.aunt of replace.ent. provided it take. place
gradually.
My point in 90in9 over this £aa111ar g~ound is to insist
that the .hip of The••us presents ua with a genuine paradox.
By this I a.an that .ach pre.ise is very plausible and the
denial of each pre.ise ••••& ad hoc.
The con£lict aaong intuitions revealed by the ship of
Theseua rei••• iaportant questions. First, we need an
explanation of how such a vital and everyday notion as identity
through ti•• , which for th••oat part functions
unprobl.a.t1eally, could lead to a contradiction. What are we
and th. world 11ke £or thia to be possible? Second, which, if
any. o£ the .any propo••d resolutions is best?--and by what
atandard? EV8n fraa1ng th. aatter in these teras is soaewhat
controv8ra1al and it 18 appropriate to discuss the general
i.aue of invention v.raua d1acovery in metaphysics.
1.2 INVENTION VERSUS DISCOVERY
Th.r8. ar. ~wo quite di££erent attitudes with which puzzles
concarn1ng 1d.nt1~y are approachedG The descriptive attitude
-161-
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1s one of discovering the correct reaolution. where correctness
might be aeasured in teras of either nature or closeness to our
conceptual ache.eo There is a preauaption that neither nature
nor our conceptual ache•• ia inherently contradictory.
Wiggin.·., Sa.enes. and Substance. 18 a sustained attempt
to be descriptive. He sees his Aristotelian descriptions as
--the only explanation which can possibly aeasure up to the
surprising deterainacy of .oat o£ the identity questions that
we encounter in real 11£8.'·17 Typically. such
inve.tigator. apeak with considerable confidence about u our
intuition•• •• Faced with an apparent puzzle, thM descriptive
.etaphysician wants to dispel the puzzle by trying harder to
get the de.cription right. It. 1s this process of '·get.ting
thing. right.'· t.hat I question wi th regard to the f iesion
puzzl•••
The puzzle. aay be approached in an alternative and, I
think. pr.£erabl., spirit; they can be seen as evidence that
our ordinary concepta of ·'ssaene••" and ··1denti ty·· are nowhere
near ea pr.c1•• aa t.h. logicians use of .1=11 and that puzzles
are to be expected--eapecially when one is dealing with such
rech.rche situations aa fisston. "atheaattcians and logicians
•••u•• that 1£ ...... and ··t n are singular teras denoting natl.Jral
nuabers. then th~r. ie a definite anawer whether s=t.
Certainly the identity relation in logic and aathe.at1cs is an
17. Wiggina. 1980. p.54.
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equivalence relation which satisfies Leibn1z 6 s law. But why
aSBUM. that our ordinary '''saae-FID concepts will conform to such
a high standard?
In his The Mirror of Nature, Richard Rorty suggests
one extr••e view: since there is no such thing as airroring
nature "exactlyD' or ·'according to ita standards·'. and our
··conc.ptual ache.e ll is a f l1a.y £' pragaatic a:£fair which
struggle. ae best it can to help us eat g sleep, aeke war, and
carryon aa hu••n.. there are inau££1cient data for
••taphya1c1ana to exa.ine. 18 They are one 8n~ all in the
busine•• o£ very loo.ely cODstrained invent1on--invention which
lacks the glory of science, aua1c or poetry.
On. need not accept Rorty'a sweeping skepticisa concerning
ontological exploration and discovery to question whether there
is anything to be discovered in _any specific areaa; £or
exe.ple. Quine writea:
Scientist. and philosophers seek a comprehensive
syat•• of ~h. world. and one that is oriented to
reference .ven .ore squarely and utterly than
ordinary language. Ontological concern is not a
correction o£ lay thought and practlce; it is £oraign
to lay culture, though an outgrowth of 1t.19
The .hip of Th•••ua is not an isolated case. Several
ex••pl•• and analogi•• should eerye to aotivate further the
ide. that th8re ar. are.s in which our concepta are vague or
£.11 to a.t1a£y appar.ntly natural principl.s.
18. Ror~y. 1979.
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One favorite exaaple of such indefiniteness 1s that of
nations. Useful as it is to talk about nations.and to speak of
lithe saas nation" GD in .any particular 81tuations 1 t is unclear
as to whether x is the sa•• nation as y. Parfit gives a good
axe.ple: IIIWas England the S8ae nation I5fter 10661 1120
Hu.e~. examples o£ the sound and church are also relevanta
••• 8 .an who hears a n01se. that is frequently
interrupted and renew1d. ssye. it is still the same
no!ae; tho~ ~t1. evident th. sounds have only a
specific identity or r ••••blance~ and there is
nothing nuaerically the saae. but the cause. which
produc1d the.. In like .anner it aay be said without
breach of propriety o£ language, that such a church,
which was £or••rly o£ brick, fell to ruin~ and that
the parish rebuilt the ea•• church o£ free-stone~ and
according to aodern architecture. Here neither the
fora nor aaterial. are the aaae. nor is there any
thing coa&on to the two obJects. but their relation
to the inhabitants of the parish; and yet this alone
ia sufficient to ask. us denoa1nate thea the
••••• 21
It aay be obJected that the Boat such axa.ples ahow is
t.hat .any o£ our •••••• Fl. concepts are vague and ada! t of"
borderline ca8e.~ not that they could lead to actual
contradiction.. Here a W1ttgenste1nian ga•• analogy is useful.
One can i.ag.in. a aport which had been successfully played for
years be£ore so••one noticed that the official rule book
allowed for the extraora1nary possibility that one "inning",
11. could b. part of the aa•• gs•• aa 12 and also part
of the .s•• gsa. aa 13. where I2 and 13 were not
20a Par£it. 1971. in Perry, 1975. p.204.
21. Hu••• Tre.t1.9_ p.2~8; ••e a180 longer note C.
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part o£ the eaae gsae. Much debate ensued as to whether the
rules were worth changing since (1) people had grown accustomed
to the•• (2) the resulting change would be quite cOBplex, and
(3) no one iaagined that any actual situation would sriae in
which the ano.aly a5ttered.
1~3 AN INDIRECT CRITICISM OF nODAL PROPERTIES
The broadly conceptualist the.es defended above are, r
want to show. closely related to issues discussed in previous
chapters. By drawing these connections, we ahall be 1n a
position to ••• how the confusion resulting froa fission
puzzle. can be turned into an arguaent against the literal
interpr.tation of ordinary Bodal mentences.
In chapter four. I noted a funds.ental division between on
the on. band thoea philosophers who £ind tnat our co••on~sense
ontology of tabl•• , persona. billiard balls and other
aoderate-sized dry goods22 is adequate and coherent 8S it
stande and tho•• who aainta1n that it is neceesary to
supple••nt. ind••d expla1n~ the ordinary ontology in teras of
aore b••ic: entit1ea---for instance. ··te.poral slices. II ··priaary
obJects. e. or "aggreg&t•• of stoa•• " Particular proposals raise
particular probl••a~ but .everal trends can be aeen 1n broad
outline. The devote. of co••on aense will stress how peculiar
and unnatural the ··creat.ions·· o£ the theorist.s are" how
cu.b8rao•• the propos.d analy••• o£ •••• ingly ai.ple stateMents
22. The phre•• is £roa Austin. 1962, p.8.
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become. The theorists will counter that they are driven to
the views by the puzzles and inconsistencies in ordinary
thought, as well as the difficulties in fitting our
pretheoretical Judgments with the data--in short, the usual
reasons for theory construction.
We noted above Quine's feelings about the limitations of
ordinary discourse, feelings which are shared by philosophers
in the tradition of Hume who speak of a "loose and popular"
sense of identity. Wiggins provides us with rhetoric from the
other side:
In the twentieth century, analytic philosophy
has also been prey to the illusion, most likely
produced by an.irrelevant admiration of what is
admirable in science, that by Judicious enrichment of
the obJect language the theorist can rise to some
vantage point on a higher plane of theory and then
inspect and describe from on high, in his own
theoretical way, the subJect matter of ordinary
thought and discourse. Perhaps it is almost enough
to put this hope into words to see that, almost by
definition, philosophy is the place where its
disappointment is nearly inevitable, and to conclude
that technical terms whose sole advertised purpose is
to achieve this are to be shunned (as Leibniz so
quaintly and vehemently put it in Preface to
Nizolius) as worse than dog or snake.23
Puzzles concerning identity through time are one issue on
which the debate focuses. Theorists in the tradition of Hume
see them first, as clear evidence that all is not well in our
common-sense world, and second, as test cases with which the
power o£ the conceptualist approaches can be demonstrated.
Both a mereological position (Quine and Goodman) and a
23. Wiggins, 1980, p.G.
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auccesa10niat picture (Chisholm) provide intriguing pictures o£
what is going on in the Theseus puzzle; each accords the mind a
role in IIIc:arving up" or IIlinking together" bas!.:: entities and
each provides a picture o£ the world--a apet1o-temporal
£raaework full of baatc entities.
If ay contention in earlier chapters is correct~ then
puzzles like the Theseus puzzle provide indirect support for
criticism. o£ literal interpretations o£ ordinary modal
sentence. in that they lend support to the general Huaean
poaition, which is in turn antithetical to conteMporary Modal
realisa in the Aristotelian tradition.
The relations I aD suggesting a&y be diagrammed as
£ollowa:
~N••d for Invention
Ft••ion Puzzles 1 Critici•• of Modality
~Hu.ean Ontologiea~
The £i••ion puzzle. and other ana.alies suggest that
ontology require. an el•••nt of inYention~ that the
po••1b111t1•• for discovery are 1i.it.d. HUM.an ontologies in
turn are both perticularly suited for such invention and o£fer
an explanation of how our ssae-F notions could fall into
con£uaion. Finally_ •• stressed in earlier chapters, there is
a t8na1on between Hu••an ontologie. and the literal
int8rpretat1on o£ ordinary .odal sentences.
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SECTION 2
RESOLUTIONS
This section outlines seyeral recolut1ons to the ship of
Theseus puzzle. The resolutions discussed both illustrate and
are u~ed in defense of typical con.truction~ in the tradition
of Huae and provide benchaarks for co.parison when we turn to
the rather invQlved discussion of Chandler and Noz1ck in the
next section.
2.1 THE ANSWER IS THERE IS NO ANSWER.
If by a resolution to tho Theseua puzzle one means a
syat.aatic way o£ answering all of the relevant identity
questions. then it is quite re~.onabl& to claiM that there 1s
no "resolution" to the puzzle. Rather II one 18 faced wi th IS
situation which can be described quite clearly without any such
sorting out of the identity claiM.. Parfit suggests such a
general akept1c1sa when he reeo••ends that discussions of
"personal identity" and £1.8ion turn toward what would really
.a~tar in fission situationa, naaely. personal survival, and
turn away fro. the irrelevant and unsolvable que.tions o£
ontology and identity:
If all th. po.sible answers are i.plausible, it 18
hard to decide which of the. 18 true. and even hard
to k ••p the belie£ that one o£ th•• must be true. 1£w. give up this belie£, aa I think we should. theae
probl••• disappearll We ahall tl,en regard the ca•• aa
like .any oth.ra in which. for quite unpuzzling
reasona. there ia no answer to a que.tion about
1d8nt.1t.y.24
24. Par£1t~ II'Peraonal Id.ntity,·· 1971, in Perry_ 1975, p.204.
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Three theses need to be distinguished. Firat, that
ordinary language does not supply a straightforward
··resolution. I. Second, that there are several equally
acceptable ways of "handling" the puzzles, no one of which is
clearly best--indeed there is a serious question as to what
standards one is to use in this area. Third. that the
situations can be described clearly as they stand.
I have discussed the claim that there is nothing further
to b. found in ordinary language. The cla1. that there is no
beat resolution would require £or a :ull Justification an
exaa1nation of the options. SOBa of these will be discussed
below~ But even without exaaining all of the optiona p the
cla1. ca~ be aotivated. Because of the conflicting nature of
our intuitions, and the fabricated nature of the puzzles,
philosophical logicians have even greater freedoa than usual in
fission caBe. to conatruct consistent syste... No one would be
surpri••d 1f one ended up with a nuaber of acceptable
reaolut1ons. Furth.raor8. there are no clear criteria for
choosing a.ong resolution.. O£ course one says the usual
thing. about. "closen••• o£ £ 1 t wi th our conceptual Siche.A·· and
such, but the proble. is one of finding ~ a.tric. Particular"
contexts aight supply a ••tric, but without a context. one 10
at ••••
Conaider an analogous situation. Rather than r&pr•••nt1ng
.Yolu~ion through tia., let the linea b. an ordinary
-169-
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two-dimensional map of a highway.
A D
Suppose one were to ask, How .any roads are there between A and
01 A natural answer, "t.,;o", raises the pseudo-puzzle as to
whether two roads can occupy the saae place at the saae t1aa.
One could say by analogy with the aereologist that the two
roads have certain parts in co••oo. Or one could oay by
analogy with the success1on1at that strictly speaking there are
four roads, AB, upper BC. lower BC. and CD. Or one could
question the question. Who cares? What .ore is there to know
once one has a clear aap of the situation? Why think that our
ordinary talk concerning roads (or pipes. or rivers) is
sU££iciently deter.toote to £avor one resolution over another?
Perhaps the .1tuat1~ns are aU£ficiently eoaplex that what one
needs is a aap. not a resolution.
The sugge.tion that there is no reason or way to choose
among consistent resolutions to a fission puzzle is co.patible
with a range o£ cntolog1es. Fro. a aerso!og1cal perspective,
there are a great Many entities (occupants of four-dimensional
receptacles> and the question of which are roads (or ships)
could ba settled in a variety of way.o A succeaaion!st could
.ee whatever controversy there ia as a controversy surrounding
th. "1008. and popular'· sense o£ identit.y. Or one .ight think,
ontology it••lf being 80 controversial. that the sorts of
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questions which. have so occupied wri tars in the Utl\eory o£
reference·' are best left open.
Other suggestions have been .ads in the recent literature.
Of those aent10ned below, two are seriously flawed and two.
though plausible, are hardly co.palling.
2.2 TWO INADEQUATE SOLUTIONS
THE 50~ SOLUTION One rather bad idea haa soae currency in the
literature. It 1s 8oaet1aes suggested that the problem staas
fro. our pera1as1veness 1n matters o£ replace.ent snd
reaaseably: a little bit 18 peraissible (otherwise one would be
a '·lRsreolog1cal essentialist,'1 1 ike Chishola) but too Iftuch
generates paradox. 25 Of course any particular cut off
point will appear arbitrary~ but 80a& vagueness can be allowed
~n this matter. The basic idea 18 sia11ar to what I reaeaber
hearing as a child. naa.ly. that if a dollar bill is ripped in
two, the part that coaprised more than 50~ of the original was
worth a dollar while the other part was worthless. This is
certainly a practical resolution to a division probleao And it
might at first bluah appear to work in resolving fission
puzzles:
A
~
------------1
:F
B
c
But there is a aiaple reason that a cutoff point. which
25. Ayers. 1974. p.133, and Wiggins. 1980, pe97.
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aay work for dollar billa. fails for physical obJects (if the
goal is to provide a consistent way of talking which ensures
that tht3 relation II is t.he S811e F as·a 1s an equivalence
relation.) Intransitivities arise over tiaeu A .ight L.) lesa
than SO~ di££erent than B which in turn 1s less than 50~
dif£ergnt fro. C. but C would be over 50* diffsrent than A.
90 10
~ ..A, ,
'---~ L... ~-----'
A
,-\0". B L.t 0 .-,. C
In br1e£_ the proble. with a cuto££ point is not only that
it would be arbitr~ry. but that even allowing for a range of
vagueness_ 1ntrana1tiv1tisa would ariS8ft" Relations such as
"differs only slightly £ro.·· or "shares .oat parts with" are
ai.ply not equivalence relat.ions. This "solution lll fails
miserably.
THE CONCEPT OF A SHIP IS AftBIGUOUS A second inadequate
resolution ate•• fro. the t.hought that puzzles ··about words'D
usually result froa aabigu1t1es and a £ailure to define one's
tar•• with adequate care. This suggests the possibility of
ai.ply defining t.wo type. o£ "ships": continuous-ships" and
reaa•••bable-ahipa. Ayera auggeats this as soaething he would
expect (but not accept) £roN his opponent whoa he labals "the
conceptualist.··26 But the ·.Jconceptua11st·· would certainly
b. ai.taken to ••braee such an approach. A proble. ar1s.a
26. Ayera. 1974~ p.133.
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because the ThesBus process can be repeated:
A
"
"-
'-
" , .
B C
Is B or C the saa. l·reass821bab18-ah1pla as A? No natural anawtar
suggests its81£. In addition. the idea of having two types of
ship at the saa. place at the saae tiae is sufficiently at odds
with co••on sens•• to require considerable Just1£1cation.
2.3 TWO MORE PROKISING RESOLUTIONS
LEWIS AND THE OVERLAPPING PARTS RESOLUTION
In previous chapters I noted that with the exception of
~oni.t8~ philosophers tend to accept that two obJects o£
different kind. can occupy the se•• place at the saae tiMe: for
exaaple. a ring and a piece of gold. But can two obJects o£
the saa. kind occupy the sa.. place at a time? Perhaps
there ar.~ even at the outset. two ships o£ Theseua. one which
r ••alna afloat throughout it. l1£e and one which will be
dise.s••bled? Rather than finding an aablguity in the general
noun,. "ship,. II t.his sugg••t.ion £ 1nda an aab1gui ty in t.he
aingulftr tera .Ithe ship of Th•••us. el L8W1& .ake. such a
8uggeat1on concerning per.on £ua!on and aplit braina. 27
Lewi.'. propoaal ia _oat e.sily aotivated in the case of
per.ona. Suppa•• 30hn'. brain were split and transferred to
27. L.wia" "Survival and Identity," in A. Rorty, 1976.
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two new bodies. Each awoke and recalled his ear11~r life in
Just the way the rest of us do. It is quite plausible that
Johnl and John2 would talk and think about the.selves
as having been the saae person at one tiDe. They Might
rea1n1sce about t~e t1a. they were together in Buch the 8a8e
i
way that par.ons who grew up in the ea•• £aa11y do.
I
O£ course the idea o£ two persona occupying the 8a.e place
at a tiae is extreaely cur1ous~ but that is (Lewis .ight argue)
because we1ve never experienced it. From a aereolog1cal
perspective. the situation is analogous to a ring and a piece
of gold sharing a teaporal part. Faced with the obJection that
there is originally only one person. Lewis r ••poods that we do
or could count persons using the relation 1dentitY-8t-a-t1me~
which is an equivalence relation holding 8.00g obJects sharing
a teaporal part at a ~i.e. By analogy, we aoaet1.es use tho
relation. identical at 8 place_ in speaking about highways: £or
exaapla p 1-95 and Route 128 are the saa. road near
Boston. 28
The aereologist will further atteapt to reaove any
lingering puzzle surrounding the resolution by distinguishing
between two .enses o£ the principle that no two obJects o£ the
M.a. kind can occupy the ea•• volua. at a tiae. The principle
1s £a18. 1£ it pr8clud•• two obJects sharing a t ••poral partM
But on another r.ading~ it raises a puzzling question which is
28. The highway exaaple 1. a favorite. See Chishola, 1976, pe93.
and Lewis, 1976. p.93.
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not at issue. naaely, Could the .attar compoeing two obJects
co•• to occupy exactly the seas place at the same t1ae?29
Lewis's approach to split brains see•• less plausible ~'hen
applied to artifacts. though one aight argue that this 1s an
uninteresting consequence of our being relatively unconcerned
about the identity of ships as opposed to persons.
How doe. Lewis's re.olution in teras o£ shared teaporal
parts £1t into ay arguaent? I£ I aa right 1n cla1alng that
ordinary language yields con£licting intuitions when con£ronted
with £iasion puzzles, thon o£ course the ahared-toaporal-part
solution cannot be the uncontroveraial Qutco•• of an
exaaination of our conceptual ache.e. Further.ore. there are_
as outlined above, reasona to question whether there 1s or
could be any resolution o£ the puzzles divorced £rom a clear
context and a apGc1£1c purpose. Such considerations have no
doubt prevented .oat philosophers fro. wholeheartedly eabracing
Lewis's ontology. I share what I take to be the general
wariness. But we can also draw a More positive aoral fro.
Lew!s's ache... Like Chi.hola. Lewis advocates a cona18ten·t~
Motivated ayat•• which 1s £unda••ntally at odds with atte.pts
to interpret 11~erally ordinary .odsl sentences. Doea this
8upport a critique of th. mtraight£orW6rd interpretation of
modal claims? 1£ not a decisive criticis., the incoapatib11ity
29. Robinson, Denis, "Re-Ident1£ying Matter p " 1982. pp~317-343.
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between the literal reading of .odal sentences and Lewis's
sche.e at least casts 80ae doubt on the straight£orward
interpretation; 1f Lewie's position is not clearly cor~ect_ it
is not. clearly incorrect., aa i'to would be i£ the straightforward
interpretation o£ .odal cl&1as were a £1ra rock fro. which
decisive criticisas could be launched against other theories.
Hy final r ••arka on Lewis's approach to fission puzzles
are ••pecially relevant to those who would relativize de
~ contexts to a count noun. 30 Consider again the
suggestion that an obJect regarded aa a G aight survive certain
transfor.stions that it would not survive regarded aa an F.
Roughly speaking, the invocation of F and G ia su££ic1ent to
distinguish two alternative 11£e histories that this obJect
might have had. But the situations we are now considering only
involve one coyering noun (lishipU or ··person") and thus ai.ple
relativ1zstion to a count noua is inadequate as shown by the
exaaple below.
I.ag1ne a case in which John does not, but could, undergo
a fission operation.
30hno---------~
SUPP088_ following Lewis. that 30hnl and 30hn2 are
30. G1bbard~ Gupta, Kvart and Lewis defend this position. See
chapter £our. aection three.
-176-
V.2 RESOLUTIONS
distinct persons who share a common temporal part. They also
share their youth with JohnO_ They cannot both be John;·
they cannot bot.h be IIJohn regarded as a person." Is it true of
Johnl and John2 that they are contingently diverse~
that they could have been identical (and identical to John) had
the operation failed? Such puzzling questions are easily
generated using Lewis's approach. Some may see in this
evidence that Lewis's theory is .istakena Lewis's own
resolution is his well-known counterpart theory: John,
30hnl~ and 30hn2 are distinct. very s1.i~ar~ obJects
which are counterparts o£ one another. 31 John and
JahOl exist in distinct possible worlds, though they have
exactly ai.llar youth••
CHISHOLM ON THE LOOSE AND POPULAR SENSE OF IDENTITY
According to Chishola. whose views were discussed in
chapter two. puzzles like the ship o£ Theseus arise when we
take t.oo seriously what 18 really only "loose and popular" talk
of identity. The ai.take coaes fro. expecting a relation like
181s t.he 118ae ship as" to have tne saa. logical properties as
strict ident.ity.
Two i ••u•• ought to be distinguished. First, does the
r.lation IIA is the saae ship as BI • i.ply t.hat A and B a.re
identical. Ch1shola disagree. with the aSJority of
--------------------31. Lewi. wa. alao discussed in chapter four, section two.
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philosophers who answer "Yes." Second, is the relation an
equivalence relation. Anyone who answered the first question
affirmatively must also answer the second question
affirmatively. But Chisholm is free to answer that in the
loose and popular sense, identity among ships is not even an
equivalence relation. If this denial appeared puzzling,
Chisholm would hasten to add (1) that identity in the strict
and philosophical sense is certainly an equivalence relation,
and (2) that the loose and popular relation, Uis the same ship
as," is undoubtedly an equivalence relation for all practical
purposes.
SECTION 3
FISSION AND THE NECESSITY OF NON-IDENTITIES
I have already noted at least one way in which fission
puzzles are relevant to our concern with modal properties,
namely, that such puzzles are readily interpreted as requiring
a Humean ontology along the line of either Quine or Chisholm,
and that such ontologies are (if the arguments in chapters one
through four are successful) incompatible with any
straightforward attribution of modal properties to obJects. We
now consider the further connections that have been thought to
exist by Chandler and Nozick.32
32. Chandler, "Rigid Designation," 1975; and Nozick,
Philosophical Explanations, Part I, 1981.
-178-
V.3 FISSION AND NECESSITY
My overall assessment is very critical. The ideas of
Chandler and Noz1ck lead dIrectly into a puzzling morass of
their own making (see subsection 3.2 below) and the
counterexaaples they propose to the necessity of identi'tiea are
based on .any questionable assumptions. While I share 'their
conviction that -fission puzzles are relevant to questiol~s of
.odalit.y~ the connections have been traced at least as ~...ell
traditional Huaeans like Quine and Chishola, as well as by
Lewis. I shall concentrate on Noz1ck' 5 presentation bet::auae it
18 the .oat £ully developed and to .y aind .ost fully r,~vealo
the weaknesses o£ the approach.
3.1 N02ICK AND CLOSEST CONTINUERS
Nozick argues at length :for what he calls a ··closest
cont.inuer" and Wiggins calls a Ubest candidate" account. of
identity through t1ae. Concentrating on fission puzzlE~s.
Nozick says" "To be soa.thing later is to be its close~lt
cont.inuer. ": 33
The closest continuer view presents a necessary
condition for identity; soa.thing at t2 is not
the sa•• entity aa x at tl i£ it is not x's
closest. cont.inuer D And "closest" a.ans closer than
all others; 1£ two things at t2 tie in closeness,
then neither is th. saas .nt1ty as x. However,
soa.thing aay be the closest continuer o£ x without
being clo•• enough to be x. 34
Noz!ck's language suggests a certain picture, one to which
33. Nozick. 1981" p.33.
34. Nozick. 1980, p.34.
-179-
V.3 FISSION AND NECESSITY
he is not adverseo If one speaks of a "war.eat costu" there 1s
an a8suaption that one has aore than one coet and that should
soaething happen to it, another of your coats would be your
war.est. It is only a short step to cases of contingent
diYersity a.ong obJects o£ the aaae kind. At leasL soae of the
fis.ion puzzles~ diagra••ed 8S before,
A
--
B doainant claimant
..... C recessive claiMant
are described aa situations in which Band C are both
"·continuers·· o£ A. B is in £act the closest continuer. but had
it £a11ed to exist, C would have been the closest continuer.
Thus A and C are contingently non-1dent1cal. 35 Noz1ck,
without endorsing a apeci£ic exa.ple. arrives at this
conclusion.
It certainly appear. that 80.e counterexaaple should
••erge. eyen to Kr1pke'a specific cla1., the
n.c•••ity of non-identities. £roa closest continuer
cona1derat1ona. 36
My aain intereat is in relating these concerns to
aodality, i~ ~art1cular_ the necessity of non-identities. I
suspect that there 1. considerable trut~ in Noz1ck 6 s ideas
about how our notion of " 011 • 8 F·· works. But. does sny of this
provide a convincing counterexa.ple to the necessity of
identiti••? I now give three reasons £or doubting that. Ubest
35. S•• longer note A.
36. Noz1ck, 1981, p.659.
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candidat.e" or ··closest continuer" theories succeed.
3.2 THE PROBLEM OF JUMPS
A serious d1£f1culty for the closest continuer scheme is
that it rapidly entw~nes itself in puzzles concerning whether a
recessive claimant can inherit an identity title £roa a
deceased doa1nant claiaant. Depending on whether one sees the
continuer sche.o as a description or an inYention~ the puzzles
will appear as either £urther evidence that our ordinary saae-F
concepts are not equivalence relations or as evidence that the
closest continuer scheaa fails aa a resolution.
Suppose with Chandler that the spa~io-te.porally
continuous ship 18 the doa1nant claiaant. What happens when it
is destroyed in a fire? Does the recessive claim take over?
Does it aatter how auch tiae pass•• between the dlv1s1on and
the :fire?
(I)
A
B
-------~J. JUllp
~
------c
Suppose the rece••ive_ reasse.bled ship C becoaes the original
ship A after the £ire. Then The8eu8~e ship makes a spectacular
Juap through apace am indicated by th& red line. Such a Jump
would violate four conditions that are £requently suggested as
nece.aary for ordinary Judgaentm about the continuity through
ti•• o£ physical obJects: apatio~te.poral connectedness~
qualitative sia11arity fro. ao••nt to .o.ent~ continuity (with
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replenishment permitted) of composition end causal
connectedness from moment to moment. 37 Such Jumps £a11 to
fit our ordinary notion of bodili continuity. As a
recom.endation. they would require considerable
Just1£icat1on--Just1£ication which no proponent of a beat
candidate theory has even tried to offer.
Sllppoe8 II JUllpS" are impossible. Two other posaibil i ties
are d1agra••ed below:
<II)
B
A
(III)
B
-- --
--c
If the doainant claimant lasts for a long tim~ after the
division,. then (II) conflicts w!-c.h 'the ver1' notion o£ S
doa1nant cla1aant. far a de£ender of the closest continuer
ache.a. there is a sia11ar d1f£lculty with <III): it would
require that the d1vision be sharp and that the dOMinant
claiaant not linger at all. But this would sega to require a
overly deta11@d knowledge of the division process~ Identity or
non-identity would be a aatter of seconds. Here is a case that
pu~:zles Nozick:
••• it ssea. absurd that there should be soae sharp
teaporal line which aakes the difference to whether
or not ~he person continues to live in the other
body. ("Doctor, there~s only one 1l1nute left! Hurry
to end the life in the old body so the person caD
live on 1n the new one." And out of which body would
thee. worda coae?)38
37. Hirsch. 1982, especially Chapter 7_ containa a detailed
d1ucuaa1on of the four conditions.
38. Noz1ck, 1981. p.~4_
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The problem o£ Juaps is 8 morass into which talk o£ best
continuers naturally leads. What are we to make of this?
Suppose Nozick and Chandler are aetaphysical inventors who
intend to racc••end a coherent~ plausible resolution to fission
puzzles; the difficulties created by JUMPS would count heavily
against their reco•••ndation. If he is a discoverer~ then
Juapa are also a problea. For suppose they are intending to
d••crib. our ordinary conceptual acheae; that there are
con£llctlng intuitions 1s eo••thing which 1m clear without
considering puzzling Juap cases. Perhaps Noz1ck and Chandler
would allow that their description 1a puzzling and maintain
that a good description o£ a puzzling practice should locate
the proble. area.. For exa.ple_ it aight be thought a merit of
a gra••ar that it correctly divided sentences into "clearly
gra••atical ~ II lDc:learly ungra••atic:al ~ I. and "borderl ine. II I
doubt that any convincing counterexamples are going to evolve
fro. the borderline phenoaena associated with £isaion puzzle8.
It is use£ul to isolate what I shall call the eE·~.ncipl~
of internal develop.ent which aainta1ns that identity depends
only on the internal arrangement and developaent of an obJect'B
aatter and 1s not a££ected by external events. Noz1ck
explicitly challenges this principle while Wiggins explicitly
de£enda 1t. 39 Nozick writes.
1£ x at tla. t is the saae individual as y at later
39. See longar note D.
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time t', that can depend only upon facts about x~ y,
and the relationships between thea. No fact about
any other existing thing is relevant to (deciding)
whether x at t is (part of the same continuing
individual as) y at t'.40
Wiggins considers a siailar principle,
•.. £or a relation R to be constitutive of the
identity of a and b, a's having :R to b must be such
that obJects distinct £roM a or ~ are irrelevant to
whether a has R to b. 41
Chandler and Nozick aa1ntain that at least some fission
puzzles are best resolved by denying the principle of internal
develop.ant. On their v1aw, whether or not A is identical with
8 depends not only on the internal development of the
AC-history but also on details of the AB-history. I have
argued that such a denial leads to a difficulty with Juapa.
3.3 A CLOSER LOOK AT THE PREKISES
One might think of the difficulties sketched above as an
awkward but non-fatal defect. No position in the area appears
to be without some such awkwardness. Let us turn then to a
closer look at the many assumptions made by Chandler and Nozick
in supposing that the closest continuer schema generates
counterexaaples to the necessity of identities.
Modal puzzles based on the closest continuer schema have a
co••on structure. So as not to preJudge the question as to
whether cross-temporal identities are strict identities, let
40s Nozick. 1981, p.31.
41. Wiggins, 1980, p.96.
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"=F=II abbreviate "1s the same F as. It The first case is one in
which there is a branch. In the second case, there is no
branch.
Case 1
A
B
.....
..... -C
Case 2
A
A = B
A = C
A = c- in case 2
C = c-
xrt;#h y. ~> -<>x=y
The puzzle ache.a:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(N-I)
Virtually all of the premises are problematic. Chandler and
Nozick face serious obstacles in atteRpting to pin the blame on
the necessity of ident1tiesu In keeping with the spirit (which
I questioned above) of the closest continuer approach, let us
accept the first three pre.iaes. Of the remaining three. there
is good reason to challenge (4) and little reason to reJect
(NI) without an alternative.
As noted in chapter three~ a number of writers maintain
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that Utransworld ll identity statements need to be Justified in
terDS o£ the actual origins o£ obJects. 42 If they are
right_ then the problem with Noz!ck'a putative cases of
contingent non~ident1ty is with,
(4) C = Cit.
If the tiae and circu••tances of C'. origin are so di££erent
fro. those of C*'. origin then whet reason is there to think
that the two are identical? If identity stateaenta are~ as
Noz1ck and Chandler aaintain. sensitive to external
c1rcu.stances~ then why not conclude that C does not exist in
the second situation and that it is B which is identical to C*?
.. .
AA
______ 8
--------==...
...... -- - C .......... c-
'--- _~So."""'e. -a.~c:.'4"
What is at issue is whether it 18 the sameness of origin or
sameness of configuration and aatter which dcainates in
cross-world 1dent1£icat1ons. An emphasis on origin would be
compatible with a reJection of the principle of internal
development but would also undermine challenges to the
necessity o£ identities along the lines suggested by Chandler
and Noz1ck .. I see no aoro reason to accept C = c- than to
accept B = C-: hence, I see 808e reason to distrust both. The
two possibilities illustrate the need to distinguish carefully
between challenges to the principle of internel developMent and
42. Chapter four, section three.
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challenges to the necessity of identities.
Christopher Lowe o£fers an interesting reason £or
reJecting C = C- and accepting B = C- in the case o£ Theseus'
ship.43 He bases his argument on two .sin preaises: first p
that. a ship cannot have an: ·'int.errupted existence" in which 1 t
exists_ goes out of existence. end then exists again; and
second. that distinct sh1po cannot share the bulk of their
parts at a t1... It follows that there could not be a
continuous .hip-path linking A and C. sine. £or a per1~d of
tiJle a:£ter the "branching U starts there aren't enough parts for
two ships.
A
B renovated ship
- C
But there is no reason why the history between A and C- could
not be that of 8 single ship. Lowe concludes that there is a
s1gni£icant di££erence between the A-C and the A-C- paths and
that we can reasonably conclude that A=B=C- and C ¢ c-.
I find Lowe's approach to the puzzle, which does not
challenge the necesaity o£ identities, to be at least as
satisfying aa Noz1ck#s approach. 44
3.4 GENERAL COMMENTS ON NOZICK'S POSITION
In the previous section, we noted two profoundly d1££erent
43. Lowe" "On the Identit.y of Artifacts," 1982, PPgS-e.
44. Further remarks on Lowe are contain in longer note E.
-187-
V.3 FISSION AND NECESSITY
attitudes towards the ship of Theseus. For philosophers in the
tradition o£ Huae, the puzzle provided evidence that our Ul ooae
and popular Oi 89nse of identity required complex analysis and
&upplementationa Others saw in it the need for r~801ut1on
short o£ introducing IIpriaary obJect.s," "temporal alic8s,II etc:.
Nozick departs £roa both of these traditions in ways that can
generate confusion. He freely acknowledges that the closest
continuer approach leads to ana••lies ~t least aa severe 8a any
that it purports to solve; it aimply puah~B back the
di££iculties a level. The assumption co••on to both attitudes
described in section one is th~t no good arguaent could be
prea1sed on 3 contradictory theory. A logician will remind us
that "anyt.hing follows froB 8 contradiction."
Perhaps Nozick is providing a description of how we are
inclined to aake Judgaents of .IS8IlS Fit. In this regard, I
suspect he is quite success£ul. I certainly feel the pull o£
the intuitions he describes in cases of body snatchers, brain
transplants~ etc. But if, as he admits* these intuitions lead
to antinom1es_ then he has come to the traditional Humean
conclusion using slightly d1££erent exasples. Why not stick
with the ship of Theseus? And 1£ our ordinsJ:·y JudgMents are
contradictory, why not racoa.end a better, strict and
philosophical. sense of identity? Aa it stands, attacks on the
necessity of identities based on the closest continuer scheme
appear to be of a piece with Carneades suggestion during
antiquity that £iss1on puzzles disproved the transitivity of
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1dentit1es. 45 Nozick supplies additional SBpport for the
long&tand1ng Hu.ean contention that our loose and popular sense
of identity is contradictory; as such~ it is a use£ul
counterweight to W1gg1ns~ valiant efforts to show that ordinary
talk 1. coherent. But does it provide us with a "thBory o£
identityU?--Not in the sense Most philosophers have wanted D
namely, a consistent, compelling way o£ sorting out and
describing identity claiaa.
45. Chiahola, 1969, p.85.
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LONGER NOTES
A. Kr1pke popularized the phrase ··the necessity o£
identit.ies.·1 A at.andard theorea of .odel logic 1s,
CNI) (x)(y)[x=y => CJx=yl,
which £ollowa £roa
(x) (x=x)
and the •••uaption that predicates for.ad fro. the identity
relation and Bodal operators are leg1t1aate aubet1tution
instance. o£ Le1bniz's law.
CLL) (x)(y)[x=y =) CFx =) Fy)].
B. I noted in chapter two the s1ailarities between Chisho18's
ontology o£ pr1aary obJects and Qu1ne~s tsaporal parts. Each
follows Huae in constructing ordinary obJects fro. other
entities with which the ordinary person is not explicitly
concerned. For conven1ence~ I refer to ontologies which have
this feature aa ··Huaean ontologies. M
c. It 1s frequently suggested that Hu.e~s eKa.ple is too
extra•• and that a .o••nt~B reflection wiJ.l reveal that one haa
a case in which the saae congregation--lIchurch u in one sense o£
the word--coaea to occupy a distinct. bUild1ng--··church" in
another sense. 46 But before disaissing Hu.&~s church 80
46a Wiggins. 1980. p.198.
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read11y~ two points should be noted. First, in Japan, where
many o£ the ancient building aaterials are extraaely fragile,
the historic temples are rebuilt every few years. 47 It is
co••on to speak of lithe saa. teaple" where 80se would require
us to say. strictly speaking. there was 11 8 distinct though
siailar t ••ple with tho aaa. foundation. 1I The residents of
Nantucket shew a .1ailer ··looseness" in their re1dent1flcat1ons
of house. which have been frequently "destroyed" by the
weather. Second, even if Hu•• ~s exaaple is too extram•• he
provides the aaterials £or .ore convincing cases such as Sydney
Shoeaaker-e:
In 1944 the Gar.ana destroyed the £our-century-old
bridge of Santa Trin1ta in Florence. Six years later
it was decided that it (1) should be rebuilt. On the
original site there now stands a bridge of s design
exactly like that uf the original. constructed by
Renaissance techniques. and built in part with the
original atonss (each standing in ita original
place). in part with new stones taken £roa the
original quarry. The facts are clsar g but how are we
to answer the qu,estion "Is the present bridge of
Santa Trinita the very bridge that spanned the Arno
four hundr8d years ago?·' One can i.ag1ne one person
saying IIThis 1s a aodern copy of a Renaissance bridge
tha t once stood here.·· and another. equa11y cogn1zan t
of the facta, saying uTh1e bridge haa been the pr1d~
o£ Florence £or £our centuries. u Clearly no factual
considerations could settle the issue between the••
And s third persen a1ght say~ not unreasonably. "You
are Just disput.ing about words."48
D. What I aa calling the principle o£ internal dev~lop.ent
47. Observation by Yutaka Va.a.atc.
48. Shoeaaker. Self-Knowledge and Sel£-Identity, 1963, p.29.
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playa a aign1£icant role in Nathan SalMon's Reference and
E•••nc8* 1981. In the .sin body of the book he finds the
principle I-exceedingly plauaible, alaoet to the point of being
indubitable (p.211>,·· and sugge.ts that Kripke tacitly appeal~
to it in an .££or~ to "derive ms••ntial!•• from the theory of
ref.r8nce (p.~;." But in an appendix Salmon reJects the
principle Cp.229) after considering Chandler'. treat.ent of the
ship o£ Th•••ua.
E. Lowe'. approach asy b. preferable to that of Chandler and
Noz1ck. but it ia not without difficulties. Two aee.
noteworthy. First, like Chandler and Nozick~ in giving up the
principle o£ internal develop.ent, Lowe invites the proble. of
Juapa discussed in aub••ction 3.2. What i£ one were to start
to renovate the ship of Theseus and then atop because the
replace.ent parts ware £ound to be defective. It would seem
that the original parts that were reMoved could be returned to
their original places without creating a new ship_ but this
appears i.possible on Lowe~s account. Second, I do not share
Low.~a con£idence that the rsnovation path has 8 stronger claim
to identity than does the path of the r~constructed ship; a
museu. curator could with Justification argue that the
reasaeMbled. original parts had a greater claiM to be the
authentic ship 0% Theseus.
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